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This thesis is a work of International History and an investigation of the birth of inter-
African relations from Ghana’s Independence in March 1957 to the establishment in May 1963 
of Africa’s first and wholly owned political organisation, the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) in Addis Ababa. The OAU’s foundation charter was and still stands as the first and 
longest-lasting unanimously approved agreement by African states in post-colonial African 
history. Its real historical importance, this thesis contends, is its contribution to the formal 
adoption of the lasting nation-state system in Africa as all signatories gave their unanimous 
support to the sanctity of their states’ right to sovereignty. This thesis therefore uncovers the 
grand strategies and ensuing diplomacy of three African states – Ghana, Egypt, and Senegal – 
during their decolonization period and charts the changing course of these states’ policies as 
diplomatic rifts emerged over how to reach the goal of unity. This period of African history thus 
saw mass propaganda campaigns, massive political interference in the affairs of other states, and 
several attempts by leaders to undermine other African regimes to the point of assassination, 
which situates this period as an African continent and its OAU as not looking outward, but 
inward. The long road to the foundation of the OAU was therefore the moment when a 
postcolonial African Regional Order was established where the rules of the game regulating 
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Introduction 
This thesis is a work of International History and an investigation of the birth of inter-
African relations from Ghana’s Independence in March 1957 to the establishment in May 1963 
of Africa’s first and wholly owned political organisation, the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) in Addis Ababa. The OAU’s foundation charter was and still stands as the first and 
longest-lasting unanimously approved agreement by African states in post-colonial African 
history. Its real historical importance, this thesis contends, is its contribution to the formal 
adoption of the lasting nation-state system in Africa as all signatories gave their unanimous 
support to the sanctity of their states’ right to sovereignty. Furthermore, the signatories designed 
the charter with an important goal in mind. Despite giving the organisation the goal of forming a 
united front to navigate issues in world affairs, the main motivation of the charter’s designers 
was to look inward, as well as to address and terminate problems with one another. Having 
witnessed six years of tumultuous inter-African relations, the charter’s architects devised a set of 
rules regulating the proper conduct of African states with each other and the protection of the 
right of African states over the conduct of their own affairs.  
The signing of the charter in May 1963 and the establishment of the state system was 
never a foregone conclusion. Six years prior, during the first few months of Ghana’s 
independence, a mood of optimism and cooperation reigned over inter-African relations. As this 
thesis will demonstrate, every independent African state supported the idea of cooperating to 
achieve the same goal – the end of colonialism in Africa. Several worrying problems emerged in 
the following year, however, owing to the way African states conducted themselves in 
continental affairs in pursuit of this goal. As this thesis contends, a major reason underpinning 
the tumultuous relations between independent African states was a series of disagreements over 
how cooperation could be achieved and how they were to proceed to reach their common goal. 
In other words, although there was unanimity behind the goal of forging an African continent 
free of colonial domination, there was no consensus on what formed the means to this end. 
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African leaders therefore began to realise that their actions were sometimes not only working at 
counter-current to each other, but also that some states actively took the liberty to undermine 
others either to achieve the same objective, or to reach other overlapping goals. Cooperation 
towards the same end was therefore proving very tricky to achieve, and this is the theme that 
formed the backdrop of the erratic and often chaotic relations between African states from 1958 
until 1963. This account of inter-African relations will also posit that the many rifts between 
African states and their reconciliation at Addis Ababa was not caused by a single crisis, but by 
collection of issues built up over these five years of state interaction towards the same desire to 
cooperate to bring an end of colonialism in Africa. 
The mood of hopefulness that swept the continent in 1957-8 very quickly gave way to 
mutual suspicion, competition, and rivalry. An important factor lay behind this change in mood. 
The state-building processes underway in these states were at fault. Leaders of new African 
states aiming to give their new state a direction and build consensus in their domestic polities 
caused the rise of competing ideologies and beliefs in how the continent should take its political 
shape. These in no way negated the idea that states held the desire to terminate colonialism on 
the continent, but these ideologies and beliefs – often varying from state to state – overlapped 
this shared desire. It was precisely this reason why African states could often compete and rival 
one another despite wanting to reach the same end. This narrative therefore engages with an 
emerging and very popular idea in scholarship which posits that some African leaders at the 
time, notably Kwame Nkrumah, held beliefs that the aim of their anticolonial struggle was not 
only to free Africa from its colonial past, but also affect an international reordering of power 
relations to terminate colonialism the world over. Leaders like Nkrumah therefore believed that 
the first step to bring a more just system of international relations was to form a large vehicle like 
a formidable bloc of African states, commanded by a strong centralised power structure to break 
through the remaining chains on the continent.1 Nkrumah’s idea to affect change on a global 
scale through a very rigid power structure called the Union of African States (UAS) overlapped 
the shared desire to rid Africa of colonialism and brought friction in African relations since not 
all leaders agreed to the idea of the UAS. This thesis, however, breaks with this emerging field of 
inquiry for an important reason. Unlike scholars like Adom Getachew contend, leaders like 
 
1 Adom Getachew, Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2020), 1-2, 110. 
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Nkrumah did not fail to meet their continental and international ambitions because their ideas 
were upended by others during an ideational battle, but because of how the leaderships of new 
African states acted in inter-African affairs.2 While this thesis acknowledges that ideas were 
important, a very close inspection of these leader’s deeds and not only their words is required as 
the theatre of inter-African relations was often where the buck dropped. 
The connection between the leaderships of newly independent states and their polities 
was very important as they can explain why inter-African relations in this period were so 
unstable. With each emerging from a successful anti-colonial struggle where important domestic 
promises were made and had to be kept, they began to understand that with the loss of national 
unity acquired during the struggle for independence came the threat of domestic opposition.3 
African leaders were therefore reluctant to let go of their anti-colonial discourse because of its 
enormous popularity and discovered that using it in a wider African context was an attractive 
tool to securitise their new regimes. Furthermore, all felt that if they were able to influence 
African politics and shape the continent they would build on their legitimacy at home. 
Conversely, if a leader fell out of favour and failed to make their mark on the African political 
scene they would run the risk of losing their popularity and justification to rule. They were thus 
stuck between a rock and a hard place; each new state leader had to find a winning combination 
on how to juggle their own ambitions and security, the growing needs and pressures at home, and 
achieving foreign policy goals. This thesis provides the explanation of why the newly made 
independent African states competed so fiercely against each other for continental dominance 
and how their leaders overcame their differences in 1963 and agreed to come together to build 
their first African institution to regulate continental affairs. The conduct of inter-African 
relations and the implementation of foreign policies in this period were influenced heavily by 
their country’s domestic politics and state-building.4 Thus, this study examines the effect of the 
domestic challenges in the state how their leaders chose to craft foreign policies from which 
arose conflict or cooperation. The story of inter-African relations in the period of 1957 to 1963 
 
2 Adom Getachew’s book is persuasive if you only take her account from a vacuum of ideas. Very little attention is 
paid to how these African leaders chose to establish and wage their foreign policies to make their ideas a reality.  
3Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa: The Politics of Independence (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), Chapter V. 
4 Recent scholarly attention to the International Relations of the Global South are showing that it was very common 
in this period for the foreign policies of states to be influenced by their domestic politics. See, Imad Mansour, 
Statecraft in the Middle East: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics and Security (London: IB Tauris, 2016). 
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was therefore a story about the forces and processes of integration of African states into an 
acceptable system of rules regulating their conduct with one another.   
With neither military nor economic power to use as tools to gain any influence in Africa, 
states instead used an incredibly effective public diplomacy to reach their foreign and domestic 
policy goals. This means that during the early post-independence period, inter-African relations 
effectively functioned as a multi-lateral dialogue in which each state had an input and the others 
felt a corresponding output. Since these were new states in the making with a population 
impatient for change, the effects of something seemingly anodyne like a leader taking a new 
position in African affairs had the capacity of turning on a major alarm bell in the other 
countries. Any new turn in this diplomatic dialogue held the threat of a terrible disproportional 
effect on other countries like the erosion of solidarity and legitimacy for the new regimes. In this 
great diplomatic dialogue specific themes and issues emerged in 1958-60 and became hotly 
contested because they had important effects for the new nations and their future as functioning 
independent states. While there were a host of contested issues that arose, they nevertheless 
narrow down to the following: what it meant to be an ‘African’, how should the independent 
African nations cooperate and respond to the continued colonial presence, how the African states 
should band together to confront their own continental affairs and engage with the world, and 
finally, defining what was meant by ‘African unity’ as an important ideal. 
Not only did their interactions determine what political scientists term the ‘regional 
order’ in Africa – the rules of the game of continental diplomacy – by which they would conduct 
their foreign affairs on the continent in the future, but they also helped cement Africa’s place in 
the world and its interactions with it.5 Rules were agreed to at Addis Ababa; for instance the 
agreement that state sovereignty was sacrosanct, helped ward off the slew of attempts by African 
leaders of interfering in the affairs of other states to improve their relative continental position, or 
worse, to topple one another. This was a period in which several contentious ideological issues 
were also finally settled and removed as potential sources of conflict. The diplomacy in this 
period is particularly important to track because of the changes in these definitions and what they 
 
5 Christopher Clapham makes a similar point that the foundation of the OAU helped channel inter-African relations. 
It must be said, however, that his book does not include the Arab states of Africa, which are extremely important. 
See, Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 110. 
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can tell us about the way in which the African leaders of new states thought of themselves, their 
goals, and how they thought they could have an impact on the continent, and in some cases, the 
world.  
The states most covered in depth in this story – Ghana, Egypt, and Senegal – make up the 
protagonists of this narrative as they were the most involved in African affairs; the narrative of 
inter-African relations in the 1957-63 period also revolves around them because they were the 
most influential in changing the course of inter-African politics. They were most influential 
because their domestic politics necessitated a very strong stand in inter-African politics in order 
to cement their power at home. They were also the most influential in laying the ground for 
important ideas that were debated throughout this period and they did so in numerous ways. In 
the cases of Egypt and Ghana, who rushed onto the African political scene to engage the 
continent into rival anti-colonial directions, Gamal Abdel Nasser and Kwame Nkrumah used a 
mixture of propaganda campaigns and the hosting of conferences to allow their message to 
spread throughout the continent. Conferences were indeed very important events for inter-
African affairs as their resolutions would dictate states’ positions on common African issues like 
colonialism, economic cooperation, alliances, and the like. Conferences, notably in Monrovia in 
1960 and Casablanca in 1961, were just as heated as the pan-African conferences of the 1940s 
but also so polarising that they determined systems of alliances. They also permitted states to 
congregate and debate issues which were settled. One such important issue – Senegal being its 
largest backer – was that the agreement that sovereignty was sacrosanct helped ward off the slew 
of attempts (common in the late 1950s and early 1960s) of some African leaders of interfering in 
the affairs of another state for their own benefit, or worse, to topple one another. Thus, the period 
of 1957-63 was a period in which several contentious ideological issues were also finally settled, 
removing them as potential sources of conflict. Some points of ideological contention that were 
settled in the summit in Addis Ababa in May 1963 were the one true meaning of ‘African unity’ 
and what was meant by ‘African’.   
Ghana and Egypt feature prominently in the story as both ruthlessly pursued cavalier 
foreign policies and tried a mixture of enticement and bullying as means for their own ends.6 
 
6 Nasser’s paternalism is made quite bare in his own text. He likens Sub-Saharan Africa as a ‘dark land’ in need of 
Egypt’s guiding light. In his foreign policy in Africa, he was also using a method of ‘carrot and stick’ to goad other 
states to do his bidding like using promises of loans to foreign leaders, or support for their domestic opponents. See, 
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Both stood to win a great deal from the rising tide of African challenges to colonial rule, and this 
motivated them to design and pursue very aggressive foreign policies in Africa. Both had large 
ambitions for the political future of the continent (they wanted to see it conform to their own 
image and wanted to aggrandise their state’s power) and their large role in it, and both had a 
reason to achieve this role for domestic purposes. Nkrumah and Nasser were authoritarian 
leaders of new states and maintaining popularity was crucial for their legitimacy underpinning 
their leadership and their survival. These leaders made grandiose promises to their populations 
about becoming a guiding light for Africa and a successful eradication of colonialism on the 
continent (Nasser) and becoming the force to send the colonial powers packing and forge African 
unity (Nkrumah). The stakes were high: they had to deliver or risk undermining their own rule.7 
By 1960, the situation in Africa heated up diplomatically because of the sudden dramatic 
increase in the number of independent states on the continent, most of them from the former 
French West Africa. Diplomatic activity picked up at a really fast pace, and alliances formed on 
the continent as a result of mutual suspicion of each other’s motives, and of either agreement 
with or resistance to the policies of France, Ghana, or Egypt. 
Scholarly Overview of African History in the Leadup to the Formation of the OAU 
There are several recent accounts of the diplomacy of African states which are very 
detailed and good, but their scope remains compartmentalized into regions – North Africa, Sub-
Saharan Africa, and the Middle East. Strangely, much of the scholarship alludes to the fact that 
there were political tensions between states in the lead up to the foundation of the OAU, yet keep 
their accounts superficial, brief, and with a lack of in-depth analysis.8 As for Egypt’s foreign 
policy in Africa, it has never been seriously considered since the opening of several state 
 
Gamal Abdel Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution (Cairo: Mondiale Press, 1955), Fathi al-Dib, Abdel Nasser et 
la revolution algérienne (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1985), and Jean-Robert Lalancette, "The Third Scramble for Africa: 
Egypt’s Continental Policy in The Early Years of the Decolonization Period." (2015) MPhil, University of Oxford. 
There is no better work which illustrates Nkrumah’s own ‘carrot and stick’ approach to African diplomacy and his 
paternalistic attitude towards other state ideologies in Africa than Scott Thompson’s excellent work based on 
Ghanaian foreign ministry documents which were briefly available after Nkrumah was toppled in a coup in 1966. 
See, Scott W. Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 1957-1966: Diplomacy, Ideology, and the New State (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1969). 
7 It is quite remarkable just how much political leadership in Africa and the Third World in general resembled the 
politics described by Machiavelli. See, Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Harvey Mansfield (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998), especially chapter XIX. 
8 Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System, and Robert Vitalis, “The Midnight Ride of Kwame 
Nkrumah and Other Fables of Bandung (Ban-doong),” Humanity, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2013): 261-288. 
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archives. The only serious account was written in the 1970s and based on newspaper articles and 
speeches from Egyptian politicians. The author also seems to view Egypt’s relations with Africa 
through the lens of the Arab-Israeli Conflict as it infers that Egypt had an African policy mainly 
to counter Israel’s own African policy.9 Gaining access to Egyptian archives remains a problem, 
thus the inclusion of Egypt’s African policy in this narrative necessitated using a mixed use of 
primary sources from diplomatic archives (France and Belgium) as well as material found in 
Ghana, Tunisia, and Senegal.  
The best and most instructive monograph available on inter-African diplomacy in this 
period is Scott Thompson’s Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 1957-1966: Diplomacy, Ideology, and the 
New State because the author had rare access to the archives of the Ghanaian Foreign Ministry 
right after a coup toppled Kwame Nkrumah in 1966. While it does give an interesting account of 
Nkrumah’s ideological underpinnings for his foreign policy and Ghana’s relationship with 
Egypt, it does not go into much depth with Ghana’s troubled relationship with its Francophone 
West African neighbours or their political development.10 There are several recent accounts of 
the diplomacy of African states which are very detailed and good, but their scope remains 
compartmentalized into regions – North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East. 
Christopher Clapham’s excellent book on the International Relations of Africa, for example, only 
considers the interaction of states south of the Sahara.11 Michael Willis’ excellent and much-
needed book on the Maghreb does give a fantastic account and convincing explanations behind 
the particularities of the foreign policies of Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco.12 Yet it does not 
engage with the very prominent African identity of these states and their history of interaction 
with the continent as a whole. These were obviously important: the FLN attended every African 
conference from 1957 to 1963, as did Tunisia and Morocco.  
 
9 Tareq Ismael, The U.A.R. in Africa: Egypt’s Policy under Nasser (Evanston, Il: Northwestern University Press, 
1971). 
University Press, 1971). There is another book which does help determine some interesting motivations (some 
examples of paternalism evident in the articles) behind Egypt’s African policy, but it does not attempt to sketch out 
a narrative. Khair el-Din Haseeb ed., The Arabs and Africa (London: Croom Helm, 1985).  
10 Scott W. Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 1957-1966: Diplomacy, Ideology, and the New State (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1969). 
11 Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996). 
12 Michael Willis, Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the 
Arab Spring (London: Hurst & Company, 2012). 
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 The Connections between North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa in Scholarship 
One of the aspects of this study is to add the growing body of work uncovering the scale 
and importance of connections and relationships between North and West Africa despite them 
being seen as two distinct regions. Certainly, the most curious aspect of African studies in 
general is how compartmentalised it is. Africa, after all, is an incredibly large continent, and 
splitting the continent into regional zones to conduct studies does carry some measure of sense. It 
is not uncommon, for instance, to see continental regions mentioned in studies like East Africa, 
West Africa, and North Africa. This is perfectly understandable for those willing to study a 
regional group of African states but when Africa has been considered as one whole in studies it 
has largely been split into two units of study: North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa.13 Part of the 
answer why the split occurred has to do with the establishment of Area Studies as a discipline in 
the 20th Century which compartmentalised ‘different’ parts of the world for study. Edward 
Alpers, Allen Roberts, and Paul Tiyambe Zeleza remark in their overviews and critiques of 
African Studies that the idea of Area Studies grew as part of an American project to 
compartmentalize areas of the world unknown to policymakers into regions which could start to 
be studies systematically.14 Thus, anthropologists and political geographers were put to work to 
divide up the world into neat, coherent parts based on supposed commonalities of language, 
ethnicity, politics, religion, and shared historical heritage. The result was a clear split onto the 
Sahara, with the continent of Africa split in two: the upper Arab third going to Middle East 
Studies, and Sub-Saharan Africa to the Africanists. This has become problematic for the 
following reasons: it has become difficult for researchers in either camp to conceive of a project 
spanning the divide since they have internalized the notion of the existence of many different 
‘Africas’.  
We can also point to another level of complexity. There are problems within the divisions 
themselves; for instance, in Middle East Studies, the Maghreb is thought of as being distinct 
from the Middle East (hence the name MENA, or Middle East and North Africa) and research on 
 
13 Jeffrey Herbst’s great account of African state-building, for example, focuses on Sub-Saharan Africa and leaves 
out North Africa. See, Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015).   
14 P.T. Zeleza, ‘African Studies and Universities since Independence’, Transition, Vol. 101 (2009): 110- 




topics including both regions of the Arab World are sparse. Some do exist, like Eugene Rogan’s 
famous history of the Arabs, but they remain very few.15 Particularly on diplomacy, these books 
are extremely scarce because despite the very heavy interaction between the two regions after 
independence. Michael Willis’ Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and 
Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring is a case in point; whilst it is a remarkable and 
much needed history of these three countries, its focus stresses on the Maghreb, and by doing so, 
helps project the image of the distinctiveness of the Maghreb from the Middle East and the rest 
of Africa. States of different regions interact with one another and do not necessarily pay any 
mind to artificial divisions. Colonial actors and even the African leaders included in this 
dissertation show often in sources that they had internalised the idea of the split. For instance, 
Moktar Ould Daddah spoke of his state, Mauritania, as being a bridge between a ‘Black Africa’ 
and a ‘White Africa’.16 In the African Middle Ages, the Arabs during the Islamic conquest of 
North Africa began to view the areas of the south through an ethnic lens - calling the people 
living in the Sahel (or the southern shore of the Sahara Desert) as part of Bilad al-Sudan – or 
‘land of the Blacks’.17  
The last decade, however, has spawned a new generation of historians to question if there 
ever had been a true disconnect between North and Sub-Saharan Africa. Taking on the 
misleading idea that the Sahara became a barrier to interaction during colonialism’s realignment 
of trade and politics to the European metropoles, many works have emerged showing that this 
was never the case. During the colonial period, Saharan connections were very much alive and 
saw important trade, travel, migration, and even economic activity continue between the shores 
of the Sahel.18 This dissertation adds something new to this body of scholarship by bringing the 
timeline of the story of the interactions between North and South Africa ahead from the colonial 
age to the period of African statehood. Whilst trade, migration, and travel did continue, the 
connection between North and Sub-Saharan Africa took on a new dimension as new state 
 
15 Eugene Rogan, The Arabs: A History (London: Penguin Books, 2009). 
16 “Communauté. 24 JUL. 1960. Mauritanie. UP 19.” VP 141, Fonds de la Vice-Présidence et Présidence du 
Conseil, National Archives of Senegal. 
17 François-Xavier Fauvelle, The Golden Rhinoceros: Histories of the African Middle Ages (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2018), 48. 
18 James McDougall and Judith Scheele, “Introduction,” in Saharan Frontiers: Space and Mobility in Northwest 
Africa, Ed. James McDougall and Judith Scheele (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012), and Ghislaine 
Lydon, On Trans-Saharan Trails: Islamic Law, Trade Networks, and Cross-Cultural Exchange in Nineteenth-
Century Western Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).   
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leaderships emerged from colonialism, began the process of building their new states, and 
undertook foreign relations with states beyond the Sahel. This theme forms the backdrop of 
inter-African relations in 1957-8 as new states met for the first time at official conferences in a 
symbolic show of their triumph over the former colonial overlords. This dissertation shows that 
the enthusiastic mood characterising their initial contacts in Accra in March 1957 quickly 
subsided to uncertainty, friction, and differences of opinion over the necessary challenge of 
forging a system of cooperation to bring the rest of Africa out of colonialism. From April 1958 
onwards, these initial contacts yielded the important debates and questions that would frame 
inter-African relations until their resolution at the OAU summit in May 1963. Questions over 
what constituted a true African identity, whom was fit or unfit to lead the continent to full 
decolonisation (and if it was right for one to do so), what form should cooperation take place, 
what were the true issues regarding the African continent, what were the agreed limits of the 
continent and its affairs, were African states’ new borders legitimate or illegitimate and if so, if it 
was right for foreign leaders to redress them. These were proof that the new leaderships held 
their own clashing opinions and visions over the future political shape of the continent. Their 
subsequent decisions on appropriate courses of action were to signal the start of diplomatic 
tensions which characterised inter-African relations until 1963.   
De-linking Cold War History from Africa’s History 
Recently, historians of Africa in the Middle Ages have worked tirelessly to bring their 
narratives into the wider focus of World History to prove that the continent – and not just North 
Africa – has been important to shaping the history of our world.19 These historians are lending 
help to a previous generation of Africanists like Cheik Anta Diop and Martin Bernal in the 
project of ‘Afrocentricity’. Coined by the late Ali Mazrui, this historical project aims to place 
Africa at the centre of the history of the world and to finally provide the counterpoint to 
Orientalist constructions of African History.20 Naturally, central to the project has been a 
conscious effort to properly evaluate the African contribution to other parts and peoples of the 
world. To achieve it, scholars have had to put “the African experience” first which required 
 
19 François-Xavier Fauvelle, The Golden Rhinoceros: Histories of the African Middle Ages, 14 and Michael Gomez, 
African Dominion: A New History of Empire in Early and Medieval West Africa, 4.  
20Ali Mazrui, “The Re-Invention of Africa: Edward Said, V. Y. Mudimbe, and Beyond,” Research in African 
Literatures, Vol. 36, No. 3 (2005): 77-9, 81. 
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placing African sources to the forefront.21 This movement in the study of Africa is tremendously 
important not only because it dismisses the assumption of Africans’ lack of a voice (if not 
irrelevance in the face of global processes) and also seeks to assess the level and effects of 
interaction between Africa and the rest of the world.  
This dissertation both pays homage to the project and yet in the attempt to be as accurate 
as possible, falls short on another aspect. The main purpose of this dissertation is to provide the 
perspective of the African states during the critical phase of their continent’s decolonisation. To 
bring the ‘African experience’ to the centre, great care was given to uncover and use a maximum 
amount of African diplomatic sources as opposed to relying on western sources. While I believe 
the maximum reliance on African sources was critical to correctly narrate the story of the coming 
together of the continent as one political unit as a genuine African story, this dissertation will not 
attempt to join the current of World History. The period of the new African states’ foreign 
relations under study has led me to urge caution to connect Africa with other global processes 
like the Cold War or the Afro-Asian movement. 1956-63 were critical years of the rebuilding 
stage of African politics after the start of decolonisation, and they were years when the new 
African states were more focused inward to continental affairs than to the wider world. Apart 
from Egypt, not much attention was paid by other African leaders to the 1955 Bandung 
Conference and its aftermath.22 Even the Cold War, whilst a major process on the world stage at 
this time, was not considered to be terribly important to African leaders when compared to their 
domestic and continental affairs. Since this work of international history places the experience of 
the African states at the forefront, it is therefore necessary to disentangle it from the current of 
another dominant field with a wider scope – Cold War History. 
For much of the previous two decades, the field of International History has been 
confounded under the seemingly all-consuming sub-field of ‘Cold War History’. Initially a 
project to understand and explain events after WWII using newly declassified archives from the 
United States (and its NATO allies) on one side and the former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc 
countries on the other, it slowly branched with scholars going to archives also going outside of 
 
21 Ibid, 77. 
22 Christopher Clapham makes a similar point in his book. See, Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International 
System, 126. This point is also addressed in chapter two as the leaders of independent African states met for the first 
time in April 1958 in Accra, there was resistance to Egypt’s idea that the conference they were attending was an 
extension of the Bandung Conference.  
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the Cold War’s European theatre to place other characters at the centre of narratives located in 
the ‘Third World’ in Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East.23 Perhaps this turn in Cold War 
History owes most to a pivotal book by Matthew Connelly about one of the most important 
events of Africa’s decolonisation, the Algerian War. In his A Diplomatic Revolution, Connelly 
explains that he sought to break the pattern of reliance on archival sources from the Cold War 
rivals (he used archives from Algeria and Tunisia) to build a better narrative by adding the 
perspective of the Algerian resistance movement to the French and American.24 Of specific 
concern to this generation of Cold War historians was to demonstrate the repercussions of the 
emerging states’ interaction with the main participants of the Cold War. Despite the inclusion of 
Third World states, the histories of their diplomacy were constructed in tandem with one, or 
sometimes, both the rival superpowers which makes the Cold War omnipresent and very 
influential in events in the Global South. Recent narratives have attempted to decouple their 
stories’ main characters from the superpowers, but somehow come back to the Cold War and its 
influence. In Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization, and the Third World Order, Jeffrey 
James Byrne narrates from the perspective of Ben Bella’s Algeria after independence, bringing 
much of the focus of the book on Algeria’s relations with other actors in the Global South. Yet 
whilst Byrne does succeed in delivering a postcolonial International History, he nonetheless 
demonstrates that Algeria’s push into the globalising world led it to become consumed by the 
Cold War despite their policies of non-alignment.25  
     International historians, during these past few years, have therefore become 
increasingly interested shifting the focus away from the Cold War to highlight the important state 
interactions within the Global South. While the Cold War rivalry was important to the course of 
international events, the foreign relations of newly decolonised states were especially crucial to 
 
23 Perhaps the greatest example of what was called ‘New Cold War History’, see John Lewis Gaddis, We Now 
Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). For great examples of Cold War History 
books using archives in the Global South, see Lorenz Luthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist 
World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), Paul Thomas Chamberlin, The Global Offensive: The United 
States, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Making of the Post-Cold War Order (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), and Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002). 
24 Connelly notes in his introduction that he was the first to consider breaking the mould of Cold War History’s 
reliance on American, European, or Soviet sources. See, Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s 
Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (Oxford: University of Oxford Press, 2002), vii.  
25 Jeffrey James Byrne, Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization, and the Third World Order (Oxford 




the shaping of politics within the Global South. It is somewhat curious, however, that the recent 
historiography is slowly picking up on this approach as it was indeed quite popular with many 
Western scholars of ‘Area Studies’ in the 1960s. Works like Malcom Kerr’s essay on inter-Arab 
politics, G.H. Jansen’s book on the interactions in the Afro-Asian world, and Immanuel 
Wallerstein’s study of inter-African politics (to name but a few) were arguing that the politics of 
the Global South were significant to the actors involved.26 What is incredible is that these 
scholars were not as removed as we are today from the Cold War (after all they lived and worked 
during it) and yet managed to keep away from the Cold War lens as much as possible to dare 
suggest that it was perhaps not the dominant factor in the political life of states in the Global 
South. So where does that leave the Cold War in an analysis of African politics in the 1950s and 
1960s? 
 No matter the approach adopted by International Historians of the Global South in the 
1950s and 1960s, the Cold War remains an ‘elephant in the room’ because it was spreading 
throughout the globe. While there were foundational moments of interaction within the Global 
South in this period,27 they produced the concept of ‘Non-Alignment’ and ‘Afro-Asia’, which 
was the reaction to both the retreating force of colonialism and the globalisation of the 
superpower conflict.28 In the middle of the decolonisation of empires of the 1950-60s, the Cold 
War spread throughout Asia through direct superpower involvement (Korea and South Vietnam) 
and the Middle East, notably in 1955-7 as a result of Egypt’s deal with the Soviet Bloc for new 
weaponry, the Suez Crisis, and finally the landing of American Marines in Lebanon to counter 
alleged Soviet and Egyptian influence.29 It would be a mistake, however, to believe that in the 
case of Africa the retreat of the colonial powers left a gaping chasm into which the Superpowers 
rushed, pulling the continent into the Cold War. While it was true in the case of Indochina (and 
then South Vietnam) where the French left only to be replaced incrementally by the Americans30 
 
26 Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1958–1964: A Study of Ideology in Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1965), G.H. Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment (London: Faber and Faber, 1966), and Immanuel Wallerstein, 
Africa: The Politics of Independence (New York: Random House, 1961). 
27 Christopher Lee, ed. Making a World after Empire: The Bandung Moment and Its Political Afterlives (Athens: 
Ohio University Press, 2010). 
28 G.H. Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment, prologue. 
29 For a great International History on the latter, see Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower 
Doctrine and the Middle East (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004). 
30 For a good recent example making this claim see, Max Hastings, Vietnam: An Epic Tragedy, 1945-1975 (London: 
William Collins, 2018). 
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and perhaps in a more muddled way with Soviet and American influence in the Middle East, in 
Africa it was different for a host of reasons which left the Cold War’s influence to a minimum 
from 1957-63.  
A key example illustrating the lack of superpower attention to Africa took place in 
correspondence between France and the United States in 1958. When de Gaulle regained power, 
he immediately set out to challenge the growing power of the United States to reinstate France as 
a great power. De Gaulle sent the Americans and the British a note asking to join them in direct 
involvement in the Lebanese Crisis at the behest of the Lebanese Government but to his 
astonishment, his request was ignored as they went ahead without France to land troops.31 This 
affront caused de Gaulle to cry foul over the NATO framework’s favouritism to the Anglo-
Saxon powers’ range of action, and he requested talks with them to prevent further affronts to 
France’s status and rights to act in world affairs, especially when it came to Africa.32 As a result, 
the three powers sat down in Washington in April 1959 and hammered out the specifics of their 
key interests in Africa. The Americans acknowledged that Africa was strategically important for 
the West because of its resources and geopolitical position. They also believed that the continent 
was going to be affected by the pressures of self-determination and that “it was essential that 
[change] should take place in an orderly manner and in the closest cooperation with the Western 
powers.” Most importantly, American officials explicitly stated that “the U.S. regards the 
European Powers as best equipped for the leading role” and that it supported any attempts at 
evolutionary self-determination.33 The United States, in short, acknowledged to the French that 
Africa was not their turf, thus recognising the French sphere of influence in Africa.  
One may point to a possible objection – the case of Egypt in the 1950s-60s– and say that 
the Cold War’s involvement was quite heavy, but when it came to the superpowers and Egypt it 
 
31 “M. Couve de Murville, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, à M. Roché, Ambassadeur de France à Beyrouth, 15 
juillet 1958,” and “M. Couve de Murville, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, aux Représentants Diplomatiques de 
France à Londres, Washington, 17 juillet 1958,” telegram reprinted in Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Documents 
Diplomatiques Français: 1958, Tome II (1er juillet – 31 décembre) (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1993), 76-7, 89-
91.  
32 Charles de Gaulle, “Lettre et Mémorandum au Général Eisenhower, Président des États-Unis d’Amérique, 17 
septembre 1958,” memorandum reprinted in Charles de Gaulle Lettres, Notes et Carnets: juin 1958 – décembre 
1960 (Paris: Plon, 1985), 82-84. 
33 “Memorandum of Conversation, April 16, 1959,” Memorandum reprinted in Glenn La Fantasie, Harriet Dashiell 
Schwar and Stanley Shaloff, ed, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960: Volume XIV, Africa 
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), 45-7. 
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was always the case that it regarded Egypt and its relationship to other states across the Suez 
Canal and not because of its affairs in Africa.34 The Soviet Union did start to have political and 
economic relations with African states frustrated with the West, starting in North Africa with 
Egypt in 1955 and in Sub-Saharan Africa with Guinea in 1959. At the time, it was Nikita 
Khrushchev’s hope that African states could be convinced of the Soviet Union’s ideology and 
side with the Eastern Bloc.35 Economic relationships were founded between the Soviet Union 
and African states and some small forms of aid was given, but the Soviets often found their 
attempts at setting up spheres of influence in Africa to be completely thwarted by the strong 
leaderships of these states (Guinea’s Sékou Touré and Gamal Abdel Nasser are prime 
examples).36 In any case, the Soviet Union’s economic aid given in forms of material was judged 
completely inadequate by the Guineans which undoubtedly gave it a bad reputation in this 
period.37 As a result, Soviet influence was kept out of Africa in this period. There was a case, 
however, where the Cold War did play a role on the continent - the Congo Crisis which started in 
1960. During the crisis, the Americans ramped up their diplomacy significantly in Africa to push 
away the Soviet diplomatic attempts to gain a toehold there and to undermine the rule of Patrice 
Lumumba, whom the Americans believed to be turning into a communist and new Fidel Castro. 
Yet American involvement did not surpass all other states involved because its efforts 
deliberately remained subordinated to the United Nations’ lead.38 The Congo Crisis, however, 
was the signal of the start of the trickling in of involvement (which really took off more 
significantly from the mid-1960s onward) on the continent by the superpowers, as colonial 
conflicts emerged in the Portuguese and Belgian colonies during decolonisation.  
 Superpower interest and involvement on the continent from 1956 to 1963 was further 
made negligible given the attitudes of the leaders of the new independent African states. One of 
 
34 It was true that the Soviet Union helped Egypt stage an Afro-Asian conference in Cairo in late 1957 in hopes it 
could get a toehold in Africa, but Egypt nixed these plans to prevent the Soviets from supplanting them in influence 
there. This story is given in detail in chapter two.  
35 Sergey Mazov, A Distant Front in the Cold War: The USSR in West Africa and the Congo, 1956-1964 
(Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2010), 13-4, 76-7, 92. 
36 Ibid, 28, 129-37, 181-6, 187-8. 
37 Mazov writes of a multitude of examples of the lack of foresight by the Soviets to deliver adequate aid which was 
often left to waste in ports because of insufficient distribution networks, spare parts, or advisors to help use 
equipment. See, ibid, 184-6. 
38 Emmanuel Gerard and Bruce Kuklick, Death in the Congo: Murdering Patrice Lumumba (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2015), chapter 4, and Sergey Mazov, A Distant Front in the Cold War: The USSR in West 
Africa and the Congo, 76-7, 92. 
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the revelations of using archives from North and West Africa – as opposed to archival material 
from the superpowers – was that the governments of the new African states did not pay much 
attention to the Cold War in this period. Leaders like Senghor, Nasser, Nkrumah, Bourguiba 
were all acutely aware of the superpower conflict and did address it from time to time in 
international forums, particularly at the United Nations, where they urged the Superpowers to 
disarm.39 Regarding African affairs, however, it is very clear that from 1956 to the establishment 
of the OAU in May 1963 they were focused instead on setting rules to govern inter-African 
relations (especially the restraint of intervention in each other’s affairs), the prospect of inter-
African cooperation in trade and international relations, the prospect of speeding up the process 
of continental decolonisation, and finally, establishing a common agreement on the future 
relationship between the continent and their former European colonisers. This dissertation, 
therefore, is justified to steer clear of being described as a story of the Cold War because it 
simply had not yet arrived in a meaningful way in Africa to alter the continent’s politics. Simply 
put, the decolonisation of Africa and its subsequent inter-state interactions until 1963 is not a 
Cold War story, but an African and European story.   
Notable Omissions from the Story 
There are notable omissions from this narrative because it was forced to narrow down the 
scope inter-African relations. As a result, some less important North African and Sub-Saharan 
states were relegated to the periphery or omitted entirely. States like Sierra Leone, Nigeria 
(which only began to throw its weight in African affairs in 1961-2 and lagged in influence 
behind Ghana), Niger, Upper Volta, Dahomey, and Libya do not feature prominently. States 
outside of West and North Africa are rarely mentioned for a few reasons: for one, many states 
only became independent much later in the story like Kenya and Tanganyika, when basic ideas 
of African unity and the desirability of one system of rules for regional relations or another were 
already well established in the continental discourse. Others, like Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, and Madagascar did not share contiguous borders with the protagonists and were 
 
39 A good instance is the May 1961 appeal of the Monrovia Group (a mixture of anglophone and Francophone 
African states, along with some Arab countries) to the superpowers that they should stop building nuclear weapons 
and begin disarming. According to the conference’s resolutions, this item came at the end of the agenda and 
therefore showing that continental politics was more important to them. See, “CHAS/26. Monrovia, Libéria, 12 mai 
1961.” Folder Unité Africaine Généralités (1960 à 1965), National Archives of Senegal. 
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therefore insulated from the harmful effects of relations with predatory neighbours like Morocco 
and Ghana.  
Issues in places like South Africa and the Portuguese colonies are also absent. This thesis 
does not negate the fact that West and Arab-African states did not consider problems in places 
like South Africa to be inconsequential. At the 1958 Conference of Independent African States, 
for example, African delegations addressed the racial problem in South Africa and the steps they 
ought to take together in protest.40 Yet problems in East and South Africa (with the exception of 
the Congo Crisis) at the time were issues that were not as polarising as the Mauritanian Question, 
or whether or not African states should rally together behind an anti-colonial policy against 
France. The largest issue which is not covered in minute detail in this narrative of postcolonial 
politics is the Congo Crisis.  
No rational scholar of African history could ever persuasively claim that the Congo Crisis 
did not matter and should be left out of a narrative because of it. Not only did it provide the first 
stand-off between the two rival superpowers on African ground, but it also resulted in the 
Western-assisted murder of a democratically elected African leader, Patrice Lumumba.41 The 
crisis also spurred the important African leaders of Ghana, Egypt, and Ethiopia to send military 
personnel to join a United Nations force to ensure it could restore peace, prevent the Katanga 
secession, and keep Lumumba in power. This evidence alone could potentially be wielded in 
support of its inclusion in a narrative of African affairs in the period under study and to include 
this Cold War connection. Such an argument, however, would fail to be persuasive in the face of 
two important factors.  Firstly, it is indeed important to highlight that the Congo Crisis was the 
first Cold War flash point on African soil. Yet its length, scale, and outcome for the loser, the 
Soviet Union, shows that it was an isolated event for the duration of the period under study. 
According to new research from Soviet archives, the Congo Crisis was nothing but a short flash 
point in which the Soviet Union was forced to retreat until 1966. Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet 
leader, had held an important interest in trying to expand Soviet influence into Africa using 
foreign aid since 1955-6, and he saw Lumumba as a radical he could work with to counter 
 
40 “Conference of Independent African States – 1958,” 380-8. I. Micr. Afr. 573, Bodleian Libraries, University of 
Oxford. 
41 Ludo De Witte’s research uncovered a very scathing account of Western interference in the Congo’s affairs and 
the West’s assistance on ending not only his presidency, but his life. See, Ludo De Witte, The Assassination of 
Lumumba (London: Verso, 2002). 
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American influence.42 The Soviet leader also threatened the United States to intervene with a 
large force to check their influence and support Lumumba. Alessadro Iandolo, however, points 
out that the threat was a complete bluff to try to compel the United States to stop their support of 
Katanga and Lumumba’s domestic opposition. Not only did the Soviet Air Force did not have 
the airlifting capabilities to transport a large force, but neither did the Soviet Navy have the 
means and the Americans knew it.43 The best the Soviets could do was assist with its few 
transports to ferry a much smaller Ghanaian force from Accra to Leopoldville.44 The Americans 
called the bluff soon after and led the UN efforts to shut down runways to stop the Soviet planes 
and shut down radio stations to silence Lumumba and prevent him from rallying his domestic 
power base. This left the Soviet Union with no choice but to resort to the dismal chance of trying 
to influence the outcome of the crisis at the United Nations.45 As a result of its ‘loss of Congo’, 
the Soviet Union lost its confidence to confront the United States on African soil, and its strategy 
of buying influence in Africa saw a significant dwindling of aid packages to African states.46 The 
Soviet Union, in other words, lost its appetite to spread its influence in Africa and would not 
return after the OAU summit of 1963. 
The second factor behind the decision not to delve deeper in the Congo Crisis in this 
narrative is the problematic context of inter-African relations during the crisis. It would be 
tempting to think of the Congo Crisis as either an important rallying point or lesson to the 
independent African states who later formed the OAU. Making this argument is beset by too 
many problems, particularly when the Congo Crisis is scrutinised in the context of inter-African 
relations. As chapter five will show, when the call from Morocco came in December 1960 for all 
African states to meet in Casablanca to discuss measures to respond to the crisis, only a few 
responded and went. As I will demonstrate, not only did these states (Morocco, Ghana, Guinea, 
Mali, Egypt, the Algerian government in exile, and Libya before it opted out at the conference’s 
end) each did so with different and more pressing ulterior motives unrelated to the crisis, but the 
ones who did not attend had instead chosen to shun the attendees because of they had suffered to 
 
42 Alessandro Iandolo, “Imbalance of Power: The Soviet Union and the Congo Crisis, 1960-1961,” in Journal of 
Cold War Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Spring 2014): 32-6, 54.  
43 Ibid, 41-3, 45. 
44 Ibid, 49-50. 
45 Ibid, 45, 49-52. 
46 Ibid, 54-5. 
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their predatory actions in continental politics. The resulting split into two competing alliances in 
African affairs between the Casablanca and Monrovia blocs in 1961 therefore did not occur 
because of the Congo Crisis, but because of antagonisms in inter-African relations as these were 
held to be much more important.  
The Structure of the Thesis 
 Chapters one and two make up the first phase of inter-African relations and it took the 
form of an African Scramble for Africa as both Gamal Abdel Nasser and Kwame Nkrumah saw 
Africa as a virgin land ripe for their influence to steer it on their own style of anti-colonialism. 
The first chapter demonstrates the domestic origins of their foreign policies and how this shapes 
their goals. A rivalry initially grew between them as Ghana attempted to keep Egypt well out of 
African affairs because it suspected Nasser only wanted to use Africa’s decolonisation as a 
platform to spread his anti-colonial message which was often loaded with issues that had nothing 
to do with the African continent. Central to this chapter are the debates that came at the 
Conference of Independent African States (IAS) which was the very first time that official 
delegations from independent African states met in the same place in April 1958. Chapter three 
explores the way in which the rivalry between Nasser and Nkrumah was eventually stymied 
when both realised they pursued similar goals, notably their anti-colonial efforts. They joined 
their efforts in propaganda campaigns, Egypt with its powerful radio network, and Nkrumah with 
print media. Their anti-colonial policies also became clearer and they began to define issues like 
the sanctity of borders as a consequence of their actions, especially Ghana which undertook 
severe challenges (which were justified by dubious means) to rip away territory from its two 
neighbours, Togo and Ivory Coast. The fourth chapter delves into the domestic conditions that 
formed Senegal’s foreign policy orientation in the wake of the Mali Federation split of August 
1960, and details how its isolation in West Africa led it to seek alliances abroad. Furthermore, 
French Soudan’s intrusions into Senegalese affairs caused the Senegalese leader, Léopold 
Senghor, to start forming a bulwark against predatory states. Chapter V details the Mauritanian 
Question of 1960-1 in which it saw parry Morocco’s attempt to absorb its southern neighbour 
into the Kingdom. This was an important development which led to the creation of one of the 
powerful rival blocs in African politics, the Casablanca Group. The powers which combined in 
the Casablanca Group, Ghana, Egypt, Guinea, Mali all gravitated around each other because they 
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had anti-colonial policies, shared the same tactics to achieve foreign policy goals (notably 
supporting subversion in the affairs of others), and shared a common aversion to France’s 
continued position in Africa. Instead of being strength, however, it weakened their hold on the 
development of inter-African affairs because it spurred a rival group to establish itself, which is 
covered in chapter six.   
Archival Sources Used 
 Due to the African approach of the study, this project tried to rely as much as possible on 
primary sources from Africa. Although none of the three African countries I visited allowed 
researchers access to the archives of their respective foreign ministries, the national archives or 
libraries nevertheless held invaluable material for a few reasons. For one, the period under study 
coincided with the existence of the short-lived Mali Federation and the time in office of 
Senghor’s deputy in government, Mamadou Dia, whose entire records are kept in the National 
Archive of Senegal. The ‘Fonds de la Fédération du Mali (1959 – 1963)’ and ‘Fonds de la 
Présidence et Vice-Présidence du Conseil (1956 – 1962)’, by far the best collection of documents 
on inter-African affairs from the perspective of the francophone African states of the ex-AOF, its 
documents range from the establishment of de Gaulle’s Communauté in the fall of 1958 to 
Senegal’s participation in the Union Africaine et Malgache in the summer of 1963. The 
collections included documents related to inter-African diplomacy (including inter-state 
communications, secret intelligence assessments, and foreign ministry reports), some verbatim 
talks with African leaders, Dia and Senghor’s key speeches, the tensions between Senghor, Dia, 
and Keita of French Soudan, as well as many documents relating to the important issue of 
Mauritania’s independence and the formation of the Monrovia Group.  
The time period of this study also coincided with Nkrumah’s presidency, and the Bureau 
of African Affairs Collection at the Public Records and Archives Administration Department 
(PRAAD) in Accra holds an important amount of documentation on foreign affairs given he was 
effectively wielding Ghana’s foreign policy from 1958-66. Patience was a virtue in this archive 
given that the organisation of folders was chaotic, but overall the collection was well rewarding: 
documents included foreign policy reports, cabinet meeting minutes, correspondence between 
Nkrumah and foreign leaders, secret intelligence reports, Nkrumah’s orders to his foreign 
ministry and diplomatic missions, propaganda material, secret plots against foreign governments 
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(including an incredibly important one against Mauritania), and the coming together and 
dissolution of the Casablanca Group. Not many documents were cited from the Padmore Library 
in this thesis as a considerable amount of more time would be required to excavate (quite literally 
as it turns out) the material held in the very damp cellar and on completely unorganised shelves. 
Despite Jeffrey Ahlman’s work a few years prior to organise and catalogue the material in the 
cellars of the library, when I visited in March 2017, multitudes of folders were strewn across the 
damp floor, pages were ripped off, folders piled into wheelbarrows, and many folders from the 
catalogue could no be found. It was also frustrating that W. Scott Thompson, by virtue of being 
in Ghana at the time of the coup, had access to foreign ministry documents in the late 1960s and 
that they are no longer available to peruse. Despite this, the collections at PRAAD gave a large 
enough window for researchers into inter-African affairs from 1957-63. Luckily, Thompson 
brought back to Oxford a large verbatim transcript of the April 1958 Conference of Independent 
African States, the first time African leaders met in the postcolonial period. This microfilm, the 
only version of this document accessible to scholars, is available at the Bodleian Library. 
 The National Archives of Tunisia, despite the country’s dismissal of its repressive regime 
in the revolution in 2011, is still unavailable for consultation on all documents on the post-
independence period. The National Library of Tunisia, however, contained important 
documentation regarding the Mauritanian Crisis and the breaking of Tunisian-Moroccan 
relations. Perhaps when the Tunisian archives will finally be open to researchers will we get 
better insight of Tunisia’s foreign policies in Africa and the Maghreb, which were deeply 
intertwined given the attention Habib Bourguiba gave to the Mauritanian Question as well as his 
African alliance with Senegal. The inside story of Egypt’s foreign policy in Africa, on the other 
hand, would profit greatly from opening the archives in Cairo which unfortunately remains shut 
after the end of the events of 2011-3. Nasser initially had great plans for Egypt’s presence in 
Africa, and he built several institutions, including a research institute, to not only expand Egypt’s 
knowledge of the African continent, but also to help coordinate policy. Much of the same could 
be said of the Royal Moroccan Archives, which undoubtedly holds many documents on African 
affairs in this period. Sadly unopened for research with the exception of special appointment to 
the King, Abdeljelil Temimi remains the only person to have been allowed to consult these 
archives to study the effects of the Mauritanian Question on inter-Maghrebi affairs. Some of the 
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documents he collected were published in an edited volume in the early 2010s from a Tunisian 
press, and it was of great help to this thesis. 
European states, France, the United Kingdom, and Belgium have vast amounts of 
documents relating to African affairs over this period. Belgium’s African archive, conveniently 
located inside the Foreign Ministry with the diplomatic document collections, was a gold mine 
for any researcher on inter-African affairs, reports on the many conferences hosted by African 
leaders and states, as well as the propaganda campaigns waged by both Nasser and Nkrumah on 
African soil. These documents were a very good source of information because of their level of 
incredible detail. This was ostensibly due to the fact that the Belgian state, at the time holding on 
to its colony of the Congo, was incredibly fearful of any ideologies or influence from the 
independent African states onto its colonial subjects which could jeopardise their grip on its 
colony and its position in Africa. The Belgian authorities, unlike the French and the British, also 
took the propaganda and actions from African leaders at face value and therefore they rarely 
came to the conclusion that the various African nationalist figures were ‘communist 
sympathisers’ or the like. Since they took African leaders and their propaganda seriously and 
correctly came to the conclusion that they were anti-colonial in nature, the documents of the 
Belgian archives were given precedence over the other European documents.  
The two main French archives were also consulted – the centre in Nantes, which holds 
documents produced by consular and embassy staff and sent to Paris, and the centre in La 
Courneuve (in the North of Paris) which holds documents of the French Foreign Ministry, Le 
Quai d’Orsay. The documents of the embassy of Egypt were tremendously helpful in helping 
determine the early foreign policy of Gamal Abdel Nasser as he navigated the problematic 
domestic situation he inherited after the 1952 coup. Furthermore, the documents at the embassy 
level also revealed the extent and effect of his influence with his propaganda campaigns by radio, 
but also the vast network of material support he operated in North Africa in order to keep the 
flow of weaponry open to Algeria. The Foreign Ministry documents were very helpful to bridge 
gaps where there were no existing documentation from African archives on particular episodes. 
Archives in Africa, unlike at Kew or Paris, are notoriously fickle for lost documentation because 
this leaves gaps for the construction of narratives, undoubtedly because of a much lower amount 
of funding and government interest. Since France was very closely tied to West Africa, 
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especially at the time of de Gaulle’s referendum, the French diplomatic documents were an 
invaluable resource about Ghana’s attempts to influence the Francophone African states into 
claiming their immediate independence.  
Lastly, I consulted the Kwame Nkrumah Papers at the archives at the Moorland-
Springarn Research Centre at Howard University in Washington, DC. Upon being deposed in a 
coup in 1966 whilst away on a trip to Asia, Nkrumah’s closest advisors took with them many 
state documents in his possession. The collection is very eclectic and contains some 
documentation relating to Ghanaian foreign policy, yet these were already well studied by W. 
Scott Thompson and were generally not useful for this study. The collection also includes much 
post-1966 correspondence between Nkrumah and a host of state leaders and private individuals. 
These were unhelpful yet conveyed the message that even after he was deposed in a coup, 
Nkrumah kept putting pressure on others to accept his view of African unity. The only helpful 
documents found for this study were part of the correspondence between Nkrumah and George 
Padmore from the mid-1950s which highlighted the advice that Nkrumah begin to build an 
African policy for West Africa. 
 
Chapter I: Postcolonial Foreign Policies of Egypt and Ghana 
 The foreign policies adopted by post-colonial African states were the catalyst for the 
problematic inter-African relations from March 1957 to May 1963. Perhaps the most detrimental 
reason lurking behind this development was that prior to 1957 African leaders placed much of 
their energy on their own troublesome domestic politics. Since none of the leaders of these states 
took care and time to think through what the independent African continent should stand for, 
what it should politically look like, and especially how inter-African relations should be 
conducted between the new independent states, a lot of friction and suspicion between them 
arose when they finally began to establish their continental foreign policies. Thus, not only did 
each resort to shaping their own African policies in their own image, they also began to use them 
as a device to secure power at home. The fact that they linked their own visions of what Africa 
should represent with the goal of security at home raised the stakes each had in continental 
politics and ensured a great level of speed, determination, and ruthlessness to chase these goals. 
Beginning in 1957 inter-African relations became tremendously important for African leaders 
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and owing to the stakes they placed on their goals made them suspicious of one another and their 
relations acrimonious.   
Each of the cases of Ghana, Egypt, and Senegal share many differences owing to a host 
of different circumstances, yet what is most important is what they have in common. For each of 
them, their leaders were crucial for the shaping the foreign policy outlook. Not only were their 
personalities and own personal goals in African affairs important factors, but none more so than 
their desire to cement their power at home. Both Senghor and Nasser were not hugely popular 
and faced significant opposition at home, while Nkrumah, perhaps a little bit more secure 
because he crushed his opposition in 1957-8, still had to prove to a large part of his population 
that he was the right man to lead the new state. All three therefore needed to prove themselves 
and achieving foreign policy goals would do the trick. Each of these states suffered, albeit on 
different levels, from domestic pressures and this greatly limited the foreign policy options they 
could pursue, and all ended throwing themselves into the pit of African politics. For Nkrumah it 
was a desire to seek domestic legitimisation by showing the Ghanaian people that he could lead 
Africa to unite to form a shield against colonialism. Ghana’s population responded well to the 
idea of their nation leading the continent and given that 70 per cent of the population had never 
been able to vote in elections in the 1950s, Nkrumah saw it as a way to build popularity and 
insulate himself further from any domestic threat. For Nasser, his foreign policy in Africa was 
the solution to insulate himself from two major domestic threats to his rule, the Egyptian 
population and the military. By building Egypt’s new identity and sense of purpose as an anti-
colonial state deeply involved in the Third World, he was able to shift the focus away from 
domestic politics and stop the incessant calls for a restoration of democracy and pluralism in the 
public sphere. As for Senghor, who unlike Nkrumah never believed in abolishing pluralism from 
Senegalese society, the pressure exerted by his domestic opposition was the most significant and 
consistent challenge to his rule. After dangerously acquiescing to demands to seek unity with 
neighbouring states (he nearly lost power to a foreign state), he undertook a foreign policy to 
convince his nation and the continent that nationalism and a good working relationship with 





 ‘Revolutionary’ Egypt: Fragile Regime, Bold Foreign Policy 
Every credible and careful analysis of Egypt’s foreign policy from the ‘revolution’ or 
Officers’ Coup of 1952 to the end of the 1960s correctly places the figure of Gamal Abdel 
Nasser on the centre stage.47 In matters of foreign policy, Nasser was indeed dominant. Very 
ambitious, manipulative, resolute, crafty, and often reckless, Nasser acquired the ultimate skill of 
any great statesman during the Suez War of 1956 – the ability to turn a serious setback into an 
opportunity – and he became one of the most influential leaders in the Third World. But as newer 
historiography is beginning to demonstrate, Nasser started his regime without the famous 
confidence he was showing in the late 1950s and 1960s; despite becoming a strong authoritarian 
leader, he never had a completely free hand to wage his foreign policy. Nasser’s new regime was 
deeply affected by domestic constraints and Egypt’s recent past, and his foreign policy reflected 
the problems he faced during his early years in power. The strongest challenge that Nasser faced 
from 1952-6 were from the military and Egypt’s population and a careful balancing act had to be 
found to ensure the new regime could conserve power. Beginning in 1954, Nasser worked out 
this balancing act by establishing and directing a bold foreign policy as a tool to insulate himself 
in power because it could build his legitimacy as leader as well as steer the country’s attention 
away from domestic problems. While it never became the most important front of his foreign 
policy, the African continent nevertheless represented a very significant opportunity as the 
continent was on the brink of decolonisation and up for grabs. From 1954, Nasser reshaped 
Egypt’s identity as an anti-colonial power and sold the idea of a new foreign policy based on 
active opposition to colonialism to Egyptians. From aiding nationalist movements in North 
Africa from 1954 onwards to becoming an important Third World anti-colonial figure with his 
dashing appearance at the Bandung conference in 1955, he very quickly capitalised on his 
military loss at Suez in the summer of 1956 to spearhead an anti-colonial campaign in the rest of 
Africa. Nasser’s grip on power was contingent on finding success in international affairs, and 
this explains his zealousness to expand Egypt’s influence in Africa and the speed with which he 
entered African affairs.  
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Nasser’s reign began in 1952 in dire circumstances. Plagued with colonial intrigues, the 
growing interest of the superpowers, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Egypt would not be easily 
navigated through these troubled waters. Due to these important external factors, many accounts 
of Egypt’s foreign policy focus on these fronts and derive their explanations of Egypt’s foreign 
policy behaviour from them.48 These factors were very important in the crafting of foreign 
policy, but newer historiography shows that domestic consideration were central to Nasser’s 
foreign policy. A struggling economy, social problems, and the issue of the regime’s popularity 
are given as major reasons for the regime’s selection of its foreign policy orientation.49 Some, 
like Joel Gordon, also correctly argue that the regime used foreign policy as a tool to shift the 
population’s focus away from domestic issues. Gordon further claims that it was only in 1955 
that Nasser was confident enough to wage a foreign policy.50 Unlike this account, I claim the 
Egyptian leader was forced to wage a foreign policy as a tool for domestic purposes and to 
solidify his regime even earlier. The 1955 date is incorrect, and part of the mistake is due to 
limiting the focus of the Egyptian regime’s policies towards the Cold War superpowers, the 
Arab-Israeli Conflict, and the stirrings of an Afro-Asian Bloc. In reality, Egypt’s foray into 
international affairs began much closer to home in Africa, and this early foreign policy helped to 
shape subsequent events on which much attention has been lavished, bringing Egypt into direct 
conflict with the colonial powers and Israel in the fall of 1956, in turn helping bring the 
superpowers’ focus on the Middle East, and built Nasser’s image of a great Afro-Asian figure. 
Most importantly, Egypt’s early foreign policy in Africa brought lasting effects on African 
politics and helped shape the course of inter-African politics.   
The Backdrop of Revolutionary Egypt’s Foreign Policy 
In 1952-3, problems and potential threats arose for Nasser, ensuring his position atop 
Egypt’s political hierarchy was never entirely secure.51 The main domestic issues he faced and 
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needed to resolve were on three interconnected fronts: leadership attempts from other figures 
associated with the coup, mounting threats of an ouster from troublesome units in the armed 
forces, and the need to become popular and gain the unflinching support from the Egyptian 
masses. The first two years of the new regime’s time in power were treacherous for Nasser as 
they spent them defining their ‘revolution’.52 Most of their efforts were done under the umbrella 
of changing the old order in Egyptian political life, in which the politically and economically 
troublesome 1940s were blamed on the monarchy, the old landowning elite, and the warring and 
corrupt political parties. Dismantling the old regime was the junta’s (which named itself the 
Revolutionary Command Council or RCC) primary objective, and once they seized power they 
immediately announced dramatic changes which stunned and appealed to many segments of the 
general public. In the months following the change of power, the RCC (led by Nasser) began a 
limited land reform program that fractured the largest land holdings and allowed common 
peasants land ownership, abolished the old political parties, began a purge of the military and the 
intelligentsia of those tied to the old elite.53 After a short period of elation, resentment quickly 
grew in Egypt.  
While the general population began to worry about the slow pace of the land, economic, 
and political reforms, anger in the ranks of the armed forces was simmering for many reasons. 
The armed forces were early supporters of the RCC’s takeover because the King and his 
henchmen in the military’s upper ranks were held responsible for the army’s humiliation against 
the Israelis in the 1948 Palestine War.54 Their support was also contingent on a few factors. For 
one, many in the armed forces wished to see the RCC restore parliamentary life and return to the 
barracks. Secondly, for the armed forces to get a larger share of the national budget and be given 
better equipment and weaponry (inadequate weaponry was blamed for not being able to fight the 
Israelis properly) in order not to be humiliated again on the battlefield.55 A few months after the 
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coup, the continuing wave of the RCC’s forced retirements, firings, and arrests were beginning 
to be thought of as unjustified and they stirred resentment and rumours of a military coup against 
the RCC.56 while Nasser’s promise to the armed forces of obtaining better weaponry remained 
unfulfilled, he was blindsided by a branch of the military because of his crackdown of army 
figures and the RCC’s policies.  
One of Nasser’s first policies regarding the armed forces was to bring it under his thumb 
and to prevent it from playing a role in Egyptian politics. In December 1952, he ordered a list 
drawn with the names of officers whom were either liberals who posed a challenge to the current 
regime, or low-ranking members of the Free Officers movement because they could harbor 
political ambitions. This list was extensive – 4,000 officers – just over half were relocated to 
cushy civilian administration jobs and 800 were forced to retire.57 This measure unsurprisingly 
offended some in the military. As the French embassy noted, many officers, particularly in the 
artillery corps, were not pleased with the government’s firings and forced retirements of fellow 
officers. The RCC, they argued in secret, should not be getting involved directly in the army’s 
affairs.58 In early January 1953, the feeling of resentment intensified in the artillery branch. The 
RCC had just banned political parties and kept up its efforts to arrest dissident officers on the 
trumped-up charge of supporting the ‘ancien régime.’59 For the artillery officers, this was the last 
straw. Not only had the new regime brutally intruded in the army’s affairs, but it also 
contradicted their political outlook. Many artillery officers gathered to petition Nasser and 
argued that he was wrong to betray their hopes. The coup was not a means to suspend plurality in 
Egypt, but only of liquidating the royalty and the corrupt politicians. Parliamentary life, they 
demanded, should be restored. They asked Nasser if he could allow more equal representation 
(artillery officers were a minority within the RCC) but he turned them away. To his horror, they 
began to speak with the Muslim brotherhood and decided to act decisively against him and the 
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RCC. Learning on 16 January from an informant in the nick of time that they were about to use 
artillery units to arrest members of the RCC, take Cairo, and restore parliamentary life, Nasser 
quickly had them arrested.60 Nasser had been surprised that an important part of the army had 
almost mutinied and come close to throwing him from power.  
Nasser’s relationship with the wider Egyptian public, despite the popular but restrained 
land reform program, soured quickly in the months after the coup. Nasser understood that in 
order to undertake a program of radical economic change for the Egyptian people, he required 
foreign help with investment and technical aid. His solution to this issue and to find weaponry 
for the armed forces was to turn to the United States.61 For the next two years he continued the 
former regime’s policies as he pinned his hopes on negotiations with the Americans to deliver 
change for his country, and tried to convince the Egyptian people of something suspicious and 
difficult for them to accept – an aid package from the West. Unfortunately, the initial wave of 
enthusiasm in Egyptian society after the coup dwindled as he was simply unable to please its 
hopes, yet he pressed on knowing his own popularity was at risk. Students, angered by his tilt 
towards the Americans called him “Colonel Jimmy” in public, trapped him in a Cairo University 
office during a visit, and forced him to stop a speech early by heckling him during a speech in 
Alexandria. Workers were not pleased with the lack of change in labour policies and the 
stagnation of salaries and they shouted insults at the RCC when they appeared in public.62 His 
popularity also took a further hit because he was widely believed to be the authoritarian leader 
behind the termination of Egypt’s democracy.63 Managing the country’s affairs as they had 
always been while hoping for an aid package came at great expense to his own popularity, and 
the man he had put as a figurehead leader of the RCC, Muhammad Neguib, became the darling 
of the people and worse, of an influential cavalry unit in the armed forces as well.64  
By 1953 Neguib was becoming a real threat to Nasser and the RCC because it had 
become obvious to him that he was a mere figurehead as president of Egypt. Neguib simply did 
not have much of an opinion in the RCC, and Nasser and the other officers in the RCC simply 
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ignored him. The insulted Naguib therefore began to side with the public and found allies in the 
armed forces, notably the cavalry corps.* Nasser was still trying to get a significant aid package 
and weaponry from the Americans which would solve the problem with the armed forces and the 
general public, but after the attempted coup by the artillery, Neguib went behind his back to 
solve the problem and threatened to derail Nasser’s plans. In late January 1953 the figurehead 
leader walked into the Soviet embassy and asked if Josef Stalin would allow the sale of 
weaponry to Egypt. After failing to gather a positive answer, Neguib tried the same with the 
Czechoslovak Government a few months later, and asked if Egypt could quickly purchase 100 
light tanks for its armoured corps, clearly in a bid to help his favoured faction of the armed 
forces.65 The move surprised Nasser and prompted him to retract the request and to sideline him 
from the ongoing negotiations with Great Britain over the status of the Suez Canal region. 
Furthermore, Nasser re-affirmed to the British Government that he was the man to negotiate for 
Egypt and that Neguib was not.66 Throughout 1953 and the first months of 1954, Naguib toured 
the country and found a large amount support throughout Egyptian society – from the middle 
class to the landed elite and intelligentsia – all of whom wanted a restoration of democracy.67 
The Nasser-Neguib rivalry continued and finally came to a head in February 1954 when Nasser 
and the RCC cut him out from their meetings and told him to accept his mere role as figurehead. 
Neguib surprised them by resigning and Nasser put him under house arrest. Once the information 
hit the streets that their leader was brushed aside, Neguib’s many followers staged violent 
protests.68  
Nasser gladly accepted Naguib’s resignation and put him under house arrest, thinking the 
rivalry was finally over. Naguib’s followers in the army, however, objected and staged a sit-in at 
the cavalry mess hall in protest. They soon gave their demands – the re-instatement of Naguib, 
the dismissal of the RCC, and a transition to democracy.69 To diffuse the tension, Nasser went to 
the mess hall to meet with them. Unbeknownst to the leader of the RCC, he was walking into a 
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trap. The mutinied officers refused to let anyone else into the hall and he was made to sit down in 
front of shouting officers as tanks noisily surrounded them outside to intimidate him. Nasser had 
no other choice but to fold and concede to their demands. As he hung his head in shame back at 
the RCC headquarters, convinced he had lost everything, the Egyptian intelligence service went 
to work without his knowledge to end the mutiny. In a remarkable show of force, artillery units 
were sent to surround the tanks and the mutinied officers as a propaganda campaign kicked off to 
spread the news that the mutiny was supporting communism. Salah Salem, a member of the RCC 
and head of propaganda, hit the airwaves and stated that Muhammad Naguib had never been a 
free officer and declared him ousted from the RCC. The mutiny was shut down and Nasser 
saved, but Naguib’s ouster angered Cairo’s citizens who saw him as their true hero and they 
flooded the streets chanting his name while vilifying Nasser’s.70 Nasser’s hand was forced and 
he re-instated Naguib because of this pressure on 27 February and promise of an eventual return 
to parliamentary rule on 4 March, but he was merely biding his time. Throughout March, Nasser 
unleashed his security organs to arrest those responsible for the mutiny, further purging elements 
in the army that could meddle in politics and threaten his rule.71 By the end of March 1954, the 
now-purged army completely filed behind Nasser as he proclaimed a reversal of his promises to 
allow the free officers to vote, and let the old political parties to participate in the interest of 
preventing the old order of rampant corruption and inefficiency from coming back.72  
The armed forces’ mutinies of 1953 and 1954 shook Nasser profoundly. He learned that 
despite his efforts to control the army, conspiracies against him were still possible. He had not 
forgotten how he had risen through the military to take power at a time of the army’s discontent, 
and he understood more than ever that he could ill afford to ignore the demands and hopes of the 
military. These hopes created the basis of an important pact between the army and Nasser after 
he came to power. Should the army feel betrayed again, Nasser understood it would mean a 
shifting of the army’s support away from him towards a more suitable contender. He had to bring 
the army to his side after shaking it with forced resignations and arrests. Co-option and bribery 
were therefore the only solutions promising rapid results. Thus, Nasser handed out promotions to 
key officers and increased the army’s military expenditures from 17% to 25% of Egypt’s 
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budget.73 This arrangement was in Nasser’s immediate interest because keeping the army happily 
behind him would give him a great measure of legitimacy as the leader of Egypt. Yet the army’s 
co-option only bought him a little bit of time as the army still felt humiliation from its dreadful 
performance in 1948. He had to deliver on its demands to get outfitted with new weaponry to 
restore its pride if he was to stave off any other attempts to rob him of his rule.  
Thus, one of Nasser’s key foreign policy objectives in 1954 was to get an arms deal with 
a foreign power for one of his largest domestic concerns, the army. Although Nasser did secure a 
significant weapons deal with the Soviet Union, he was still reported as not completely insulated 
from the threat of the army as potentially dissenting officers were still being arrested and purged 
from the army as late as January 1957.74 As new historiography is beginning to show, Nasser 
was never free from the threat of the army during his rule because what had appeared to be a 
trusted aide and friend at the head of the armed forces, Hakim Amer, led and used the army as 
his personal fiefdom and often forced Egypt to deviate from Nasser’s policies until the aftermath 
of the Six Day War of 1967.75 The threat of the armed forces remained a real problem for Nasser, 
and one that he could at best manage while treading carefully. 
In their first year in power, Nasser and his RCC were met quickly with simmering 
popular unrest and possible revolt from what they thought were their power base, the military. 
These domestic problems were indeed besieging the new regime, and their combination of on-
the-spot management and luck was seeing them through, albeit barely. A more sustainable 
strategy needed to be devised to keep domestic pressures in check while giving their revolution 
meaning and direction. An important part of the solution that Nasser adopted, and very early on, 
was to redirect popular attention outwards and well away from Egypt’s domestic troubles. 
Beginning in early December 1952, Nasser began a radio and media propaganda campaign 
aimed at inflaming domestic public opinion towards France for its conduct in Tunisia and 
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Morocco.76 The campaign was particularly captivating because it was so vitriolic and 
sensationalist. For instance, French Government officials were appalled that the propaganda 
campaign claimed the French army was waging a “war of extermination” against the Istiqlal 
Party in Morocco, that the French built concentration camps in Tunisia, and razed the Tunisian 
city of Kelibia to the ground. The French Government was also concerned that the these 
fictitious news reports were quoted at length at the Arab League.77 Among the population, these 
reports gained traction as the French embassy received letters from the Egyptian public 
protesting French treatment of Arabs in North Africa.78 The idea of a propaganda campaign 
against the French was not new at all, since the Egyptian monarchy had sporadically used the 
trick before, but what was different was that Nasser injected it with new vigour and starting in 
1954, expanded it as part of a wider strategy.   
Nasser’s tool of vilifying the forces of colonialism and imperialism to divert the public’s 
attention grew into the foundation of his grand strategy and shape Egypt’s new identity. From 
1954 onwards, Nasser’s foreign policy reflected this new strategy and became profoundly anti-
colonial and anti-imperial, and most often aimed at the French and the British.79 While 
propaganda campaigns did continue, it was not long afterward that Nasser turned another of the 
monarchy’s unfinished projects into an opportunity. In the late 1940s, King Farouk had been 
interested in waging some sort of North African policy to oppose its dominating colonial power, 
France. Egypt therefore helped resistance groups of North Africa and launched sporadic 
propaganda attacks on the French and harbouring these groups’ leaders, including the famous 
leader of the Rif Rebellion, Abdel Krim, and important members of the next generation of North 
African politicians like Allal al-Fassi of Morocco, Tayib Slim of Tunisia, and Mohammed 
Khider of Algeria.80 These were allowed to freely associate in Egypt under Farouk, and although 
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he wanted them to have an effect on French policy in North Africa, they were too poorly 
organised (mostly due to Abdel Krim’s inability to work and compromise with others) and 
underfunded to kick-start any form of insurrection.81 Farouk’s North African policy, if could be 
called that, was therefore only a poorly attended pet project. It was not until 1953-4 that Nasser 
pulled the project off the shelf and breathed new life into it. In the aftermath of the 1952 coup 
these groups were allowed to remain in Egypt, as well as use Egypt’s new radio network to 
broadcast their cause both to the Egyptian public as well as the rest of the Arab World.82 In the 
spring of 1953, Nasser began to pay more attention to the North Africans because he saw some 
value in it for Egypt. He allowed Abdel Krim to set up a guerrilla training centre to train North 
African expats in Ismailia, on the condition that half of the graduates could be called to serve in 
the Canal Zone against British troops if the RCC called them to action.83 Nasser also ordered the 
establishment of a Department for Arab Affairs and charged Fathi al-Dib, one of his most trusted 
assistants, to examine and report on the situation in North Africa and to draw up Egypt’s policy 
towards North Africa in accordance with the values of the ‘Revolution of 23 July’.84 Al-Dib 
quickly got to work and in late 1952 and early 1953, met the leaders of North Africa’s resistance 
upon their return to Cairo.85 This groundwork established important relationships between 
Nasser and important resistance leaders like Allal al-Fassi of Morocco, Salah Ben Youssef of 
Tunisia, and the figure would become the most important, Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria.86  
With his obvious preoccupation with domestic affairs, Nasser still had not introduced or 
even defined Egypt’s new direction in foreign affairs. Putting one in place would help redirect 
the attention of the Egyptian population and the armed forces and perhaps even galvanize them 
behind a new goal. What Nasser needed was a general theme for this foreign policy, a safe target 
to focus on, and a place where Egypt could be effective. With the French fighting a losing battle 
at Dien Bien Phu in their colony of Indochina, they became an attractive target because their grip 
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on empire looked weak. On 16 March 1954, Nasser and al-Dib set up a meeting with some North 
African leaders and divulged details of a new policy for the first time. Egypt was to play a 
central role in North African politics by bringing every resistance group under its wing to ensure 
cooperation to one end – the liquidation of colonialism in North Africa. To justify Egypt’s 
involvement, Nasser invoked the resistance movements’ need to unite to maximize the effects of 
their efforts, Egypt’s fundamental duty to come to the aid of fellow Arabs trying to liberate 
themselves from colonial oppression, and the great timing in their favour since France was mired 
in the jungles of Indochina.87 A further meeting was held on April 3rd in Cairo with the North 
African resistance movements and they swore to form one committee in Cairo, to work together, 
and coordinate their actions. Nasser was also very impressed by Ahmed Ben Bella’s conduct at 
the meeting and of his intricate plan to wage a sustained armed resistance campaign against the 
French for their independence. Ben Bella made it clear that what he needed from Egyptians to 
execute the plan were weapons. Nasser not only ordered al-Dib to begin coordinate Egypt’s 
policy with Ben Bella, but he immediately became convinced that Ben Bella was the man Egypt 
should be closest to because he was the most organised leader of the Algerian struggle. Shortly 
thereafter, Ben Bella, al-Dib, Nasser, and the head of Egypt’s secret services concluded an 
agreement in principle for Egypt’s material and political support to the Algerian struggle.88  
 Naturally, Nasser’s eagerness to be generous to the Algerians appeared altruistic but it 
concealed important opportunities in foreign affairs. Being the first state to come to the material 
and political aid of the Algerians meant there was potential to extend a sphere of influence there 
and the granting of future favours for Egypt like access to their resources or favourable trade 
agreements which could see them become large importers of Egyptian manufactured goods.89 
Becoming the largest donor to the Algerian struggle for independence could also help Nasser 
score points at the Arab League and help him monopolise its direction. Most important for 
Nasser for his present situation, however, was that putting a focus on Algeria could bring the 
population’s focus of attention away from affairs at home. While steering Egypt’s foreign policy 
on an anti-colonial path would corral support from Egypt’s society, supplying weaponry to the 
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Algerians was a problem because the army was already short on stocks. Nasser needed to tread 
lightly because he risked further confrontations with the military if it were discovered that he 
was depleting Egypt’s military capacity to favour a foreign force in a foreign venture. Thus, the 
first shipments of weapons to the Algerians were very small and could only equip at most 200 
men.90 Nasser’s wish to help the Algerians put much added pressure on him to find weapons, and 
with none forthcoming from the United States after years of negotiations, Nasser was forced to 
seek the Soviet/Czechoslovak route in the spring of 1955.91 This arms deal solved an important 
problem for Nasser as he finally made the military happy by replacing the Egyptian stocks of 
dubious quality with new Soviet arms. The arms deal also made it possible to shift the dubious 
Egyptian arms to the Algerians who badly needed them to fight the French, saving him some 
expense. This was a very clever move by Nasser because he effectively killed two birds with one 
stone – his new foreign policy was on track while he attenuated a major problem between him 
and his military. As a result, arms smuggling was reported by the British and French to be 
proliferating in North Africa as Egypt ramped up its commitment to the Algerians.92 A caravan 
route was set up in the Libyan desert, ships took arms and supplies for the Algerians to many 
North African ports for eventual smuggling into Algeria, and even commercial airlines were used 
to ferry ammunition in their cargo holds.93 The French did correctly suspect Nasser was behind 
the arms smuggling and for sending commandos trained in Egypt, but Nasser gave his ‘soldier’s 
word’ that he was not responsible.94 The sheer hike in volume of arms shipments and the fact 
that lied when confronted by the French shows Nasser’s determination to see his North African 
policy affect change in the region, but also that he was very serious in putting Egypt on an active 
anti-colonial course.  
Although Nasser did have a significant part of an effective foreign policy in place, it was 
not yet properly articulated to the wider Egyptian public. Nasser understood that he needed to 
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communicate with his country and respond to pressing questions because he wanted to raise the 
popularity of the new regime. Thus, he devised an important document building a bridge 
between them and the new regime and serving as a sort of ‘social contract’. This was particularly 
important at this juncture of the new regime’s hold on power because of the domestic turmoil it 
had just been through; in other words, either Nasser took Egypt on a new direction or he risked 
never being able to wriggle free from the domestic strife. Besides, the book was an answer to a 
very pressing question – where was Egypt going now that the Free Officers had liberated it from 
the monarchy? Hastily written by Nasser and published in September 1954, the Philosophy of the 
Revolution was written simply and widely distributed throughout Egypt because it was meant for 
easy mass consumption and designed for every Egyptian could understand, connect, and identify 
with.95 The most striking aspect of Nasser’s manifesto is that it only briefly addressed the many 
domestic issues facing Egypt. Noting the new regime’s low popularity at home, Nasser credits 
his domestic political opponents as the culprits and asked his readers to pay them no mind 
because they were opportunistic, jealous, and only desiring to reap spoils of office.96 Colonialism 
had been responsible for fracturing Egyptian society, he argued, and the previous generations of 
Egypt’s politicians of responded with words and a grievous lack of deeds, preventing the country 
from coming together. The new regime, he claimed, was genuinely addressing the “real 
conditions” facing the country and taking appropriate action.97 Nasser acknowledged that while 
some of the measures were unpopular, they were justified because they would secure a bright 
future for the country.98 Nasser also used the text to communicate to another troublesome sector 
of society, the military rank and file. He sympathised with them and agreed that the defective 
weaponry issued to them in 1948 was an absolute ‘scandal’. He reminded them that he too had 
been a soldier who had experienced the humiliation of 1948 because of faulty armament and 
poor leadership.99 He dismissed rumours that the Revolution was just a coup by self-interested 
army officers who had held secret elections in the shadows. He reminded readers that had joined 
in protests in 1923 to restore the constitution, and that the military truly shared the hopes of all 
Egyptians and would do its duty to fulfil them.100 It is very clear in the text that Nasser wanted to 
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convince Egyptians that ‘the Revolution’ had good intentions for Egypt and promised that good 
change was indeed coming, but that the people and the armed forces needed to put their faith in 
the regime.  
Instead of delving into the great detail in the problems facing Egypt, the bulk of Nasser’s 
text attempts to justify the Free Officer’s coup (which is referred to as ‘the Revolution’), the role 
of the RCC as the vanguard of the nation, and Egypt’s new role in foreign affairs and revealed 
the country’s important new direction abroad.101 This marked an important moment in Egypt’s 
history because Nasser was linking Egypt’s new identity and reason for being with its foreign 
policy direction. Nasser opened the last and most important (and certainly the most intricate) part 
of the text by stating that Egypt’s age of isolationism was over because it had a new role to play 
to be a positive influence in international affairs.102 By virtue of historic fate and geography, a 
great opportunity was up for grabs for a regional actor to step up to a great heroic role and Egypt 
was the one to do it.103 Egypt’s new foreign policy orientation took inspiration from Egypt’s 
geographic identity and the need to expand Nasser’s project in Algeria – to help fuel anti-
colonial resistance – onto a much bigger stage than North Africa. In the book he unpacked 
Egypt’s geographic identity and explained that it was a natural justification for Egypt to seek a 
role in other regions. Thus, he introduced the concept of Egypt’s position within ‘three circles’ – 
consisting of the Arab, African, and Islamic circles. These areas of special interest overlapped 
each other considerably by virtue of geography and tradition, he argued, thus Egypt belonged to 
all three and needed to be active in them.104 What is revealing in the text is the hierarchy in 
which Nasser places these circles by order of importance. The Arab circle, he argued, was the 
most important as it was not only “the most closely connected to us” culturally and linguistically, 
but also because of historical and geographical reasons.105 Egypt identified itself with the other 
Arab states because they all had a shared history and sense of purpose – the Arab World, Nasser 
opined, faced the common enemy of imperialism and therefore needed to unite in the coming 
anti-imperialist struggle.106 Egypt also stood in the middle of the Arab World and Nasser 
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believed that geography bestowed Egypt an important role to play in it.107 It is very clear from 
Nasser’s manifesto that he envisioned Egypt to try to unite the Arab World into a common 
struggle and play a leading role in Arab affairs. In chapter three, I demonstrate that Nasser’s 
demonstrated importance to Arab affairs was a significant problem during the start of his 
diplomacy with other African states because it aroused their suspicion that he was seeking to 
promote an Arab agenda.  
 One of the most striking aspects of the idea of the three circles is Nasser’s description and 
emphasis on the African circle because it underpinned his attitude and continental policy. The 
Egyptian leader believed that nationalist conflicts were to set Africa aflame which would pit the 
peoples under tutelage against their white colonial overlords. Just as he had argued in his case of 
the Arab circle, Egypt was located in Africa and could not be impartial in its affairs; it would 
therefore play a role there.108 What is most important is that Nasser recognised that a new era 
was sweeping the continent – one which promised the potential for the end of colonialism. 
Africa, in short, was deemed a space of opportunity in which Egypt could act. As Nasser 
continues to give his thoughts on Africa, he claimed that “the people of Africa will continue to 
look up to us, who guard the northern gate of the continent and who are its connecting link to the 
world outside. We cannot, under any condition, relinquish our responsibility in helping, in every 
way possible, to diffuse the light of civilisation into the furthest part of that virgin jungle.”109  
Nasser also envisioned Cairo becoming an important centre of research of the continent to 
“enlighten” the minds of Africans and promote Africa’s progress.110 Africa seemed to Nasser a 
continent ripe with opportunities for Egypt to play a significant role.  
Many parallels existed between the paternalistic way the imperial powers looked at their 
colonies and Nasser’s thoughts and feelings on Africa and the Arab World. Nasser’s words 
exhibit a particular sense of Egyptian superiority vis-à-vis African peoples. Nasser’s mindset was 
surprisingly similar to imperial thought - not only did he believe there was an opportunity to do 
good on foreign lands, but there were also inferior peoples to bring civilisation to. The only 
difference between the imperialism of the colonial powers and Nasser was that the Egyptian 
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leader claimed to be defending the African peoples from white colonials rather than from 
themselves or foreign ideologies. Nasser’s paternalistic attitude to Sub-Saharan Africa would 
later become a sore source of apprehension in his relations with many Black African politicians 
in 1958 because of the persistent idea in African culture that the Arabs had always looked down 
upon Black Africans, with some even alluding to the story of Egypt’s enslavement of Black 
Africans to build the pyramids.111 Despite his anti-colonial views, Nasser was a new breed of 
imperialist with dreams of leading Egypt into African affairs. His manifesto also reveals an 
important factor that would later instil fear into African leaders. Nasser was demonstrating that 
he was also opportunist. Concluding his manifesto, Nasser claims that his country had been 
charged with a historical role in the Arab World and Africa at the cusp of a large struggle against 
imperialism. An opportunity was conferred onto Egypt to become the defender and ally of 
Africans and Nasser was going to fill it.112 Although he claimed in the Philosophy that he had 
altruistic aims – just as the colonial powers had once had – many leaders on the continent were 
going to disagree claiming he was exploiting the colonial powers’ precarious position in Africa 
for Egypt’s own ends.  
  A month later, another important piece of writing emerged in the public eye and 
confirmed Egypt’s new anti-colonial posture in foreign affairs. In a book entitled North Africa in 
the Past, the Present, and the Future, Nasser attached a revealing preface. The book’s message, 
supported by Nasser, was that a common Arab community needed to stand together against the 
Western colonial powers and it urged the North Africans to seize their right to join a struggle to 
win their independence. Egypt, the book argued, was to be the spiritual guide of the Arab 
World.113 Nasser’s preface did not mince words: “North Africa is a part of us, just as we are a 
part of North Africa.” Not only should the whole Orient stand united against the West, but all 
Muslims (as neighbours and brothers) in the Arab World had the duty to help one another in their 
adversity. All Africans were neighbours and brothers, and therefore Arabs had the duty to find 
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their emancipation and help them find security.114 It is also no coincidence that a few months 
after the release of Nasser’s Philosophy of the Revolution Nasser converted the Institute of 
Sudanese Studies at Cairo University into the Institute of African Studies and Researches in 
order to assist the state in his new foreign policy venture in Africa. Articles and books on Africa 
also appeared more and more as Nasser and the country began to be more interested in the 
continent.115 By 1955, Nasser had prepared his population for a new front of Egypt’s foreign 
policy that stretched beyond North Africa to the rest of the continent to the south.  
Ghana, Nkrumah, and Foreign Policy 
 The case of Ghana’s – that is to say Nkrumah’s – foreign policy outlook at the dawn of 
independence differs dramatically from its Senegalese counterpart, and instead shares some 
commonalities with Nasser’s Egypt. In Senegal, foreign policy considerations were affected by a 
more radically minded generation putting pressure on the regime and diverting much of its 
attention to domestic affairs. In Ghana, Nkrumah was at the head of the younger and more 
radical generation who successfully contested colonial rule and won the country’s independence. 
The dominance of Convention People’s Party (CPP), after crushing the opposition in the first 
year of independence, made Nkrumah, just as Nasser was after the Suez Crisis in 1956, the 
uncontested leader of Ghana and certainly allowed him to craft a foreign policy orientation of his 
choosing.116 Much like Nasser, however, threats to his rule never completely disappeared despite 
crushing and co-opting the opposition. This only drove his opponents underground, or worse, 
made them re-emerge inside the CPP itself. He was surprised several times during his rule by 
assassination attempts which sometimes influenced his foreign policy.117 Meeting the foreign 
policy goals he set for the state was therefore crucial to conserve his rule because it would not 
only maintain his popularity, but also fulfil promises he made to a large portion (70%) of the 
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Ghanaian population whom had not been able to vote in the elections of the 1950s.118 Motivated 
by an ardent zeal for his long-held beliefs in Pan-Africanism, Nkrumah took the country on a 
project the next six years t the continent in an anti-colonial crusade which took the country to 
great heights in African affairs.  
In March 1957, Ghana found itself in an advantageous situation on the continent, and 
Nkrumah quickly jumped on the opportunity to make his country punch well above its weight. 
At first glance Ghana’s power potential in African affairs did seem very low at the time because 
it was a very small country, with a small population, limited resources, albeit a strong economy. 
Yet in truth it held an amazing potential to become an amazing force in continental affairs 
because it was the first Sub-Saharan African country to successfully struggle for its 
independence. Nkrumah understood Ghana’s geopolitical limitations and knew exactly how to 
exploit its unique situation to make Ghana punch above its weight. Other countries would soon 
follow and become independent, and the eyes of Africans would see Ghana as a role model and 
seek to follow its example. Nkrumah therefore believed that Ghana needed to quickly make its 
mark on continental affairs by imposing itself through a discourse on the best course of action for 
the continent’s future. While Nkrumah understood the importance of seizing the opportunity to 
be the first to get off the mark, his strong personality and diplomatic style harmed his relations 
with others.  
 As scholars have correctly argued, Kwame Nkrumah’s foreign policy outlook not only 
dominated his own state’s foreign policy, but it also mirrored his personality traits and was 
moulded by his past experiences.119 For Nkrumah in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Ghana’s 
foreign policy was an intensely personal affair, and he hoped to realise the great Pan-African 
vision he had had since the late 1940s – to realise some form of unity for Africa which would 
form a shield against colonialism. Nkrumah’s personal handling and oversight of Ghana’s 
foreign affairs was a function of his personality and managerial style. Since his days as a student 
in the 1930s and 1940s, Nkrumah not only got involved in student and Pan-African politics, but 
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always sought to manage and control organisations, and after 1945, the Pan-African movement 
itself. Nkrumah was influenced heavily by Marxist ideology as a student, and had a particular 
penchant for Lenin’s concept of ‘vanguardism’ which he applied to his organisations, most 
prominently his political party, the CPP.120 For Nkrumah, political power had to be made most 
direct and effective to bring about change, and this required it to be wielded by as few people as 
possible and with the least possible chance of being contested by reactionaries.121 A good 
example of his thinking on political action and the desire to be sole leader is the organisation he 
founded in 1945 called ‘The Circle’. After leaving the Fifth Pan-African Congress and returning 
to London, Nkrumah founded his own organisation called West African National Secretariat 
(WANS) to promote and bring Pan-Africanism to West Africa and agitate for the right to 
independence of their nations.122 Inside this organisation, Nkrumah created a much smaller and 
exclusive one called ‘The Circle’ which was specifically designed to be its vanguard and guide 
for action. Not only did its members have to declare that they “accept the leadership of Kwame 
Nkrumah”, they also had to swear an oath to obey the directives of its council. The Circle’s 
stated raison d’être would also become a constant theme of Nkrumah’s foreign policy outlook – 
to work to bring about “West African unity and the destruction of colonialism.” The Circle’s end 
goal, its founding document stated, was to come out at the opportune time “as a political party 
embracing the whole of West Africa, whose policy then shall be to maintain the Union of 
African Socialist Republics.”123 The Circle’s end goal is incredibly revealing and crucial to 
understand why Nkrumah attempted so often to take the lead on efforts at both forging African 
unity and fighting colonialism, and finally, that his actual goal was to become the leader of a 
united Africa. Whilst the goal of other political parties in West Africa had similar aims of trying 
to forge unity (like the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA) in French West Africa), 
what made Nkrumah’s case different was that he kept to this ideal long after his African 
counterparts ceased to believe in it in 1960.  
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 Nkrumah’s vigorous pursuit of foreign affairs, while incredibly important to him later as 
leader, was never a priority or even much a concern for him from 1945 to early 1957 because he 
was focused on domestic affairs. The reason lay with the fact that he took his guidance from the 
debates and resolutions adopted at the Fifth Pan African Congress in Manchester (in which he 
played a significant role) as he left to pursue his career in politics with the WANS in London and 
then the Gold Coast in 1947. Nkrumah was a convinced and dedicated Pan-Africanist, but as 
Dorothy Nelkin argues, the congress ushered a shift in the Pan-African movement away from 
internationalism to becoming a movement of national independence. Thus, the primary focus 
was directed inward at the issue of liberating colonial territories and pushing the idea of unity to 
secondary status.124 Nkrumah soon returned to the Gold Coast to be more influential in the 
struggle for national independence by joining first the United Gold Coast Congress (UGCC) in 
1947, and after falling out with other members, establishing his own party, the Convention 
People’s Party (CPP) in 1949. For the next eight years, Nkrumah focused exclusively on running 
his party, winning elections, and negotiating with the British despite founding the CPP with the 
explicit goal “to assist and facilitate in any way possible the realisation of a united and self-
governing West Africa.”125 This fact particularly alarmed one of his closest friends and future 
foreign affairs advisor, George Padmore, as far back as 1954. In a letter from London, Padmore 
urged Nkrumah to think more about foreign affairs rather than putting all his focus on his 
political struggles he and the CPP had at home against the opposition and the British. Padmore 
charged him with for not reading up on international affairs, imploring him to remember that one 
day he would have “to chart a course for your country, when the responsibility of assuming 
direction of your foreign policy falls upon your shoulders.”126  
 George Padmore kept advising Nkrumah from abroad from 1954-7, and there is ample 
evidence that after independence Nkrumah drew heavily from his friend’s previous advice when 
he finally set his attention to foreign policy. In August 1955 Padmore felt it was the right time to 
prepare the Gold Coast to take the lead in the African affairs and advised Nkrumah to begin 
plans to host a Pan-African conference in the Gold Coast. The conference, he argued, should be 
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designed along similar lines as Bandung and be a “get-together for a mutual exchange of ideas 
on political, economic and cultural matters […] the spirit of co-existence and non-interference 
should be the policy.” Padmore urged Nkrumah to realise that his party, the CPP, was already 
beginning to by seen as a role model by other African nationalist parties and this presented an 
important opportunity for African affairs. Hosting a conference would build even more prestige 
for Nkrumah who would then possess the influence “to show other African nationalists the 
correct tactics and strategy.”127 Padmore realised that if Nkrumah was the first to pounce on this 
opportunity, he could become one of the most influential continental political figures and 
therefore use the position to lead the continent’s future direction. As I will show in chapter three, 
Nkrumah took Padmore’s advice and on the day of Ghana’s independence, immediately seized 
the opportunity to take the lead in continental affairs and immediately called for an African 
conference to be held in Accra. Nkrumah organised many political conferences during his days 
in the United States and Great Britain, using them as platforms to build influence. In his 
autobiography, Nkrumah expounded on his role in the Fifth Pan-African Congress, explaining 
that he was selected to organise the conference, became one of its chairmen, and succeeded in 
passing a significant resolution.128 While this account is triumphalist, it is clear Nkrumah 
believed he helped to effect a change in the Pan-Africanist movement and this helped boost his 
confidence. His belief in his capability to affect change at conferences like the conferences of the 
1940s was one of his tricks in his arsenal of foreign policy moves and he would return to them 
often from 1957 to 1963. 
In the years before independence, both Padmore and Nkrumah had a vision of Africa and 
its political limits strikingly at odds with that of Nasser. Seeing it through the lens of race, 
neither believed that Arabs belonged in the movement. In his August 1955 letter to Nkrumah, 
Padmore explicitly stated that the basis of Pan-Africanist doctrine was “black nationalism plus 
socialism.”129 Tellingly, Nkrumah’s autobiography does not just adopt a similar understanding of 
Pan-Africanist; it also makes no mention of North Africans or any attempts to reach out to Arab 
political leaders and discuss with them African affairs before Ghana’s independence.130 Padmore 
and Nkrumah’s oversight was undoubtedly due to the fact that the roots of Pan-Africanism were 
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firmly rooted in the Afro-Caribbean intellectual tradition. Besides, Nkrumah’s outlook on unity 
in this period was restricted to West Africa and this showed his particularly narrow area of 
interest on the continent.131 Perhaps, as W. Scott Thompson argued, that Nkrumah found 
reaching out to the Arabs a tough sell domestically and to his closest followers because many 
believed the Arabs had always looked down on Black Africans.132 In any case, Padmore and 
Nkrumah were not very interested in the issues facing the wider Arab World, and ignored the 
ramifications of their push to build a great relationship with Israel around the time of Ghana’s 
independence.133 As I will show in chapter three, these were important oversights because their 
lack of knowledge and interest in Arab issues caused tensions with some North Africans when 
Nkrumah brought the two halves of Africa together at the first Conference of Independent 
African States in April 1958.  
The same can be said of his attitude and interest to the issues facing the states and leaders 
of the ex-AOF. In his autobiography, Nkrumah explains that he was guided by the idea of West 
African unity. He visited Paris in 1946 to invite the leading African politicians from the French 
colonial territories to a West African conference he was to host in London to discuss how to 
implement the idea. Nkrumah met many leading figures and managed to secure the interest of 
Léopold Senghor to come to the conference to represent the AOF.134 There is evidence to suggest 
that Nkrumah did not make a good impression at all on the Francophone African leaders when he 
met them. Contacts between them after their initial encounter rarely took place until 1960, and 
when they did, they ended terribly because Nkrumah tried to impose his stature and ideas on 
them. Shortly after independence in 1957, the Ghanaian leader visited the Ivory Coast (then a 
French colony) and attempted to convince its leader, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, to take the 
Ghanaian experience as gospel and to fight to secede from the French entirely because the 
Ivorian politician had his vision for his country all wrong. Houphouët-Boigny took exception to 
Nkrumah’s paternalistic message and retorted in public that he predicted Ghana would become 
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economically weak and isolated within a decade. Both ended the trip sourly on a bet to see which 
country would be better off in ten years’ time.135 Nkrumah neither respected nor appreciated the 
views of his Francophone colleagues, and as this dissertation will show, this severely 
complicated African affairs and undermined Ghana’s position on the continent by 1963. 
Another important aspect of Nkrumah’s foreign policy is that while he had a professional 
foreign service to inform and advise him as well as other advisors, all decisions were his 
alone.136 There is evidence that he listened to the advice given to him by his friend and advisor, 
George Padmore, in the mid-1950s. Padmore believed that a new country in international affairs 
was threatened with manipulation by other states and that other CPP members could seek to 
influence the direction of its foreign affairs. Thus, Padmore advised that it was “absolutely 
necessary that you, and you alone, should guide the country in its orientation as it moves into the 
bigger sphere of international relations.” Total control over the country’s foreign affairs needed 
to be upheld, which meant only trusted, loyal men could be entrusted with diplomatic posts.137 
Nkrumah heeded his friend’s advice, pushing a bill through parliament which stated that all 
ambassadorial posts were to be determined solely by the party in power (and by extension 
Nkrumah alone because he held executive power in the CPP), making them political and 
personal appointments.138 Many of these appointments, particularly to the most important 
countries, were given to loyal friends or family. In the case of his most loyal advisor, Nkrumah 
originally wanted to place Padmore as foreign minister but was forced to back down after 
members of his civil service strongly protested because he was a foreigner. Nkrumah thus placed 
himself as Ghana’s first foreign minister (he then chose his close political friend, Kojo Botsio, to 
replace him a year later), and undeterred, placed Padmore at the head of sensitive projects for 
Ghana’s foreign policy. He was first sent to Israel to create a strong relationship, then advised 
Nkrumah during important African conferences, and finally managed Ghana’s aid efforts to anti-
colonial African movements through a state institution he created, the Bureau of African Affairs, 
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from 1958 until his death in 1959.139 Nkrumah was not always methodical with his handling of 
foreign affairs, and handed important responsibilities to men he completely trusted, like 
Padmore. K.B. Asante, who had befriended Padmore on assignment to Israel and later worked to 
advise Nkrumah on African affairs, was handed the difficult responsibility of implementing the 
Casablanca Conference resolutions of January 1961.140 
There are quite a few constants in Nkrumah’s foreign policy from 1957-63, but none 
more important than the goal of spearheading some form of unity on the continent. At first his 
vision of unity was limited to West Africa, but he later extended it in the early 1960s to cover the 
whole continent as he grew bolder. The goal of unity was a question of strategy for Nkrumah, 
and it was a means to an end. In his first official state trip abroad as the Gold Coast’s Prime 
Minister in 1953, Nkrumah visited Liberia and gave an address at a well-attended party at 
President William Tubman’s residence. In his speech, entitled ‘The Vision that I See’, Nkrumah 
spelled out his state’s future foreign policy direction after independence. Nkrumah stated that 
“the campaign for a United West Africa had begun and that all the various territories on the West 
Coast of Africa should now think in terms of unity and solidarity with one another” because he 
believed that it was only by coming together as one that they could hold enough leverage to build 
equal respect on the world stage.141 This speech reveals one of the aspects of Nkrumah’s thought 
on post-colonial international relations. Achieving unity between African nations was required if 
they were to upset the disadvantageous power relations with the wider world that they had 
chronically suffered from. Not only could unity give the Africans the power to demand respect 
from abroad, but Nkrumah insisted it could also be the greatest tool in their arsenal to defeat 
colonialism. Perhaps most important for the future of African affairs, Nkrumah showed that he 
was insensitive to other states’ foreign policies by boasting his own ‘true’ vision. Given the 
position he would reveal a few years later, William Tubman was taken by surprise that Nkrumah 
came to his country and boasted of the coming of West African unity.  
Nkrumah did not have an unmitigated hatred and desire to vanquish his former colonial 
power. He openly expressed a great fondness for Great Britain and its people after living there in 
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the 1940s, he loved being courted by the Royalty, and even employed many British expatriates 
as close advisors and even as chief of staff of the armed forces.142 Unlike Nasser, Nkrumah never 
suffered a devastating military attack by former colonial powers, and this surely helped conserve 
a certain level of fondness for Great Britain. What Nkrumah resented from the colonial countries 
and what he dedicated himself to destroy over the first six years of Ghana’s independence was 
colonialism – which he defined as “the policy by which a foreign power binds territories to 
herself by political ties with the primary object of promoting her own economic advantage.”143 
Nkrumah saw the colonial relationship as exploitative and asymmetric because neither side 
recognised nor respected the other as an equal. It was a historic wrong that needed to be 
corrected, and according to his own analysis of colonialism he had to find a way to smash the 
exploitative ‘political ties’ linking African territories to colonial powers. This would allow the 
colonial territories to find their own governance and independence through which they would 
end their disadvantageous economic relations and gain the respect of other states as equals. 
Nkrumah saw the idea of unity between independent states as an important step towards freeing 
the African economies and even as a method to build a competitive and independent economic 
sphere in Africa. It was this mindset that led Nkrumah to judge and accuse many other African 
states who decided to partner with their former metropoles, particularly the states of the former 
AOF, as reactionaries and enemies of Africa because they sought to perpetrate colonialism 
because of their links to their former colonial power. Foremost on his mind was the liberation of 
the Gold Coast of colonialism, but he also saw further in the future. For Nkrumah, the threat of 
colonialism did not end at the Gold Coast’s independence because he believed that only when it 
was banished completely from the whole continent could a true independence be achieved for the 
Gold Coast and all other African nations.144 This was to be his main calling and a major theme of 
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Chapter II: Ghana and Egypt’s Continental Rivalry, 1957-1958 
 
At the independence celebrations of Ghana in March 1957, a jubilant Kwame Nkrumah 
met briefly with other African leaders for the first time as Ghana’s first Prime Minister. He 
publicly launched a novel idea which amidst the exuberance was easy to dismiss as far-fetched: 
the possibility of quickly hosting the first-ever conference between leaders of independent 
African states. The next few months, however, revealed that Nkrumah was serious and 
determined to carry it out despite an initial flurry of competitive bids to hold it elsewhere on the 
continent. Habib Bourguiba, arriving first to Accra, was the first to suggest to Nkrumah that he 
should hold the conference in Tunis.145 The Moroccan delegation, headed by Foreign Minister 
Ahmed Balafrej, quickly made a bid to the Ghanaian leader behind closed doors and tried to 
convince him to hold the conference in Morocco instead. According to diplomatic sources, there 
were noises from even further afield of another African state trying to stake its claim. The 
Egyptians, who were not attending the celebrations in Accra because of a suspicious lack of 
invitation by Nkrumah, were trying to make the claim that such a conference should be held in 
Cairo.146 The rush of bids by the leaders of African states to hold the first inter-governmental 
African conference demonstrates that each recognised the historic significance of holding this 
event in their own capital. Each understood that it could be an excellent opportunity to boost 
their popularity and their status in African affairs.  
Nkrumah, however, was prepared not to give way and was the most determined to bring 
the independent nations to Accra. After all, Nkrumah saw the opportunity as a logical 
progression of previous conferences he had attended abroad in the 1940s and 50s where African 
personalities met to discuss the state of colonialism and the ways to bring about its demise. He 
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quickly sent follow up letters the next month to pre-empt the others, and the invitations were sent 
that summer to the other independent African states to meet for a preparatory meeting. Officials 
of the Ghanaian, Sudanese, Liberian, Tunisian, Ethiopian, Libyan, and Moroccan governments 
met for the first time at the Sudanese Embassy in London on 15 August. This meeting was not 
only significant because it was the first of many which organised the first conference between 
African heads of state eight months later, but especially for its glaring omission.147 This was 
brought up at the first meeting, and it must have seemed curious to the officials involved that this 
upcoming conference was meant to be a meeting between all independent African states yet 
Egypt was not present. One reason, and the only one given by the acting Ghanaian High 
Commissioner at the meeting, was the fact that Egypt no longer had diplomatic representation in 
London as relations were cut with Britain during the Suez War.148 The acting High 
Commissioner did tell the others that he would send Egypt reports of preliminary meetings 
through the Indian High Commission, but this deliberately obfuscated Ghana’s strategy for the 
upcoming African conference.   
Despite pledging to keep Nasser informed and included, Nkrumah was duplicitous 
because he had already put his strategy in motion. Nkrumah was extremely suspicious of 
Nasser’s motives in Africa, and at once jealous and fearful of his status on the continent as one 
of the great leaders at Bandung and as the ‘victor’ over the colonial powers at Suez. It was 
impossible to keep Nasser out of African affairs for very long, yet Nkrumah purposely kept 
Egypt out of the first preliminary meeting for the African conference because he wanted to 
control the discourse of the first conference and its agenda. At Bandung, Nasser, as the largest 
leader of the few official delegations from Africa (Liberia, Libya, and Ethiopia participated), had 
assumed the voice for Africa and via the resolutions, associated the whole continent with the rest 
of the developing world. With the budding Afro-Asian solidarity movement, Nasser was 
focusing his efforts to become its leader and merge the African continent with Asia. Nkrumah 
was trying to keep Egypt’s influence to a minimum for three reasons: Nkrumah wanted a 
spotlight for himself on the new African stage for both domestic and continental ambitions; 
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starting at Bandung and the AAPSO, Nasser was gunning hard to be the forerunner on 
controlling the voice of Africa for the same purposes; and finally, Nkrumah knew that if Nasser 
were to control any agenda, he would bring about issues which would harm Ghana’s newfound 
relationship with Israel. 
 Egyptian-Ghanaian relations until late in 1958 were described in the media at the time as 
a rivalry, yet in the historiography this rivalry is described as “alleged.” According to this thesis, 
the rivalry did not exactly exist because Nkrumah and Nasser were never far apart on large 
international issues nor did they have any particularly conflicting foreign policies.149 While the 
two did begin to get closer from late 1958 to 1959, and indeed came to understand that they 
stood closer on many incredibly important issues than they had originally thought, their early 
relations did suffer from a rivalry marred by mutual suspicion and competition. The crux of their 
rivalry was a symptom of the continent’s ongoing post-colonial political struggle – the 
apprehension and misunderstandings of two parts above and below the Sahara as they strove to 
join up as they had before colonialism. On the one hand Nkrumah, a dedicated pan-Africanist, 
was determined to keep Africa’s decolonisation and its politics contained within Africa’s 
continental limits, and on the other Nasser believed the decolonisation of Africa was part of a 
much larger worldwide phenomenon in which African states should play an effective role in a 
much larger anticolonial struggle. It has also been written that a major cause of friction between 
the two was Nkrumah’s close relationship with Israel. While Nasser was undoubtedly concerned 
seeing the Israelis rapidly make ground in Ghana, not once did he try to defame, shame, or 
blackmail Nkrumah for siding with the Israeli ‘imperialists.’ Besides, the Ghanaian-Israeli 
relationship, while mutually beneficial in 1957 and 1958, soon fell out of importance for 
Nkrumah.150 The Ghanaian-Israeli relationship was nothing more than a minor nuisance.  
What instead stoked the fires of the rivalry was the confrontation of two different grand 
strategies waged by two aspiring postcolonial leaders. Gamal Abdel Nasser wanted to build on 
his stature as a key Afro-Asian figure by continuing the ‘spirit of Bandung’ and bringing the new 
African states into the Afro-Asian fold. Kwame Nkrumah, on the other hand, saw Nasser as a 
potential nuisance in African affairs because of his rising popularity and the fact that he had his 
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fingers in many geopolitical pies – the Middle East, the Afro-Asian sphere, the Cold War, and 
stood to firmly place another in Africa proper. For Nkrumah, the African continent should stand 
alone and make its proper mark in the world and could not afford to be being dragged into other 
geopolitical spheres. The problem, therefore, was that both leaders pictured their role on the 
continent to be the leading one. This rivalry erupted in the open during winter and spring of 1958 
at two rival conferences, the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Cairo and the first Conference 
of Independent African States (IAS) in Accra. This rivalry, whilst limited to Nasser and 
Nkrumah, was nevertheless emblematic of the positions taken by the North African and the Sub-
Saharan African states. As the first conference uniting free African leaders showed in Accra in 
April 1958, a major fault line emerged over the North African states’ Arab identity. The Arab 
leaders exhibited solidarity over the much-discussed principles of Bandung and the issue of 
Palestine yet found it difficult to understand why the Sub-Saharan African states would not back 
them. For leaders like Mohammed V and Habib Bourguiba it made sense to discuss the Palestine 
Question at the conference because of the number of Arab states attending. A deep sense of 
kinship was evident in the Arab leaders, and they attached a deep sense of importance to Arab 
affairs, even if an issue was actually located on the African continent. Yet for leaders like 
Kwame Nkrumah and Liberia’s William Tubman, they did not want to discuss at length and pass 
a resolution they considered a Middle Eastern problem because the conference was designed for 
African affairs. Thus, a differing conception of what was and should be part of Africa or 
‘African’ was hotly debated, and it took many African delegations at the conference by surprise 
because they assumed all parties were on the same page. Part of the question behind the fault line 
was whether or not Africa was poised to stand tall by itself during this process of decolonisation 
or if it was merely a small part of a much bigger geopolitical whole facing the anti-colonial 
struggle. The first Conference of Independent African States was a crucial step in reconciling the 
Saharan divide imposed by the colonial powers because it helped to resolve the issue of the 
North African states’ Arab identity and the building of a shared African identity.  
Nasser Enters African Affairs: The Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Conference 
 In the context of the Middle East, the Soviet Union and Egypt had developed a working 
relationship since 1955. Hoping to gain a foothold in the region, the Soviet leadership granted 
steady supplies of arms to the Egyptian army and also given technical and financial aid for the 
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Aswan Dam project. This aid was very beneficial for Nasser because it secured his new regime 
and freed him to wage a foreign policy – for one, Soviet arms would placate his demanding and 
unruly army, while the Aswan Dam project had the potential to help Egypt’s agricultural sector 
and development plan.151 The Soviet Union also had its eyes on the African continent because of 
the loosening grip of the colonial powers. More and more countries were becoming independent, 
and the Soviet Union wanted to develop new and beneficial relationships to grow their 
influence.152 Nasser’s stock had risen in the Afro-Asian world since 1955 because of his 
attendance at the Bandung Conference and then his ‘victory’ over the colonial powers in the 
Suez War in 1956, which attracted many anti-colonial figures from all over Africa to come to 
Cairo. For his next foreign policy move and just as the Soviet Union, he aimed to act on his 
words from his Philosophy of the Revolution and grow Egypt’s influence in Africa.  
 Gamal Abdel Nasser gained a good reputation both at home and abroad at the Bandung 
conference in 1955, and it was a seminal moment for him.153 Not only was it his first trip abroad 
as Egypt’s leader (therefore signalling his regime’s solid hold on power), but he met other 
leaders who, like himself, took a stand against colonialism and it put him in the international 
spotlight.154 Given that Bandung was heavily publicized throughout the world, it allowed the rest 
of the developing world to see him for the first time and demonstrated to the Egyptians that their 
new leader was important on the international stage. Bandung did a lot for his image and prestige 
as an anticolonial figure, but perhaps his crowning achievement at Bandung is that he managed 
to wrest some time and attention on two key issues of Egypt’s foreign policy – the colonial war 
in Algeria, and the unsolved Question of Palestine.155 Among the leaders who attended the 
Bandung Conference, Nasser was the most keen to hold another conference to continue the 
‘Spirit of Bandung’ to build on his success there and the Egyptian Government raised the 
question of holding another conference several times in 1956-7. India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, 
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and Indonesia were tasked by the conference to organise a second, but due to disputes over 
future Soviet and Israeli participation, the refusal of Baghdad and SEATO pact countries to 
attend, and the fear of the conference becoming an Arab-Nationalist platform if held in the 
Middle East, the project floundered and many countries lost interest.156 Throughout 1956 and 
1957, the most ardent supporters of holding another conference were Egypt, the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), and the Soviet Union, the latter of which was desperately trying to get 
closer to the Afro-Asian countries to compete with the PRC, which had been present at 
Bandung.157 As a result of several meetings between Egyptian, Soviet, Chinese, and Japanese 
Communist figures in the Soviet Union, India, and Egypt in December 1956, Nasser authorised 
the holding of an Afro-Asian conference in Cairo in the fall of 1957.158  
The context of the timing of this conference is important should not be shrugged off as a 
coincidence because it came so closely before Nkrumah’s conference of Independent African 
States. The Ghanaian leader’s quick strives to get the conference going, coupled with his attempt 
to keep Cairo in the dark was interpreted by Nasser as the rise of a challenger for supremacy in 
African affairs. Nasser knew that his position in the lead of Africa’s race was tentative; adopting 
Africa’s voice at Bandung was not enough to secure victory. Worst of all, should Nkrumah’s 
conference limit its focus to the continent of Africa, his strategy of expanding the resolutions of 
Bandung and the appeal of the Afro-Asian sphere would be stunted. Nasser needed to act quickly 
and decisively on the African front, and he did so in two ways. First, he rushed the planning and 
invitations of his own conference and second, he would rally the Arab states behind him and 
undermine Nkrumah. At the 28th session of the Arab League in November, Nasser got a few 
special recommendations passed by its council in a “bundle entitled “Tightening of the links 
between Arabs in the countries of the African continent.” The political committee of the Arab 
League therefore recommended to every member of the League to generalise their diplomatic 
relations in the Arab-African countries, to install Arab League bureaus in them, and finally to 
 
156 Central Intelligence Agency, CIA-RDP78-00915R000700140014-4 “The Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference, 
Cairo, Egypt – 26 December 1957 – 1 January 1958,” 1-2, accessed 12 January 2019, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78-00915R000700140014-4.pdf  
157 The Soviet Union was kept from being represented at the Bandung Conference but admitted to a body closely 
associated with conference, the Committee for Asian Solidarity, just after Bandung in 1955. See, “Monsieur Larock, 
Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, à Messieurs les Agents diplomatiques et consulaires. Bruxelles, le 11 février 
1958.” AE/II/22 (2912) Archives Africaines, Royaume de Belgique, Affaires Étrangères, Commerce Extérieur et 
Coopération au Développement, Brussels, 25. 
158 Ibid, 3-5. 
61 
 
organise better links between them and the Afro-Asian states.159 Nasser was arguably the most 
powerful figure in the Arab League at the time and this move was meant to bring the Arab-
African states closer together and to the Afro-Asian states. Doing so would enable Nasser to go 
to Nkrumah’s conference and support him while he steered its African agenda under the 
umbrella of the Afro-Asian group.  
In the course of the spring and summer of 1957, Nasser extended invitations to the other 
Bandung states and offered to pay for transport and lodgings for the attendees.160 His hopes of 
being the host of the ‘second Bandung Conference’ were dashed, however, because many of the 
states refused to send official delegations from their governments or recognise a delegation from 
their country.161 According to Belgian intelligence sources, only eleven states could be 
considered as having either organised or approved to allow a delegation to take part in the 
conference which included a mixed bag of Communist states (the PRC, North Korea, and the 
USSR) and some African states (Ghana, Ethiopia and Egypt). This meant that Nasser’s 
conference in Cairo was going to be different than the one in Bandung because it would not be at 
held at an inter-governmental level. Undeterred, he designed it as a “conference for Afro-Asian 
peoples” which welcomed all delegations from the Afro-Asian world and as a result, the 
conference had various unofficial delegations coming from more countries to Cairo (45) than 
ever went to Bandung (29).162 Gamal Abdel Nasser understood that beating Nkrumah to the 
punch at hosting a conference on African soil was an opportunity to promote Egypt’s agenda and 
also influence the tone and discourse of future continental conferences, thus building more 
exposure and prestige for himself and for Egypt. To do so, however, he needed to ensure its 
complete domination before deliberations even started in order to make it impossible for any 
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other figure to have too much influence on the outcome. As the preparatory commission met in 
October, the Egyptian Government began to frame the tone and discourse which would 
characterise the conference. Public cables were sent by the commission to the United Nations 
urging Dag Hammarskjold to intervene in the Algerian War. Media coverage in Cairo also began 
a propaganda campaign in which it insisted that the coming conference would be affirm the 
Afro-Asian opinion as it had been manifested at Bandung, as well as promoting the advantages 
of adopting a policy of positive-neutralism, and urging others to take on the call of the struggle 
against imperialism.163 A month before the conference Nasser ramped up the propaganda a 
notch, and the Egyptian Government declared the second week of December a special 
propaganda week. It featured particularly vitriolic news editorials and radio broadcasts attacking 
Western imperialism and much praise was given to the Afro-Asian Bloc.164 Unsurprisingly, due 
to these efforts and the election at the preparatory meeting of Anwar al Sadat and Yusuf al Sibai 
as chairman and secretary general of the conference, the conference’s resolutions were decided 
in advance and designed to serve Egypt’s national interest.165 
As a result of the lack of interest by many of the original states who had supported and 
organised the original Bandung Conference (key of which was Nehru’s decision to snub the 
effort altogether), Nasser suddenly became the inheritor of the Afro-Asian mantle.166 
Furthermore, since he was hosting the conference on home soil it was a golden opportunity to 
use it as a platform to promote items on his own agenda and put the international issues he cared 
about under the spotlight. In this respect Nasser achieved some measure of success because the 
colonial war in Algeria was discussed in its own item on the agenda. Nasser also managed to get 
the conference to recognise the Bandung principles before passing two important resolutions to 
stand out from the rest. Resolutions five and six give the Egyptian stand on the issues of Algeria 
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and Palestine. Thus, the conference agreed that the French were waging a colonial war of 
extermination against the Algerian people, that the Algerians had the right to independence and 
sovereignty and demanded that the French government cease its actions and give independence 
to the Algerians. As for Palestine, the conference declared that Israel was “a base of imperialism 
which threatens the progress and security of the Middle East” and supported the right of return of 
the Palestinian people to their homeland.167 These resolutions perfectly echoed Egypt’s stand on 
its most important issues, and other resolutions helped set a language, a tone, as well as a list of 
issues and recommendations that would re-appear at other conferences. These included: the 
backing of the Bandung principles as the only just basis of international relations, the 
condemnation of imperialism as a tactic to undermine national governments and the sovereignty 
of the new states, the call for all colonial powers to hand over independence to their territories 
immediately, the duty of Afro-Asian people to unite and assist others in their struggle for 
independence with any means possible, a call for the unjust end of racial discrimination as tool to 
subjugate peoples, the need to for economic and technical cooperation, as well as the need for 
more cultural and social exchanges to allow former colonial peoples to get to know one 
another.168  
A key strategy was wielded by Sadat and Sibai to make the resolutions the gold standard 
for the following conferences – they did so by crafting and wording the resolutions in a way to 
adopt a much wider voice than the mere groups attending the conference. The tactic of adopting 
the voice of a larger whole was not new, as Nasser had done it before at Bandung when he 
claimed to speak for the whole of Africa. Thus, resolutions from the conference claimed to be 
from the entirety of the ‘Afro-Asian Peoples’ to give them more weight and the allure of 
righteousness.169 The general tone and language evident in the resolutions was also very vitriolic 
and calculated to dispel any notion that the colonial powers were potential partners for Africa’s 
future. Reeling from the Suez War, Egypt lost all trust in France and Great Britain and was 
engaged in low intensity conflict with them to loosen their grip on their colonial territories. 
Nasser wanted others to join him in the same venture to reel back colonial power because it 
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would create a vacuum for him to fill. Thus, the resolutions condemned the colonial powers are 
referred to as “tyrant imperialists” and charge them of the ultimate sin - deliberately dividing and 
ruining the peoples they ruled for their own benefit.170 This point is particularly important for 
two reasons – for one, the question of whether or not the colonial powers could be trusted as 
partners would divide the continent into two blocs of African states from 1960 to 1962. Second, 
this message had an incredible resonance with the younger, up-and-coming generation of 
political leaders present in many African states. Wielding this message had the potential and 
would later be used to empower the younger political opposition to undermine the established 
generation of politicians who chose to keep their relationships with the colonial powers.  
The Cairo conference represented more to Nasser than the chance to spread Egypt’s 
agenda and ideas, to monopolise the discourse of Africa’s decolonisation, and to set a precedent 
for future conferences. Nasser’s stand against the colonial powers had attracted anti-colonial 
figures in the recent past and he wanted to make Cairo the epicentre of Africa’s struggle against 
colonialism. Thus, an important goal for Nasser was reached at the conference by establishing a 
permanent body in Cairo headed by an Egyptian (which would go on to become the Afro-Asian 
Peoples’ Solidarity Organization, or AAPSO) tasked with carrying out the resolutions and help 
disseminate information.171 This permanent secretariat, headed by Yusuf al Sibai, was the 
nucleus of Nasser’s plan to turn Cairo into a base for fighting anti-colonialism on the continent 
and to attract more anticolonial figures to the Egyptian capital. To make Cairo the visible bastion 
of anti-colonialism, he had to make good on Egypt’s promise to fulfil its obligations to the 
resolutions (as well as encourage the others to join). To this end, Nasser ordered to begin 
beaming anticolonial propaganda aimed at the African interior in a few African languages, and 
shortly after the conference the powerful station at Mansourah was put to work with a new 
program called The Voice of Free Africa.172 It was not long until this new propaganda tool 
reached its intended effect. In February 1958 with the colonial powers alarmed, the Belgian 
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Government put its national radio institute to work on a project to scramble Cairo’s 
transmissions without preventing the European radio signals from getting into Africa.173  
On paper, Nasser’s conference was a success for Egypt, but his attempt to constrain the 
dialogue and direction during the proceedings utterly failed. This conference was designed to be 
Egypt’s show, but the Soviet Union had other ideas. Given that this conference was the Soviet 
Union’s first foray into Afro-Asian affairs, it is unsurprising that its delegation made a big 
splash. Many observers noted that the Soviet delegation, headed by the President of the 
International Institute of Economic Sciences at Moscow, A. A. Arzumanyan, was incredibly 
active in all the proceedings and that its work was widely publicised in the Soviet Union.174 
Causing the biggest stir at the conference and among Western observers, however, was the 
Soviet Union’s position on its future aid to Afro-Asian states: “The Soviet Union holds that the 
underdeveloped countries are entitled to assistance without any conditions – military or political, 
economic or social – that is to say, such assistance should be rendered in conformity with the 
Bandung principles.”175 Apart from the veiled offer of aid to the Afro-Asian states, the Soviet 
delegation took up too much room in the proceedings by trying to dominate them. According to a 
source close to the Belgian Ambassador in Cairo, the Egyptian leader was very displeased by the 
unexpected turn the conference took towards communism, and the conference’s president, 
Anwar Sadat was even held responsible for losing control of the conference.176 According to the 
Portuguese observers at the conference in Cairo, Egyptian politicians, both during and after the 
conference, scrambled to dispel the general impression that the conference was a tool to spread 
communism.177 More signs came out shortly after the conference of Egypt’s displeasure with the 
USSR and of the two governments’ different views of the conference, particularly in the press. In 
Egypt, the newspaper tasked with covering the conference neglected to mention the USSR’s 
active role at the conference and gave a completely different account than the ones given in 
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Izvestiya and Pravda.178 The official post-conference account destined for the Afro-Asian 
countries was published in Moscow and included a propaganda piece masquerading as a preface 
meant to entice the Afro-Asian countries to nurture ties with the Soviet Union.179 Worse for the 
Egyptian Government, however, was that all the fanfare they raised about the conference never 
reached the intended effect among Egypt’s population as reactions were apathetic.180 Egypt’s 
failure to contain the Soviet Union at the conference was the reason why Nasser turned his eye to 
hijack and dominate the upcoming conference in Accra. 
Interestingly, the Ghanaian Government did send an official delegation to Nasser’s 
Conference upon his invitation, and observers at the time noted that Nkrumah did so because he 
wanted to ensure Egypt’s attendance in Accra the following spring.181 There were undoubtedly 
another reason for Ghana’s official attendance there, as Nkrumah surely wanted to gather first-
hand information on Egypt’s behaviour at the conference to warn him of any potential pitfalls at 
his own conference. Although there are no available verbatim accounts of the conference and 
despite the measures used by the organisers to keep disagreements from reaching the public, one 
of the most notable events at the conference involved the Ghanaian delegation and leaked out to 
Western officials. The Ghanaian delegation interrupted the proceedings to level a declaration in 
protest of the Soviet Union’s intervention in Hungary in the fall of 1956.182 Since word of this 
protest leaked out, it probably caused quite an uproar in the conference (not to mention insulting 
the Soviet delegation) and surely caused embarrassment to the Egyptians.   
Planning the First Conference of Independent African States 
In the first preliminary meeting, the acting Ghanaian High Commissioner wasted no time 
and established the general substance, goal, and limits of the first conference of African states. 
To Nkrumah, this conference’s aim would form the first steps to a post-colonial Africa and repair 
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the bonds and connections between African peoples ruptured by the colonial powers. Thus, first 
and foremost, the acting High Commissioner proposed that it should be a forum in which the 
governments of independent states of Africa could congregate, get to know one another, and 
exchange political views.183 Although it did not explicitly say so to the others, to prevent Egypt 
from stealing the show at the conference, the Ghanaian government asked to limit the attendance 
to heads of state or foreign ministers of independent African states. Observers from territories 
under colonial rule, many of whom were in exile in Cairo, would not be allowed to attend.184 
This would then allow more spotlight on Ghana at the conference, but also prevent Egypt from 
using more voices to echo Nasser’s agenda. This meeting adjourned until Ghana could propose a 
general agenda for the conference, and Egypt be notified of what had transpired.185 The minutes 
of the second meeting, which took place in the Ethiopian Embassy on 8 November, gives 
evidence that Egypt was not pleased to have not been consulted about this conference and 
seemingly found itself on the back foot. Egypt, through a note given to and read out by the 
Ghanaian government, requested that it be part of the organisation of the conference and 
suggested that a meeting of officials take place in Cairo or Khartoum to lay the groundwork for 
the conference.186 Nasser clearly hoped that he could manage to shape the coming conference at 
the last minute in his own backyard. This was immediately nixed by the Ghanaian acting High 
Commissioner as Egypt’s proposal may or may not be needed, and he later suggested (with the 
other attendees agreeing) that officials would instead meet in Accra weeks before the conference 
in order to help the Secretary General with the final preparations of the conference.187 The 
meeting adjourned after Ghana’s promise to draw up a proper agenda proposal, and after all 
parties had agreed to push back the January 1958 official date of the conference in Accra because 
it coincided with Sudan’s elections.188  
The heads of missions in London met a further three times, in November 1957, February 
and April 1958 and discussed the agenda for the upcoming conference as well as other issues. At 
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these meetings, Egypt was never brought up, nor was it recorded that any of the attendees had 
sought to reach out to the Egyptian government for input.189 Perhaps this was due to the fact that 
in December, Nasser had held and directed his own anti-colonial conference which formed the 
groundwork for the Egypt-based Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO). Nasser 
had shown his cards at this conference, and all African leaders were now aware that African 
affairs were subsumed within an Afro-Asian framework, and that Nasser had a penchant for 
wanting to focus most of the attention on Arab issues. Some of the independent African states 
also had recent troubles with Egypt, particularly because Nasser had meddled in their affairs, 
which could also explain why Tunisia, Libya, and Sudan did not help Egypt’s cause at the 
meetings. None profited more from the fact that Nasser had no way of attending the meetings in 
London than Nkrumah, since he got to propose, negotiate, and settle the agenda for the 
conference without his interference. Egypt aside, these preliminary meetings were important for 
other reasons which had repercussions for the future development of inter-African affairs.  
The first point raised on Nkrumah’s agenda for the conference was a discussion regarding 
the problem of “subversive acts” on the African continent. The Liberian ambassador in London 
raised the point that the term was quite vague and needed clarification. He pointed out that this 
term could mean coup attempts coming from within the state, and the others stated that these acts 
were the exclusive domain of the state affected. In a paper circulated to the other missions after 
this meeting, the Liberian Government defined its position on what it had raised at the meeting, 
and what they had meant by subversive acts. They agreed with their fellow African states that it 
was the responsibility of their new states “by virtue of its sovereign rights, must be in a position, 
by means of penal and other laws to fight effectively against the subversive activities carried out 
by its nationals, with a view to overthrowing rightly and legally constituted authorities.” What 
they instead seemed to be musing were foreign (i.e. non-African) powers hatching plots against 
their states to overthrow their regimes.190 Subversive acts were placed into the agenda for the 
conference as item number five, and all agreed that what they had in mind were plots devised by 
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non-continental powers aimed at undermining the independent states in Africa.191 This is 
significant because it shows that in 1957 and early 1958 the independent African states were still 
in an anti-colonial mindset when it came to the term ‘subversive activities’. They believed that 
the main threats to their sovereignty and their regimes were coming from outside of Africa. None 
had ventured to mention and discuss (and therefore did not think) the possibility of African states 
using these same tactics against one another, or of using the conference as a forum to discuss 
such problems. Sudan, Libya, and Tunisia all had issues with Nasser meddling in their affairs, 
yet they curiously did not come to this conclusion and point it out in the talks. In the minds of all 
the African governments, whatever happened inside their state were private matters and they did 
believe in the sanctity of state sovereignty. In the spring of 1958, however, they did not yet 
entertain the thought of installing a system of rules in African diplomacy to prevent other 
African states from interfering in their domestic affairs. 
Nkrumah wanted the spotlight on the continent of Africa for his conference, and he kept 
his conference agenda isolated as much as he could from other previous conferences, particularly 
Bandung in 1955 and the Afro-Asian conference in Cairo in December 1957. Nkrumah wanted 
to create a sole focus on the continent and its issues for the conference and help build up an 
‘African personality’. Thus, billing this conference as a successor of the Afro-Asian conference 
at Bandung, a conference with very little African representation (and a conference Nkrumah 
never attended), would be detrimental. For one, it but it would also deviate its true lineage as a 
successor to the Pan-African congresses, but it would also bring the conference under the 
shadow of Nasser, Afro-Asianism, and issues outside of Africa. Ethiopia, however, had other 
ideas. Having participated at Bandung in 1955, the Ethiopian Government requested that the 
Bandung principles be included and re-affirmed. The Ghanaian officials grudgingly suggested 
that they should be attached at the end of the agenda.192 The shadow of Bandung began to creep 
closer as the conference drew nearer; it exposed a fault line that would pit the Sub-Saharan 
African states against the Arab-African states on key issues like the Algerian War and a Middle 
Eastern conflict, the Question of Palestine.  
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Bandung had not only been a platform for independent Afro-Asian states, but also for 
observers from different territories under colonial rule, and some of the African governments did 
not see why this conference should not allow any. Apart from allowing Asian issues to creep into 
African affairs, when Nkrumah devised this conference he really wanted it to be effective on the 
world stage and therefore designed it specifically to include only delegations of independent 
African states.193 Furthermore, Nkrumah seemingly wanted to distance his conference as much 
as he could from Nasser’s Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Conference held in Cairo where the 
majority of delegations were essentially non-governmental in nature, being chocked full of anti-
colonial groups. This issue was exacerbated two months before the conference because of the 
insistence by three Arab states, Morocco, Tunisia, and Sudan, of allowing observers from 
colonial territories and even allowing Algeria and Italian Somaliland the status of an official 
delegation to help their claims. Ethiopia immediately reminded the heads of these states that it 
had been agreed beforehand that this conference would only be for independent African states. 
Libya backed Ethiopia on this issue and, echoing Ghana’s statements in the first meeting, stated 
that opening the door to every dependency could cost the conference its potential for success.194 
The matter was again raised five days before the conference, where it was requested that this 
time only an official Algerian delegation be allowed to join the conference. Seemingly satisfying 
every government involved that the issue of allowing observers was dropped, the matter was 
forwarded to the conference in Accra for additional debate.195 Another facet of this rift was the 
simmering issue concerning the African states’ identities. Brought up at the final preparatory 
meeting of heads of missions five days before the conference began, Tunisia and Morocco 
wondered why Arabic was not included as an official language of the conference.196 This may 
have been an oversight by Ghana, which had planned that the conference be held in two 
commonly used languages in Africa for ease of communication, English and French. Although 
the conference was not designed to host any of the participants’ African languages, it would 
emerge in the conference that it was nonetheless taken as a slight by the Arab states because it 
formed an integral part of their identity.  
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The first Conference of Independent African States 
For the first time since the colonial period of Africa’s history, official delegations of 
African governments from North, West, and East Africa were congregating to hold political 
talks. While every African state recognised and understood the significance of this conference 
for the continent’s history and the people still under colonial rule, each brought to Accra 
different hopes and aims which led to some sparring during the conference.197 As nascent 
African states, the stakes were high for the leaders of the delegations for several reasons. For 
three actors, Egypt, Ghana, and Tunisia, putting their stamp on the proceedings was crucial 
because it would establish and ensure a high position in the coming African hierarchy of states. 
Nkrumah, who had initiated the conference, saw it as an opportunity to prove to his people that 
he was one of Africa’s most important political figures and continued the anti-colonial struggle. 
For the Arab states it was crucial for the Sub-Saharan states to get accept their Arab identity by 
having their language adopted, their issues discussed, and resolutions reflecting their concerns. 
As far as Nasser was concerned, he had been kept out of the planning for the conference and was 
clearly being put on the back foot. Thus, his aim was to push his agenda onto the conference, 
dominate the proceedings, bring the Africans into the Afro-Asian fold, conserve the legacy of 
Bandung, as well as keep building his status as one of the most important figures in the Third 
World.  
Side-lined completely by Nkrumah from the preliminary meetings, Nasser was not 
pleased to see that his influence in African politics was being stymied and he was clearly vexed. 
Choosing not to attend the conference, he instead sent his foremost emissary, Foreign Minister 
Mahmoud Fawzi, with a simple set of orders. This stage might well have been set in Accra, but 
Fawzi was to do whatever he could to make sure the conference became an Egyptian show and 
to advance Egypt’s interests. Fawzi wasted no time in making a very strong impression, and as is 
evident throughout the proceedings, he would persistently be unpleasant and an uncomfortable 
presence for the others. In the opening speeches of the conference, Fawzi began with criticism 
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for not being allowed to express himself in a proper African language.198 He changed the subject 
soon after, and demonstrated to the conference Egypt’s personality and role on the Afro-Asian 
stage: “It is a distinct pleasure […] for me to be able to bring you today, from North-Eastern 
Africa and far beyond it, the greetings and the renewed expression of gratitude of the United 
Arab Republic” (Egypt had begun to use this name for its state after its fusion with Syria) and 
reminded his state was the only African state which was located both in Africa and Asia. 
Furthermore, he alluded to the recent Afro-Asian conference in Cairo and stated that his 
government was pleased that this conference was being held in the same spirit as Bandung.199 
The start and tone of the speech was a strong re-assertion of Nasser’s description of Egypt’s 
identity as set down in the Philosophy of the Revolution – that Egypt was the bridge between 
Africa and Asia, and that Arabic was the cornerstone of Egypt’s Islamic personality.  
To the shock of Nkrumah, Fawzi then brought up two important issues for his country – 
cornerstones of Nasser’s grand strategy – that would cause the most debate at the conference. 
This conference, Fawzi hoped, would highlight the continued murderous nature of colonialism, 
which had been revealed by France’s grip on Algeria. Another important colonial power also had 
to be dealt with since it was equally bad – world Zionism and its ills in Palestine. Foreshadowing 
what he would bring up for debate in the conference, Fawzi brought up the rights of the people 
of Palestine and Algeria three times.200 Whilst the Algerian War had been raised as an issue for 
discussion in the preliminary meetings, the Palestine Question had not. This issue was precisely 
what the Ghanaian leader tried to prevent – the adoption of issues from outside of the African 
continent and not necessarily of concern to all African states. To the chagrin of Nkrumah, who 
was in attendance, Nasser was not deterred by his absence in the planning of the conference. If 
he couldn’t control the conference by planning it, he would instead hijack it. Finally, at the end 
of the speech, Fawzi quickly unveiled Nasser’s strategy for the conference – a series of eight 
points that the conference needed to address. Since Nasser had not been consulted when building 
the agenda, he proposed his own one which he hoped would find resolutions; apart from some 
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general points, three, four, and five were most poignant: “3. Renew our adherence to the 
resolutions of the Asian African Conference which was held in Bandung in 1955. 4. Express with 
particular emphasis our support of the rights of the Arab Nation of Palestine. 5. Equally express 
our support of the right of Algeria to independence.”201 The message was clear – Nasser wanted 
both the questions of Palestine and Algeria to appear separately in the conference’s resolutions, 
just as he had managed to do at Bandung in 1955 and in Cairo a few months prior. Egypt’s 
commitment to fighting colonialism was the kernel of its grand strategy, and hence Nasser was 
deeply invested in the Algerian resistance’s quest for independence as well as seeking ways to 
reclaim Palestine for the Arabs. Just as Nasser often did in international affairs, Fawzi’s conduct 
at the conference was destined to ruffle feathers. 
Egypt’s Disruption of the First Conference of African States 
 The First Conference of Independent African States (IAS) began shortly after speeches 
were delivered by the heads of delegations on 15 April at the parliament buildings in Accra. It 
should be noted that the only accessible official record of this conference in existence is the 
English version which was meant to include all translations from the French delegations. 
However, many passages from delegations using French went unrecorded for unknown reasons. 
Thus, the contributions of the Tunisian, Moroccan, and Libyan delegations are unknown in the 
first day of talks. French official versions were sent to the French-speaking delegations but were 
not accessible at the time of writing and it is unknown if these copies survive. An agenda had 
been set back in late March as a result of meetings in London in the previous months and this 
was to be the order of proceedings at the IAS conference. The agenda stipulated that the first 
order of business was to be a frank exchange of views about the African states’ foreign policies, 
the continuing problem of colonial dependencies, the war in Algeria, the problem of race, and 
“the steps to be taken to safeguard the independence and sovereignty of the Independent African 
States.” Second on the agenda were talks on how the states could better cooperate on an 
economic level, as well as share technical, scientific, and educational matters. Third on the list 
related to holding discussions on cultural missions at both the governmental and non-
governmental levels. The fourth item on the agenda related to talks on the prospect of 
international peace, as well as the problem of conformity with the Charter of the United Nations 
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and the Re-affirmation of the Principles of the Bandung Conference.” Finally, the last items were 
discussions about foreign subversive activities, the African maritime belt, and the option of 
setting up a permanent machinery apparatus of the conference.202 Since Egypt had not been privy 
to this agenda, Nasser had other ideas in mind and put Fawzi to the task. 
 Kicking off the talks behind closed doors, Fawzi immediately criticized the agenda, 
demanded alterations, and joined the Sudanese delegation in voicing their displeasure that Arabic 
could not be used at the conference. Africans were meant to be able to use their languages at 
international gatherings and Fawzi stated that he hoped they should do so in the future. Fawzi 
gave the continued effect of colonialism as a possible reason, but his displeasure was aimed at 
the organisers of the conference, notably the Ghanaians, and Nkrumah took exception to the 
Egyptian slight. This noted a change of attitudes in the Egyptian camp as establishing an Arab 
dimension to a conference they did not plan was important; in the runup to the AAPSO 
conference in Cairo they had also been guilty of omitting a language, French, and only using 
Arabic and English.203 All the delegations then agreed with Fawzi that all African languages 
should be recognised and suitable arrangements be made to accommodate them in the future. 
Fawzi then finished the discussion of official languages with the dubious and somewhat insulting 
assertion that since Arabic came first alphabetically over the other languages, it should therefore 
come first in all official publications.204  
The first real tense exchange of words came later that day and the division between Arab 
and Sub-Saharan African states was exposed as the delegations discussed the first item on the 
agenda, notably the Algerian Question. Liberia was shocked that during their speeches, the Arab 
states were making the Algerian struggle a special case over other African ones.205 Just as 
happened in the preliminary meetings in the months prior, the issue of allowing either 
delegations or observers from elsewhere in Africa soon came up. Tunisia, following up on the 
last meeting before the conference, tabled a proposal to allow an Algerian delegation to attend 
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the conference. Nkrumah then re-stated the point that this conference was only for independent 
African states. Liberia also explained that the Algerians were not the only nation seeking 
independence and that it was frankly insulting that Nigeria and Kenya could therefore not been 
invited and recognised if the Algerians were.206 Fawzi seized the opportunity to back Tunisia’s 
request and put the Ghanaians on the back foot. He pointed out that it was ridiculous the 
Algerians were not invited because Algeria was a de facto “independent country” and subtly 
demonstrated that Ghana’s defence of the point was not in the spirit of the United Nations which 
allowed ‘dependent peoples’ to speak.207 With the Arab states ganging up on the others over this 
issue, Nkrumah was put in an awkward position. To the surprise of many at the conference, it 
then emerged that an Algerian delegation had already assembled in Accra and were waiting for 
the chance to address the conference. There is no solid evidence showing who invited members 
of the FLN to Accra, but it is very likely that the Egyptian government had brought them. After 
all, they had done the same at Bandung in 1955, and Nasser was the closest leader to the 
Algerians, and their largest sponsor of arms and financial aid. It is therefore very plausible that 
the Egyptian government had brought an Algerian delegation to Accra to force Nkrumah’s hand, 
and to ensure that the Algerian delegation would be made into a special case at the IAS 
conference. 
Under the pressure from Egypt and the other African states, Nkrumah relented but only if 
the Algerians came to state their case to the conference. A very pushy Fawzi then pressed 
Egypt’s case further. Fawzi argued that the Algerians were still not afforded the proper status 
they deserved like they had at Bandung, and that their case seemed to be taking a step back.208 
The Ghanaian delegation, undoubtedly annoyed, then told the Egyptian Foreign Minister to stop 
pushing his luck. It was impossible to be fair to every nation vying for its independence given the 
situation because it was simply impossible to invite them all. Besides, the decision had already 
been made before the conference that it would only be for independent African states; therefore 
the Algerians already present in Accra should exceptionally be allowed to speak at the 
conference.209 That night Nkrumah backed into a corner even more, yet found a way to even out 
the balance between the Arabs and Sub-Saharan Africans at the conference. The Cameroonian 
 
206 Ibid, 218, 222. 
207 Ibid, 222. 
208 Ibid, 223. 
209 Ibid, 225. 
76 
 
anti-colonial figure who had sought refuge in Cairo, Félix Moumié, had arrived in Accra and 
called the Ghanaian leader to ask if he could be part of the conference. Nkrumah told him he 
would support his appearance and right to speak during the conference the next day, and the 
conference agreed to have him address the conference after the Algerians on April 17.210 
Nkrumah had been pipped by Egypt, and he bitterly made clear his displeasure of hosting people 
of non-independent nations: “let the representative from Algeria and the Cameroons appear 
before us with a spokesman. Give him a little time, let him tell his case and then he goes away. 
That is the line which we should adopt. I do not think we should allow any of them to debate 
anything upon it. Let them come forward, put their case and off they go.”211  
 Mahmoud Fawzi had first raised the issue of Palestine in the opening speeches of the 
conference on the first day of deliberations, and it soon became clear during the conference that 
Nasser had set him the goal of putting Palestine under the African spotlight. This move was very 
clever because with some persistent prodding, the other Arab states had to file behind Egypt. 
Given the unanimous and full support given to the Palestinian cause in the Arab World, the Arab 
states at the conference simply could not be seen going against the Palestinian cause. The 
Palestine Question had the potential of a domino effect of support in the Arab camp and all it 
needed was a little push from Fawzi. Rushing ahead of everyone to ask the chairman, Kwame 
Nkrumah, to speak first on the topic of foreign policies, he quickly demanded that the conference 
should reaffirm the principles of Bandung as well as address the unsolved problems of Palestine 
and Algeria.212 Fawzi’s tactic worked, and the Libyan and Moroccan delegations modified their 
discussion of their foreign policies and urged common action to support Palestine.213 As a bonus 
for suggesting re-affirming the Bandung principles, Libya and Ethiopia jumped aboard and 
backed Egypt. The Ethiopian added further that the African states should form closer bonds with 
Asian states as “this African group of ours is in essence part of a bigger family, the Afro-Asian 
family.”214  
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 Later in the conference during a discussion on disarmament, Fawzi changed the topic 
entirely to bring up the issue of Palestine again and it put the attendees under pressure. He 
advised the preparatory committee that it should place Palestine accordingly in the draft 
resolutions of the conference. Up until this moment, Nkrumah had managed to sidestep the issue 
of adding the Palestine issue in the resolutions, but Fawzi was now bringing the issue to a head. 
The Ghanaian leader immediately noted that this advice was not heeded because there were 
members of the conference against doing so.215 The Sudanese Foreign Minister agreed with 
Fawzi, but the Liberian delegation immediately protested: the Palestine Question simply did not 
have its place at an African conference, and besides, the Liberian government did not want to be 
used as a pawn in conflicts outside of the African continent.216 The Sudanese added that the 
Palestine Question needed to be solved if world peace were to be achieved. The Moroccan 
delegation stepped in to defend the case for the inclusion of the issue at the conference. 
According to the Moroccans, the Palestine Question was a valid African issue because it 
concerned an African state, Egypt.217 The Libyans were also in support because the issue was 
deemed an important security issue by Arab-African states. Fawzi then argued that the Palestine 
Question was an African issue because African soil had been attacked by the colonial powers 
when they had attacked Egypt.218 Tunisia threw its support behind the other Arab-African states 
in their demand to have Palestine appear in the resolutions, noting that it was being “faithful to 
the spirit of the Afro-Asian group.”219  
The Ethiopian delegation, despite having shown some support to Fawzi on the principles 
of Bandung, failed to be swayed by Fawzi’s argument. Including this issue in the resolutions 
could open the limits of the African continent to redefinition; besides, they believed that the 
Palestine Question was better suited to be debated at the United Nations and not here.220 The 
Liberian foreign minister agreed with the Ethiopians on this point, and added that he was 
frustrated this had even become an issue for the conference because no one had been warned or 
advised to be prepared to debate Palestine beforehand. He was also at a loss to understand why 
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Palestine was picked and so hotly contested to be a special case when the horrible ongoing 
situation in South Africa had not even been singled out similarly.221 Finally, the Ghanaian 
delegation protested against the inclusion of Palestine in the resolutions because it was both an 
international issue, and not even on the agreed agenda of the conference. It simply was not up for 
debate.222 Chairing the session, Nkrumah added to the Ghanaian delegation’s riposte. There were 
other hot spots in the world like Kashmir and South Africa, and the conference should not look 
to particularise, or to give the impression that it is interfering in anyone’s affairs and just leave it 
at that.223 Fawzi retorted, arguing that the colonial conflict in Algeria and Palestine were not very 
different in that even in Algeria the attacks came from outside of Africa so the Palestine 
Question was equally justified to be included in the resolutions. Most baffling to him was the 
fact that the Palestine Question was discussed and recognised at Bandung yet not in Accra. He 
then sternly traded barbs with the Liberian delegation, and it brought the day’s deliberations to 
an abrupt end. Fawzi was vexed that the Liberians had dared to accuse the Egyptians of sneaking 
an item on the agenda, which of course he was: “the question of Palestine has never been 
[brought] through the back door; it was mentioned by several of us in our opening speeches 
(which was not true). If you call that back door, then we have to revise our interpretation as to 
that word.”224  
 The two final days of the conference witnessed the last round of diplomatic sparring over 
the final resolutions of the conference, and unsurprisingly, the issue of Palestine. Fawzi once 
again pressed the case to include Palestine in the final resolutions and this time made an appeal 
for the Sub-Saharan African states to accept an issue so dear to their Arab brothers to the north: 
“I find myself among many hundreds and millions of peoples who would, frankly speaking, be 
shocked if we were to end this Conference with no mention of the question of Palestine and of 
the rights of the Arab nations, particularly Palestine.” The case for Palestine was also in the 
conference’s remit, he argued, because it was tasked with discussing racial discrimination and 
Palestine was clearly a case of “Racial Extermination.”225 Tunisia and Sudan backed Fawzi, but 
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argued that Palestine could appear in the same resolution as South Africa and Kashmir, which 
Fawzi protested. Since the conference had agreed to put the situations of Togoland and the 
Cameroons in the resolutions as separate items, he asked why Palestine could not. The Liberians 
again pointed out that unlike Togoland and the Cameroons, Palestine was an international matter 
for the United Nations. The Ethiopian delegation again reiterated that the Question of Palestine 
was never in the agenda and therefore could not appear as its own special item in the 
resolutions.226 At the suggestion that Palestine could appear in a list of other world issues, the 
mood began to shift towards finding a reasonable accommodation. The Ethiopian delegation 
stated that if Palestine appeared in the same list as other international issues, it would support it 
because there was no harm in bringing light to a bunch of issues at the United Nations. Ghana 
then threw its support at this measure and said that it did consider these issues intrinsic to the 
problem of world peace.227 Seeing that he could not secure Palestine as its own item on the 
agenda, Fawzi agreed with the others because Palestine would finally appear in the resolutions. 
Yet Fawzi was specific in his compromise that the rights of the Arabs in Palestine had to be 
mentioned along with the fact that the Palestine Question was still unresolved.228 Finally, on the 
last day of the conference, the Liberian Foreign Minister agreed with the others on Palestine 
because Liberia the sole remaining minority on the issue. Liberia would join the others in 
supporting the Palestine Question if and only if Palestine was lumped together with other 
international issues in a single item in the resolutions.229 The fault line between the Sub-Saharan 
and Arab-African states because of Egypt’s persistent prodding of the issue of Palestine finally 
disappeared on the last day of the conference.  
The three issues of language, Algeria, and Palestine at the conference had exposed a 
division between the states above and below the Sahara. By questioning why the Algerians 
deserved to be made a special case at the conference given the number of other African nations 
trying to gain independence, Liberia and Ghana showed a lack of appreciation and respect for an 
important issue facing Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. While Egypt considered the 
Algerian conflict a primary goal of its foreign policy, the conflict had reached the soil of the 
others. Tunisia and Morocco witnessed some fighting and spill-over into their states, and Libya 
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became a smuggling route for Egyptian arms. Palestine did appear in the final resolutions of the 
conference and the crux of the issue was resolved. The issue never was about questioning the 
merits of the case of the Palestinians for a homeland of their own, but rather deciding if the issue 
was an African issue or just an issue concerning some African states. There was an important 
distinction to draw in between the two, and it set a precedent for future official African 
conferences. Palestine was not an African issue just as the case of Algeria was by virtue of its 
location, and hence it was defined as an international issue. Palestine could still be discussed as a 
group, but it could never carry more weight than a continental issue. Thus, more effort and 
attention would be devoted to problems on the continent itself because African conferences were 
meant to concern common African problems.  
The Conference of IAS: A Formative Experience and Future Problems 
Outside of the Ghanaian-Egyptian rivalry and the short rift between Sub-Saharan and 
Arab-African states, the first IAS Conference was a very formative experience for all involved. 
The conference was above all the first time for them to congregate, converse, and debate issues 
they believed concerned the continent. It is very evident from the conversations in the sessions 
that some states attending understood the moment was a historic opportunity. Not many states 
had become independent thus it was possible to set the tone for continental politics for the future 
because the incoming leadership of states in becoming were looking up to them. Word that the 
conference was going to take place had indeed circulated in the African interior and in the weeks 
leading up to the conference many African political figures, trade organisations, student groups, 
and other various organisations (like the AAPSO, for instance) wrote their well wishes to the 
conference. These were read out to the delegations in Accra at the start of the conference and 
served as proof to the delegation at the conference that the whole continent was paying 
attention.230  
 In the numerous discussions of their foreign policies and how to solidify their 
independence, it emerged that every delegation was unanimous in agreement that the African 
states should not form a new bloc in world politics. Looming around this objective was the 
current situation in the global Cold War where the two blocs were threatening to invite the 
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African states to the fold and erode their independence slowly with detrimental deals. The 
Sudanese argued that the Cold War was a threat to the independence of African states and their 
territorial integrity because each side demanded a political allegiance. Conserving one’s 
independence, according to the Sudanese, required an independent foreign policy based on the 
idea of conserving the right to choose its own path.231 Mahmoud Fawzi pointed out that not 
forming a new bloc would be beneficial for African states and the world because it would project 
a good image for itself and invite cooperation from other states as equals.232 The Tunisian 
Foreign Minister also added that forming a new bloc in world affairs could hold negative 
consequences with the superpowers, as they could turn hostile towards the Africans.233 It was 
obvious to the attendees that the Cold War rivalry was problematic since both sides were eager to 
dispense financial and technical aid. Given the recent colonial past of the new African states, 
they suspected both sides of the Cold War of hiding colonial schemes in the guise of altruism. 
Fawzi, who still resented the Soviet encroachment of the AAPSO, made this link explicit during 
the proceedings as he claimed that promises of any kind of aid were a means to a colonial end.234 
Liberia warned the others not to get too close to either superpower or the colonial powers 
because they had the potential to use ‘tender offers’ of aid only to gain a hefty stake in their new 
states with which they could be hijacked.235  
 Of all the topics and issues covered at the conference, the great majority stemmed from 
the idea and possibility of African cooperation on common issues. Colonialism had made the 
territories and new African states too reliant on things like communications, transport, and trade 
from their former metropoles.236 As the first conference allowing the new African regimes to 
come and meet one another, they began to realise the problem was multi-faceted and explored 
how to redress it. One positive method every delegation agreed to was to cultivate ties between 
the African states and exchange technical knowledge was using scholarship schemes. Some 
states, particularly Egypt, were already engaging in establishing scholarships for African 
students and the others quickly vowed to do the same. All also agreed that a reform of the school 
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curriculum was overdue because the colonial system imposed on them had prevented them from 
getting to learn about one another. Scientific and technical exchanges were also agreed to.237 
There was also an agreement that the African states would meet with one another over 
coordination over international issues. As W. Scott Thompson noted, the African states tended 
overwhelmingly to side together at the United Nations after the conference.238 
Although not discussed at length during the conference, the attendees did address the 
need to discuss the prospect of economic cooperation as a means to break one of the most 
important vestiges of colonialism.239 Each state recognised it was at an economic disadvantage 
compared to the two world blocs, and that their peoples were suffering for it. After all, the future 
that the leaders had promised in their anti-colonial struggle had to be delivered. Roads had to be 
built, water sources had to be devised, domestic industry built, and economic diversification 
stimulated.240 While all agreed on economic goals, there was no consensus as to how to reach 
them, and some states offered no solutions. Others, like Ghana and Egypt, were supporters at the 
conference of eventually creating a common African market.241 For others like Morocco, felt it 
was far more appealing to cooperate with one another than relying on the colonial powers for 
support. The Ghanaians agreed with the Moroccans and suggested borrowing from international 
organisations instead of states as an interesting option.242 Some delegations realised that projects 
needed to take place to better the lives of their citizens and that these required them to seek 
economic aid. The Ghanaian delegation agreed with the Liberians and added that it was better for 
them to turn down economic aid if it meant becoming a colonial puppet. Better to be poor with 
independence than rich in servitude, said the Ghanaians.243 Nothing concrete was decided upon 
at the conference on the economic front, but all knew that a source of economic aid had to be 
found.  
Whilst every state at the conference had suffered from the colonial powers’ callous 
transgression of their right to rule themselves (a fact every one of them mentioned often), some 
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of the states who attended had also suffered another form of uncomfortable foreign intrusion in 
their affairs. In the conversations and speeches about the conduct of foreign affairs or 
International Relations, some delegations hinted that the African states themselves may have the 
potential to succumb to sins of their former colonial overlords. Although it was neither 
pinpointed, discussed, debated at length nor were any pointed accusations levelled against one 
another, the delegations of Tunisia, Liberia, Sudan, and Libya hinted that the African states 
harboured the seeds of imperialism[1]. It therefore began to dawn on a few of the states that they 
could be in danger from other African states. The first three had experienced Egypt’s intrusion in 
their domestic affairs first-hand. In Tunisia, Nasser fomented dissent by supporting its opposition 
leader, Salah Ben Youssef. In Libya, Nasser made the Kingdom suffer tense relations with the 
French Government and the presence of French army patrols on its soil because he considered it 
a mere highway for his weapons caravans destined for Algeria. The Sudanese Government had 
also not forgotten that in 1954 Nasser tried to influence the outcome of its general election and 
was caught red-handed bribing pro-Egypt Sudanese political figures.244 In the case of Liberia, 
William Tubman had not suffered from any foreign intrusion from the continent, but his opening 
speech at the conference and his delegation did show his fear that it could happen.245 The 
delegations of these states showed this in a few ways, but all essentially grounded their 
comments on inter-African affairs around the idea of the sanctity of sovereignty. The head of 
Libya’s delegation, for example, said this in his opening speech: “To attain these objectives, the 
Independent States of Africa ought to coordinate their efforts in sincerity, confidence and mutual 
respect for the differences in their political systems and institutions.”246  
The Libyan delegation later reiterated its message in a discussion on the prospects and 
goal of peace - if peace were to become a reality, several principles needed to be abided by like 
respect for self-determination, “respect for the political system in each state and non-interference 
in the domestic affairs of other states.”247 The head of the Sudanese delegation mimicked the 
Libyans’ message, stating (and perhaps even warning the Egyptians) that the choice of domestic 
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institutions and Sudan’s political system was Sudan’s own, and that it was also not looking to 
impose this system on any other state.248 In the conference deliberations, the Sudanese Foreign 
Minister advised that the states gathered in Accra should enact a “guiding principle to respect the 
independence and [territorial] integrity of our respective countries.”249 The Tunisian delegation, 
in a discussion on the foreign policies of African states suggested that common ground and 
ideals should guide the foreign policies of African states, and the basis of which should be the 
acceptance of cooperation and full respect be given to each others’ territorial integrity and 
sovereignty.250 The Tunisians tried to push for unanimity behind a defining principle in African 
affairs by stating at the end of their discussion that “we have unanimous agreement in respect of 
what we should have, in fact as well as in words, for the integrity and independence of other 
African states.”251 These words would often be repeated by Bourguiba and many other African 
allies until finally enshrined at the Addis Ababa summit of 1963, but at the first conference of the 
IAS the topic fell dead because interest was instead focused on the meddling of African affairs 
by non-African states. Although differing opinions did not emerge at this conference on these 
points nor were any direct accusations of ‘imperialistic’ behaviour levelled onto other African 
states, diplomatic conflict did arise a year after the conference as Ghana, Egypt, Morocco, and 
Mali became guilty of breaching the sovereignty of other African countries.  
During the conference and in the open discussion of the two particular topics of 
‘racialism’ and ‘subversion’, an important theme emerged that all of the African states shared. 
Some states talked about the important issue of ending the type of racism brought in from Europe 
in the previous centuries and of finding a way to protest the ongoing racial strife in South Africa. 
Some states, like Sudan, even went as far as proclaiming that end of racism in African countries 
would bring about true democracy and promote the equitable development of their countries. The 
motivations for the African states to eradicate racism, however, was not quite as altruistic as it 
seemed because it was also very self-serving. According to the Sudanese delegation, the non-
discriminatory redistribution of resources and development was a sure-fire way of controlling 
their domestic opposition; this would therefore conserve the states’ territorial integrity and 
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independence.252 In other words, African states with racial problems were liable to leave the door 
open for coups and conspiracies from minority groups if they did not properly insulate their 
regimes from them. Racism was a tool that their opposition could wield and if the current 
regimes adopted more inclusive policies with all societal groups they would be more secure. 
While the Sudanese were arguing of the domestic dangers to the regimes because of the structure 
of their populations, the Liberian delegation reminded the conference of the danger of foreign 
states preying on domestic cleavages to find a foothold in other states’ affairs. Throughout the 
conference the Liberian delegation was incredibly insistent on getting all involved to come to a 
definition of subversion and agree to oppose it as a tool of foreign policy because every one of 
them could be a target from outside because of their troublesome domestic opposition. The 
Liberian delegation explained that if foreign states could link up with dissident groups within 
their own states, leading the foreign power with a disproportionate amount of influence and the 
end of independence.253 It is evident that the attendees of the conferences understood that they all 
had the twin goal of conserving their independence and their regimes. To reach it, they all had to 
devise strategies to contain their domestic opposition and insulate themselves from foreign 
prodding. 
The Balance Sheet of the Conference of IAS 
 Overall, the first state-level conference of between the independent African states was a 
good formative experience for all involved. While one of its aims was to uncover and define a 
common ‘African personality’ for the final resolutions, the head of the Liberian delegation 
pointed out at the end of the conference that they had fallen short because “it seems to me that 
we do not know what [it is].”254 He was, however, a little quick to admit defeat because in the 
discussions, the delegations had sketched a general picture of what it meant to be an African 
state. All of them found that they had the similar goals of conserving independence and their 
territorial integrity as well as wanting to bring colonial rule to an end in Africa. Every delegation 
understood that because of the ongoing effects of colonialism they suffered from the same host 
of systemic problems and realised that there was potential to work together to attenuate them. 
They had been separated from one another and ruthlessly exploited to the point that the new 
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African states had to pick up not only from scratch, but from a position of great disadvantage. 
The new states were at great economic disadvantage and suffered from the existential threats of 
domestic opposition. Cooperation was therefore chosen by all as the way forward to redress 
these ills; the states promised at the conference that they would get to know one another, would 
begin to share with each other, and would cooperate on their foreign policies to resolve common 
continental and international issues. Another important achievement of the conference was the 
compromise found over what to do with the Palestine Question. Not only did the debate 
demonstrate the difference of the identities and priorities between North African and Sub-
Saharan African states, but their compromise on the issue showed that the Sahara, once a mighty 
colonial barrier, could no longer separate the nations on either side of it. 
While this was a definite good step in the right direction, some problems began to emerge 
which would loom larger as months went by. The failure to define a set of rules to conduct 
relations with one another was one of the main issues allowed the next five years of inter-African 
relations to sour considerably as each state remained judge over its own actions. One of the 
obvious drawbacks of the conference was the fact that the attendees were not numerous in such a 
vast continent. Thus, only a small number of states claimed to represent a much bigger whole 
and effectively founded a political program and agenda for continental affairs without other 
important parts of the continent. Apart from the FLN and a Cameroonian figure, no other African 
observers were allowed to participate and have an influence in the making of the resolutions. 
Other parts of Africa were poised to enter an important new phase of negotiation for 
independence with their respective colonial powers and they had not been invited. Thus, when 
the territories of the ex-AOF became independent and had much different ideas of continental 
politics, many states who had been to Accra in 1958 were taken aback.  
Nkrumah could rightly claim to be content with the conference. Not only did he bring the 
centre of continental attention to Accra, but he managed to direct the proceedings well enough to 
prevent Egypt from turning the conference into a virulent anti-colonial propaganda tool. Unlike 
the resolutions of the Cairo conference held months before, the first Conference of IAS was 
much more moderate, measured, and much less vitriolic. This made the African states look like 
they wanted to engage in international relations as equal and reasonable partners with a respect 
for existing international organisations like the United Nations. There were no overt diatribes 
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aimed at the colonial powers nor were threats given out to them. Unlike in Cairo a few months 
earlier, no propaganda campaign was started by the independent African states against the 
colonial powers. Even on the topic of support for the Algerian resistance, there was no consensus 
on providing more than moral support despite FLN and Egyptian requests to provide material 
support.255  
Chapter III: The Converging of Ghana and Egypt’s Foreign Policies 
 
The three years after the Conference of Independent African States witnessed a slew of 
changes in Africa’s political landscape. The rivalry between Nasser and Nkrumah finally ebbed 
as both realised their views were much closer than they had originally thought. Thus, starting in 
the summer of 1958, a gradual harmonisation of their African policies took place converging on 
a constant theme – the need to banish colonialism from the continent. Given the situation in West 
Africa and the Maghreb, it was only natural that they set the sights of their foreign policy on 
France. Much was beginning to be at stake by the summer of 1958 as Charles de Gaulle 
announced a referendum for that the African territories to decide whether to continue their 
partnership with France with some major reforms and the promise of future independence or 
immediately claim independence and sever all ties with France. This began to rally some Sub-
Saharan African states together with North African states around the issue of France’s continued 
presence and intransigence on the continent. The start of nuclear testing on African soil in the 
desert of Algeria only concretised the anti-colonial opposition towards France. Of all the issues 
the continent faced, France’s colonial policy stood above the rest as the most important because 
it both transcended continental rivalries and allied many states in opposition to French 
continental presence and policy initiatives. Thus, from 1958 to 1961, the issue of taking a stand 
against France was the node through which Ghana and Egypt were not only able to put their 
rivalry on hold, but also to find many allies in their anti-colonial crusade. The rallying of the 
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anti-colonial crusade on the continent culminated in the founding of the Casablanca Group in 
January 1961. 
Overcoming the Frosty Start of Ghana-Egypt Relations 
 The relationship between Ghana and Egypt since the latter’s independence in March 1957 
was that of a good rivalry for control over the discourse and direction of post-colonial African 
politics. Ghana, as the new state aspiring to punch above its weight, naturally saw the more 
popular Egypt as a competitor and roadblock for its aspirations to become the leading voice in 
African affairs. Nasser had pipped Nkrumah by a few months to be the first host an African 
conference, and Nkrumah did his best to keep him in the dark about the state-level conference in 
Accra. Nkrumah was initially very disturbed that Nasser used African conferences as a platform 
to advertise causes that had nothing to do with Africa and tried to keep him in check at the 
Conference of Independent African States. W. Scott Thompson, the only other scholar to have 
delved into their relationship in this period, claims that Nkrumah and Nasser never moved on 
beyond this point, rarely saw eye-to-eye on African issues, and therefore only “found a basis for 
cooperation only on international Afro-Asian radical causes.”256 It is surprising that Thompson 
came to that conclusion because in nearly every position Ghana and Egypt took in African affairs 
from 1960 to early in 1963 Nasser and Nkrumah backed one another. On many defining issues in 
continental affairs, like the Algerian War, French nuclear testing, the problem of Mauritania, the 
Congo Crisis, and the creation of the Casablanca Group of states, Nasser and Nkrumah worked 
together because they shared important common ground – an important desire to liquidate 
colonialism. From the summer of 1958 onwards, they realised their points of view were hardly 
irreconcilable which made cooperation more appealing rather than stay at odds with one another. 
Two important events took place which gave Nkrumah a deeper appreciation for Nasser’s 
foreign policy and his desire to fight colonialism wherever possible.  
 In June 1958 Nkrumah embarked on a follow-up tour to every capital of the states that 
had attended the IAS Conference a few months earlier to meet their leaders to gauge their 
reactions to the conference. The visit to Egypt was very appreciated as Nkrumah stretched it 
from five to eight days at Nasser’s insistence. As a result of their talks they found they shared the 
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same general views on “positive neutralism” and the need to take a strong stand against any 
French nuclear testing in Africa. Nkrumah, however, could not be swayed to take a stronger 
stand on Palestine than he already had at the conference, so both declared their support a “just 
solution.”257 The following month a few crises happened in which Nasser sought Nkrumah’s 
help. In the second week of July a crisis erupted in Lebanon which brought Nasser’s attention to 
Middle Eastern matters. Ghana’s ambassador in Cairo wrote to Nkrumah relaying the message 
that he had unexpectedly met Nasser who urgently asked him for a favour to “use your influence 
over American President and Canadian Premier [to] terminate military preparations.”258 There is 
some evidence that Nkrumah did try to help Nasser. In a foreign policy speech to parliament a 
few months later he admitted to supporting Egypt’s position and for pushing for the solution to 
swap American troops for a UN peace force.259 In the same week Nasser invited Ghana’s 
ambassador to sit with his diplomatic corps for a series of emergency foreign policy meetings. In 
the first meeting, Ghana was made privy to an African problem, Egypt’s border dispute with 
Sudan. The last meetings were about the details surrounding General Qasim’s overthrow of the 
Iraqi Monarchy; the Egyptian Foreign Minister asked the ambassador if he “could you use [his] 
influence to ask our friend [in] Ghana [to] accord early recognition” of the new Republic of 
Iraq.260 What is most important about the meetings was not Ghana’s choice of course of action 
on the matter, but the fact that Nasser made a Ghanaian ambassador privy to Egypt’s foreign 
policy meetings shows an unprecedented level of trust and desire to work together. A few 
months after the crisis Nkrumah began to signal he had buried the hatchet over Nasser’s 
introduction of Afro-Asian issues into African affairs. In his foreign policy address to 
Parliament, Nkrumah declared “those principles enunciated at the Bandung Conference have 
been solemnly restated by the Accra Conference of Independent African States and constitute a 
permanent basis of our policy.”261 By the end of 1958 at another Ghanaian conference, Nkrumah 
was showing more signs of coming more closely aligned to the core of Egypt’s African policy. 
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The summer of 1958 made Nkrumah understand that Nasser would always appreciate it if 
he could help him with any issues he was facing in Africa or the Middle East and ensure their 
continued good relations. Nkrumah did help Nasser and from 1960 onwards, Nkrumah no longer 
had any scruples with publicly siding with him, even at the detriment of its oldest ally in the 
Middle East, Israel. A secret meeting at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York before a UN 
General Assembly session in the fall of 1960 gave a glimpse of Nkrumah’s commitment to his 
relationship to Nasser. In his suite, Nkrumah met with the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Mahmoud 
Fawzi, and Ahmad Shukeiri (who in 1964 would become the first head of the PLO). He informed 
them that Ghana was willing to push Israel to accept the right of return of the Palestinian 
refugees and to demand that the Israelis return to a designated area under the 1947 Partition 
scheme.262 Nothing came of the suggestion, but it reassured Nasser that Nkrumah was indeed on 
his side in the Arab-Israeli conflict despite his early friendship with the Israelis. Nkrumah’s 
suggestion in New York paved the way to Ghana’s public commitment to support the Egyptians 
on the Question of Palestine when he signed to the resolution on Palestine in the Casablanca 
Charter of January 1961.263 
Common Foreign Policy Tactics: Egypt and Ghana’s Attempts to change Borders 
 An important aspect of the Egyptian and Ghanaian regimes’ anticolonial foreign policies 
was their beliefs in the lack of any tangible justification of current borders between African 
territories and states. Since the colonial powers had subjected the continent to as incredible 
amount of injustice by the tactic of ‘divide and rule’ which had pitted African peoples against 
each other, Nasser and Nkrumah not only disregard them as artificial, but also open to revision. 
Publicly, the African regimes advocated for these revisions to be negotiated in concert with the 
parties concerned, but public statements often did not match up with what was really taking 
place.264 In many cases the means used to achieve these revisions were varied and included the 
support of dissident communities who straddled borders, troop movements to show possession of 
 
262 “A Meeting held in the Osagyefo’s suite at the Waldorf Astoria, New York, on the 4th October, 1960.” RG 
17/1/49A. Bureau of African Affairs Collection, PRAAD. 
263 The Israeli Government was irate with Nkrumah’s open support of Egypt and other states on the Question of 
Palestine and they deposited a complaint to Nkrumah, but to no avail. See, “CO/AF/2A. Embassy of Israel, Accra. 
January 16th, 1961.” RG 17/1/239. Bureau of African Affairs Collection, PRAAD. 
264 The AAPC’s resolution on borders was one of many instances where Ghana and Egypt backed negotiations for 
the revision of borders. See, “Conference Resolution on Imperialism and Colonialism,” in “Information Bulletin on 
African Affairs.” ADM 16/1/15. PRAAD.  
91 
 
a contested piece of territory, the meddling in another state’s elections, and even assassination 
attempts (real or alleged) on stubborn leaders. It is incredibly difficult to tell today – as it was for 
many African leaders at the time – if rival claims for territory and support for minorities living 
across one’s own borders were justified by the injustice of colonialism or if they were simply 
flagrant attempts at land grabs or even plots to collapse foreign regimes to install more friendly 
ones. Determining whether the motivations for the claims were purely ideological or for more 
selfish considerations is not particularly relevant for this study. What is most important for the 
development of inter-African relations is how the other African regimes perceived these claims, 
and in a great many cases they cried foul. These attempts to change the colonial borders were 
therefore a great factor behind the division of Africa into camps in 1960-1 because they chipped 
away any form of trust between some of the African regimes.  
 Other than Morocco, which was the main perpetrator of the largest divisive African issue 
in this period by claiming Mauritania for itself (which is covered in its own chapter), Ghana and 
Egypt were guilty of making claims on contested territories. In the case of Egypt, Nasser’s 
intrigues in the affairs of other Arab states of the Middle East were well known, and in Africa he 
also made claims on southern territories which were contested by Sudan in February 1958. The 
Sudanese-Egyptian relationship since Nasser’s coup in 1952 was rather troubled. In the fall of 
1954, for example, Nasser still secretly held the hope of uniting Egypt with Sudan and sent his 
most important propagandists, Salah Salem, on a secret mission to Khartoum to influence the 
Sudanese elections. Becoming a bit of a laughingstock in the process, Salem was caught red-
handed giving suitcases of money to Sudanese pro-Egyptian politicians.265 In February 1958 
problems between Sudan and Egypt arose once more as neither held the same interpretation of 
the Anglo-Egyptian agreements from the colonial period delimiting their borders. Instead of 
holding talks with the Sudanese leadership, Nasser sent troops to accompany a political mission 
to two disputed areas just north of the 22nd parallel to bring the necessary equipment in order to 
allow the people living – which Egypt declared were Egyptians – to be able to participate in the 
upcoming plebiscite on the presidency of the United Arab Republic.266 Nasser’s move was 
indeed an aggressive one, showing possession and backing it with threat of violence and his 
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justification was reported to be quite flimsy. Unsurprisingly, the Egyptian government quoted 
not from the official treaty they had signed with the British in 1902, but instead from an unseen 
Egyptian interior ministry document from the same period.267 The Sudanese leadership dismissed 
the Egyptian claims as fabricated and stated that even if they had used the Anglo-Egyptian 
document it would be void because the contracting parties from the 1902 agreement did not 
include Sudan.268 The matter of the lands just above the 22nd parallel remains unsettled until this 
day, but showed the lengths that Nasser would go to try to capture territory for Egypt.  
 The greatest perpetrator of claims on contested land was Kwame Nkrumah. In this 
respect, Nkrumah was truly shameless as he never hid his intentions and it enraged fellow 
Franco-African leaders, particularly Félix Houphouët-Boigny, Sylvanus Olympio, and Léopold 
Senghor. Nkrumah’s claims on Togo were never made secret and revealed for all to see in his 
1957 The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah.269 Despite his attempts to cajole its leader, 
Sylvanus Olympio, of accepting Ghana’s call to reunite all the lands of the Ewe population 
(which straddled both borders) inside Ghana proper, Olympio never relented to having a state 
under the borders respected by UN mandate. Nkrumah then proceeded to undermine Olympio by 
proxy, a policy which continued until Olympio’s mysterious assassination on January 1963. 
Nkrumah contacted the youth movement called the Mouvement de Jeunesse Togolaise (or 
Juvento) who had split away from Olympio’s Committee of Togolese Unity party and enticed 
them to his idea of unification by offering to fund their activities, offer them asylum in Ghana, 
and give them more exposure by inviting them to his African conferences. Nkrumah’s backing of 
Juvento raised fears both with French colonial officials and in Lomé that they could now 
possibly beat Olympio in the next elections.270 Nkrumah’s constant calls for Togolese territory 
and his many public spats with Olympio unnerved many leaders in West Africa, most notably 
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Senghor who often warned him to stop because he was undermining the sovereignty of Togo and 
Ivory Coast.271 
 Nkrumah also had history of a difference of views with his eastern Ivorian neighbour, 
Félix Houphouët-Boigny, whom he insultingly tried to lobby to use the Ghanaian model to gain 
Ivory Coast’s independence in the spring of 1957, and even allowed the Ghanaian media to call 
the Ivorian leader a French ‘puppet’ throughout 1958.272 That year, the Ivorian state (backed by 
French colonial officials) was involved in the clearing out of peoples considered troublesome to 
the state, including foreign citizens, and as many as 4,000 of them resettled in Ghana.273 In the 
spring of 1959, Nkrumah met with Houphouët-Boigny to complain about the location of the 
border as many refugees were still coming across.274 Some of these citizens came from a region 
that straddled the two countries, the Kingdom of Sanwi, and they held a series of grudges against 
Ivory Coast. The people of the Kingdom of Sanwi resented the Ivorian state’s violence against 
villages of minority groups along the Ivory Coast-Ghana border and their efforts to take away 
their local powers in order to centralise the state’s power in Abidjan. One such individual, 
Armand Attié, claimed to represent the King of Sanwi and a Provisional Government of Sanwi 
which had proclaimed its right to claim independence from Ivory Coast in May 1959. Initially 
wanting to join de Gaulle’s Communauté but rebuffed by France, they now explained to 
Ghanaian officials that “they would rather like to have independence in association with Ghana.”  
The Ivorian leader and the French responded by sending 650 paratroopers to arrest 
members of the provisional government, causing many to flee to Ghana. George Padmore, then 
Nkrumah’s chief advisor on African affairs, asked Attié to be more precise regarding their 
demands before he could submit a formal request to Nkrumah. Padmore even believed that if the 
people of the Kingdom of Sanwi could proclaim they were of more ‘Ghanaian stock’ than 
Ivorian then their case could be submitted to the UN as a matter of debate between Ghana and 
France alone.275 A few weeks later Attié returned to Accra stating that the people of the 
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Kingdom of Sanwi decided “to assure the Government of Ghana that the King and people of 
Sanwi remain firm in their request for annexation to the Independent Sister State of Ghana, with 
certain safeguards such as the recognition of a special status, similar to that of Scotland or Wales 
in the United Kingdom […] and equal rights in the State of Ghana.” Attié also notified the 
Ghanaian leadership that the King of Sanwi had sent the same message to the French, whom 
responded by handing over his messengers to the Ivorian authorities who had them jailed.276 As 
far as Houphouët-Boigny was concerned, this meant that Ghana was supporting the claims of the 
so-called leadership of the Kingdom of Sanwi which was unacceptable and was very likely 
insulted that Nkrumah had not brought up the claim with him personally and chose to do so with 
the French instead. When Nkrumah pressed the claims further in early 1960, Houphouët-Boigny 
went on the air and angrily announced that “[Nkrumah] has neither the right, nor the means, to 
demand […] the annexation of the least portion of the Ivory Coast.”277 
Houphouët-Boigny’s response to the Ghanaian backing of the Kingdom of Sanwi’s 
provisional government was understandable partly because Nkrumah claimed part of his 
country’s territory, but also for another astonishing reason. Padmore’s thoughts of sidestepping 
Ivory Coast reflected the belief that Houphouët-Boigny was a mere puppet of the French and 
therefore had no say on the status of borders at all. It was also highly likely that Nkrumah shared 
Padmore’s attitude because he was allowing newspapers in the country at the time to publish 
articles accusing Houphouët-Boigny of being a “stooge and traitor” as well as a “puppet dancing 
savagely to the tunes of the French imperialist shampoolah.”278 This harsh attitude to the African 
leaders with ties to the French showed the Ghanaian leader to hold a double standard – that as a 
leader of a country he could judge whether borders should be shifted and disregard the claims of 
others if he judged these figures to be puppets of a colonial power. This gave the allure of 
Nkrumah’s claims being underpinned by spurious justifications. By tacitly supporting the Sanwi 
to attach themselves to Ghana, Nkrumah was also signalling to other African leaders that the 
Ivory Coast was not a properly united society deserving of a state, therefore undermining the 
regime’s claim to rule.279 After a crackdown in the Ivorian portion of the Kingdom of Sanwi, 
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Attié became a refugee in Accra under the auspices of the Ghanaian intelligence service, and 
operated a network of agents in the border regions to agitate against the Ivorians.280 This forced 
the Ivorian leader’s hand, and he sent government agents and the military to clamp down on the 
pro-Ghana sentiment in the border regions as well as to put a stop to cross-border traffic.281 
Ghanaian intelligence services reported in February 1960 that Houphouët-Boigny was of 
Nkrumah’s support of the Kingdom of Sanwi, calling them “militantly hostile” to his country 
and prompted a series of radio broadcasts refuting Ghana’s support.282 The pressure Nkrumah 
put on the Ivorian state explains why Houphouët-Boigny accepted Senghor’s invitation to form a 
united bloc of Francophone states later that summer despite being a history of rivalry in the 
AOF. 
The Soft Power Offensive against Colonialism: Ghana and Egypt’s Propaganda Campaign 
 A very large feature of Egypt and Ghana’s anti-colonial foreign policy in Africa was the 
attempt to create a dominant narrative about decolonisation. With this established, the regimes 
could then win the race to seize control of the continent’s political discourse on Africa’s future 
relationship with European actors and hoped it could yield real political victories. There was 
good reason to be optimistic in this campaign. In the Middle East Nasser’s radio programme, 
Voice of the Arabs, was incredibly successful in achieving political objectives. Not only did the 
radio programming build domestic opposition to many Arab regimes, it was also a contributing 
factor in preventing Arab states like Jordan from joining the Western-led Baghdad Pact and the 
collapse of the Iraqi royal family.283 So how did the manipulation of radio bring Nasser political 
success? There were two reasons: firstly, Nasser merely capitalised on circumstance. In the age 
where transistor radios became inexpensive, Egypt found itself as the lone state in the Middle 
East or Africa with enough powerful radio equipment to be able to broadcast both at home and 
abroad. Thus, Nasser understood that he had no competition to tap into the potential of a very 
large domestic and foreign audience. The second reason, and equally important, was that Nasser 
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knew how to connect with a mass audience and not just a small segment of society. Before radio, 
the previous Egyptian regimes relied on printed material to disseminate their message, and given 
the very low rate of literacy, this meant that regimes were most able to communicate with only 
the very small segment of high society who were literate.284 To ensure a wide base of listeners, 
and much like Nasser himself employed in speeches, a mixture of colloquial Arabic with neo-
classical Arabic (then used by the media) was used. Not only was he able to establish a solid 
connection between the regime and the Egyptian masses, but given that Egyptian colloquial was 
widely understood all over the Arab World because of the popularity of Egyptian films, Arabs 
outside of Egypt also began to identify themselves with the Voice of the Arabs and the Nasserite 
regime in Cairo.285  
 Wielding the Voice of the Arabs as an important political tool in his foreign policy 
arsenal, Nasser was able to contest the narratives espoused by foreign regimes and draw 
popularity to his own message both at home and abroad. In other words, by using his radio 
installations in Egypt, Nasser was able to disrupt the legitimacy of foreign regimes by putting 
pressure on their relationships with the domestic population. Understandably, Arab regimes 
viewed Cairo’s broadcasts as a threat because it meddled in their countries’ affairs, but beginning 
in the mid-1950s, Cairo’s anti-colonial message also found new opponents, Britain and France. 
Filled with catchy slogans and rich in rhetorical devices, Nasser’s radio service extolled the 
virtues of the Egyptian state’s anti-colonial policy and portrayed the colonial powers as the 
largest evil.286 So successful was the radio network and its programming that the colonial powers 
viewed it as a real threat to their interests on the continent because it had the potential to foment 
opposition. The British, in their leadup to their invasion of Egypt in the fall of 1956, bombed one 
of the transmitter installations at Abu Zamal close to Cairo.287 The French, whom had been 
subjected to Cairo’s virulent campaign of support for the FLN, tried a less direct approach after 
the debacle of Suez. France, unlike the other Arab states who were defenceless because they did 
not possess radio equipment themselves, had the means to set up their own counter-propaganda 
radio program against Nasser and they did so clandestinely. Speaking to an Indian journalist in 
February 1959, Nasser admitted his government was subjected to a French propaganda campaign 
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from a secret radio station in Turkey.288 Nasser’s radio programming was so influential that even 
the Secretary General of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjold, complained to Nasser and 
appealed to him to tone down the radio propaganda during the Lebanese Crisis of 1958 against 
the Western powers, presumably at the behest of Britain, France, and the United States.289  
 Given the response of the colonial powers and the success of the Voice of the Arabs in 
affecting change in Middle Eastern politics, Nasser was optimistic he could spread his anti-
colonial message to sub-Saharan Africa with similar effect. From 1954 onwards, Nasser’s radio 
service began to accept African liberation movement figures to Cairo and encouraged them to 
broadcast from his radio installations in their language under a program called the “Voice of Free 
Africa.”290 In less than two years, these radio transmissions were beginning to seriously worry 
African colonial administrators because Cairo’s general slogan of “out with the European” was 
catchy, “easily understood” by the public and therefore made European presence in Africa more 
difficult.291 What is perhaps most astounding is the large growth of Egypt’s radio program for 
Africa showing the importance the regime held for African politics. By March 1961, the British 
Government conducted a large study of Cairo’s radio activities for the Foreign Office and noted 
that it was broadcasting in many languages used on the continent including Arabic, Somali, 
Swahili, Hausa, Amharic, English, and French. The content was judged by British colonial 
administrators because it paid support to “extremist movements and policies” and inflamed “anti-
Western tensions by misrepresentations of British, French and U.S. policy in Africa.” The study 
also described the language and tone of the Voice of Free Africa as “violently abusive of the 
remaining white administrators and residents in the Continent […] who must be driven out by 
force.”292  
While the British did not record the numerous instances of inflammatory and abusive 
language of the broadcasts, another worried colonial power in Africa, Belgium, did and their 
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recorded transcripts demonstrate that Nasser was tapping into a large pool of resentment against 
colonialism, white administrators, the West, and at times, the communist countries. A February 
1958 broadcast in Swahili bluntly laid out its message: “Africa belongs to Africans and it must 
keep belonging to Africans. Why then are we allowing ourselves to be governed by the white 
pigs?” The host argued that the Western powers were lying about the state of Africa and charged 
that colonial administrators were thieving European money meant to go towards helping 
Africans. The host called upon former and active black soldiers to “rise up against the white pigs 
so they could give us our liberty and independence now.”293 July 1960 broadcast in Swahili 
described the West as “pigs” and “dogs” waging imperialism who were merely competing with 
communists who were trying to trick Africans into swapping one master for another. The 
programme advised that the real enemy was still at home and that Africans needed to unite “to 
banish colonialism” because what Africans truly desired was to be completely rid of “imperialist 
pigs.”294 Nasser’s regime was indeed proud of its efforts, flaunting it publicly in the media as 
“the vanguard of African radios” which made it “a powerful weapon in our hands, serving our 
policy and its aims, which the free Africans adopt.” Perhaps what made the regime so proud was 
that their transmissions were indeed effective since they evoked strong responses from its 
colonial enemies: “the imperialist States have often complained about our radio behaviour and 
said that it was a main cause of the movements against the imperialist system.”295 This was 
hardly surprising given the amount of coverage given to Africa; almost ten hours of broadcasts a 
week were dedicated to Africa compared which nearly equalled the thirteen given to the Voice of 
the Arabs.296 
A similar study conducted by the Belgian Government concurred with the findings of the 
British and added that the station’s African programs routinely clamoured for the unity of 
African states in order to blunt the imperialist forces menacing the permanent fracture of 
Africa.297 The African broadcasting from Cairo portrayed Nasser as a true leader of 
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decolonisation whom served as a role model for African states because of his success fighting 
the colonial powers. Egypt, they reasoned, did so in order to set itself as a yardstick to put other 
regimes under pressure if not even destroyed.298 The Voice of Free Africa sometimes went 
further, however, by intervening in situations and trying to incite violence. In December 1959 
Belgian colonial officials also reported in the prelude to the King’s visit to Congo Cairo radio 
upped the ante by warning the Congolese that the King was duplicitous and that they should keep 
up their struggle. The radio host also argued that if need be, they were justified to take arms in 
their anticolonial struggle like their Algerian brothers.299 
Padmore’s Brainchild: the All-African People’s Conference, December 1958 
After the relative failure to shape the discourse of the of the IAS Conference, Nkrumah, 
like Nasser before him, turned his hopes to convincing African nationalist of his strategy for 
decolonisation. Nkrumah charged his pan-African partner George Padmore with assembling 
delegations of willing nationalist movements to Accra to discuss how to defeat colonialism on 
the continent. There was no doubt that this was going to be Ghana’s show and that it would try to 
steer the conversation to produce results Nkrumah wanted. The conference was funded entirely 
by the Ghanaian state, and Padmore produced the invitations or ‘the call’ to the December 
conference in Accra which already tried to place limits on its discourse: “This Conference will 
formulate and proclaim the philosophy of Pan-Africanism as the ideology of the African non-
violent revolution.”300 In the opening speech of the conference Nkrumah reiterated that his 
country had “pride in our determination to support every form of non-violent action which our 
fellow Africans in Colonial territories may find it fit to use in the struggle.”301 Non-violent 
resistance, a Ghanaian hallmark of its own struggle for independence, was to be one of the 
dominant themes, and Nkrumah hoped he could inspire the nationalist movements on the 
continent to do the same. He urged the attendees to stay at the spearhead of continental anti-
colonial efforts because they had to above all attain and consolidate their independence. Yet he 
reminded them that the continent was not only rocked by the desire for independence, but also 
equally jarred by the feeling of building unity. The Ghanaian leader pointed to the case of the 
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recent Ghana-Guinea union and explained it was merely a steppingstone to a union of West 
Africa and of a larger Union of African States just as the thirteen colonies had formed the United 
States of America.302 This was necessary, he continued, because “it is only within this context of 
interdependence and co-operation, regardless of the constitutional framework in which it will 
ultimately find expression,” that the Africans could finally be able to “solve the disastrous 
legacies of imperialism, especially the arbitrary divisions of peoples on our Continent.”303 
Finally, the total liquidation of imperialism and colonialism, he argued, would achieve peace in 
the world as they were the two main causes behind the century’s two world wars.304 
At the conference’s end, Nkrumah could judge that Padmore’s conference had brought 
Ghana a decent measure of success. 300 delegates from nationalist movements from all parts of 
Africa attended and participated in the deliberations, and perhaps dubiously, claimed to be 
representing 200 million Africans.305 The resolutions left Nkrumah very pleased, bar one, 
because they were very closely aligned with what he had set down in his opening speech; the 
nationalist movements, in other words, had adopted a large chunk of Ghana’s ideas. In the 
resolution on colonialism and imperialism, the delegates accepted Ghana’s understanding of the 
terms, and condemned Europe for luring them in NATO alliances, free trade areas, and in 
warning to the Francophone territories, the European Common Market because their only aim 
was to give solidify “their Imperialist activities in Africa and elsewhere.”306 The resolution on 
“Frontiers, Boundaries, and Federations” essentially backed Nkrumah’s idea of needing to form 
unity among African states, but fell just short of recommending the Nkrumah’s idea of a United 
States of Africa instead opting for a ‘commonwealth of free African states.’ The resolution urged 
all movements to pursue more than independence because “the existence of separate states in 
Africa is fraught with the dangers of exposure to imperialist intrigues and of the resurgence of 
colonialism even after their attainment of independence, unless there is unity among them.”307 
With some important consequences for the near future, the conference also adopted Nkrumah’s 
views on colonial borders. The conference judged that colonial borders were entirely artificial 
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because they had been “drawn by imperialists to divide African peoples […] to the detriment of 
Africans and should therefore be abolished or adjusted.” It did urge leaders of African states to 
negotiate to come to an arrangement on any border issues, but the resolution never mentioned 
any acceptable steps for leaders to take if they could not come to an agreement.308 This last 
resolution only restated a commonly held belief rather than be prescriptive. This left the door 
open for some states, especially Ghana, Egypt, and Morocco, to try to use nefarious means to 
change borders.  
While the conference was a success for Ghana because it gained acceptance and the 
spread of basic ideas like the need for unity, it was also instrumental in founding many 
relationships between Nkrumah and the leaders of movements of national liberation, many who 
began to idolise him. One leader, Patrice Lumumba, was stirred enough to engage in immediate 
action against their ruling colonial power at home.309 This must have pleased Nkrumah because 
it only confirmed that his anti-colonial efforts were reaching one of the desired effects – the 
disruption of colonial rule on the continent. Yet Nkrumah and Padmore had not sent invitations 
to everyone to attend the conference, but merely gambled on the ones they believed would be 
most receptive to Ghana’s ideas. Confirmation of the suspicion and displeasure from another 
colonial power began to stream onto Nkrumah’s desk as French complaints over the fact that 
only the radical Francophone African leaders like Sékou Touré, Djibo Bakary, and Félix 
Moumié were invited and not the leaders closest to France.310 The French understood, just as 
Nkrumah, that skewing the attendance would lead to less debate and division at the conference, 
therefore ensuring passage of more radical views. What Nkrumah could not foresee at the time, 
however, was that his preference for close relationships with more radical elements from the 
territories under colonial rule would lead to suspicion and diplomatic tensions with the less 
radical leaderships who emerged once those states became independent. Senegal’s and Togo’s 
most powerful opposition parties, the PAI and Juvento, were present at the conference and would 
remain guests of Ghana under the aegis of the AAPC and continue to agitate against the 
leaderships of their home states.311 Nkrumah’s support of the more radical elements in Africa 
therefore came at a cost because it was a tremendously divisive force in African politics as 
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leaders like Léopold Senghor and Sylvanus Olympio cried foul often over Ghana’s intrusion in 
their domestic affairs.  
Perhaps the most significant effect of the AAPC was one that Nkrumah and Padmore 
never intended. The invitations and Nkrumah’s opening speech carefully stated that the 
conference’s aim was to discuss non-violent means to use in the struggle for independence. The 
GPRA of Algeria, four years into an armed conflict with France, saw things differently and sent 
Frantz Fanon to make the case to support violent means if necessary. In his address to the 
conference Fanon described his first-hand experience fighting with the Algerians and argued that 
non-violent means was simply futile against French colonial repression because they had always 
responded to it with violence, citing the protests in the Casbah as evidence. Fanon’s words rang 
true to the many resistance figures assembled as he reminded them that “Africa is at war with 
colonialism” and since their strong violent oppression showed the will of the imperialists to 
remain in Africa, that all movements of national liberation should envisage dislodging them “by 
force of action and, indeed, violence.”312 The argument, for those at the conference who were 
still living under colonial rule, was very persuasive. While many at the conference, like Kenya’s 
Tom Mboya, for instance, were convinced of Fanon’s argument, they pointed out that it did not 
necessarily mean they preferred immediately taking up arms because it was the option of last 
resort.313 The conference therefore decided in its resolutions to give  
“its full support to all fighters for freedom in Africa, to all those who resort to 
peaceful means of non-violence and civil disobedience as well as to all those who are 
compelled to retaliate against violence to attain national independence and freedom for 
the people. Where such retaliation becomes necessary, the Conference condemns all 
legislations which consider those who fight for their independence and freedom as 
ordinary criminals.”314  
This resolution was a blow to Nkrumah’s foreign policy because up to this point, he had strongly 
sold Ghana’s example of its liberation as the best model and advocated the non-violent means 
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which made it possible.315 The conference’s agreement that violence could be justified and 
supported made Nkrumah’s position very awkward.316 On the one hand, the policy of supporting 
armed violence brought Ghana much more closely aligned with Egypt, who had been supporting 
armed movements in North Africa since 1954. On the other, however, Ghana would now be 
associated with that decision and this was the source of problems, especially since the conference 
established a permanent secretariat of the AAPC in Accra to help organise anti-colonial 
resistance and spread the conference’s influence by widespread propaganda.317 Given that many 
opposition parties had come to the conference (Senegal’s PAI and Togo’s Juvento being prime 
examples), it was bound to arouse suspicion from territorial leaders and their colonial partners 
who understandably viewed the AAPC as a threat. Whether Nkrumah wanted it or not, Ghana 
was now fully committed to a radical anti-colonial foreign policy just like Egypt. The race to 
establish a set of ideas for other movements of national liberation was coming at a large cost to 
Nkrumah; instead of getting closer to the African unity he desired, he caused fissures and drove 
other states away from Ghana. This division was only driven deeper as he pushed his anti-
colonial foreign policy  
Ghana’s Anti-Colonial Propaganda Campaign Turns against France 
 Since the mid-1950s Egypt used propaganda as an effective foreign policy tool, and a 
year after its independence, Ghana followed suit. Unlike Nasser, however, Nkrumah did not 
possess the equipment to use the radio as the medium for sustained continental propaganda 
campaign until 1961, so he resorted to the circulation of printed materials, media coverage of 
strong speeches at home to attract attention, and the clandestine funding of political parties that 
could help achieve Ghana’s objectives. Interestingly, the cause for the start of Ghana’s 
propaganda was the same as Egypt’s – France’s African policy – and he also took a strong 
anticolonial line. After coming back to power in France, De Gaulle’s announced in Brazzaville 
he would hold a referendum that autumn giving the choice to French African territories to belong 
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to a ‘Community’ of states with France or secede entirely to claim independence. Coming four 
months after a rather dismal Conference of Independent African States, Nkrumah read this as an 
opportunity to intervene to chase out colonial influence and put his stamp on African affairs. A 
few weeks after the announcement Ghanaian news articles began to appear castigating France’s 
call for its African territories to remain tied to the metropole. Naturally, French diplomatic 
officials began to worry about the sharp rise of anti-French rhetoric in the Ghanaian media 
because it menaced their future on the continent as well as the leaders of their territories. For 
instance, an article in the Ghana Times on 15 September entitled “Reject de Gaulle’s 
Constitution” accused the French of blackmailing Africans into postponing their independence. 
The article warned Franco-Africans not to trust the words of the Ivorian leader, Félix 
Houphouët-Boigny, who was a French “puppet” and called on Africans under French rule to rise 
up to liquidate colonialism.318 Ghana’s Evening News was also taking part in the abuse of 
France’s image in Africa at that time, French diplomats reported. The newspaper called for 
Africans to vote ‘no’ in the upcoming referendum because de Gaulle was a dictator who could 
not be trusted. A vote in favour of de Gaulle’s referendum, they reasoned, would turn their 
current African leaders into his own “puppets” which would not change their situation of French 
domination. Voting for independence, the newspaper argued, was best because it would uproot 
European imperialism, lend more moral support as independent nations to the Algerians, and as 
new African nations, they would be allowed to organise their own economies.319 Ghana’s anti-
colonial and anti-French media coverage aimed to be very intrusive in a French internal affair by 
affecting the relationship between the French state, the Francophone African leaderships, and 
their electorate. Naturally, Ghana’s efforts to disrupt French colonial politics unsettled the 
French who conducted more thorough investigations of Ghanaian motives as well as lodged 
complaints of interference to the Ghanaian Government.  
  In mid and late September 1958, the Quai d’Orsay published two internal reports of 
Ghana’s propaganda campaign against them. This campaign, the French officials wrote, seemed 
to be waged independently of the Ghanaian Government, but they found that its architects, 
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George Padmore and T.R. Makonnen, were acting on the blessing of Kwame Nkrumah. The 
report noted that Ghana was engaged in a struggle to win the leadership of the pan-African 
mantle by the “sending of printed materials in the French territories, invitations addressed to the 
political leaders of French Africa, [and] receptions hosted in Accra.”320 Two weeks later another 
report was produced by French diplomatic staff and found that Ghana’s tactics were yielding 
results. Many important political figures and dissidents from territories like Guinea, Upper Volta, 
and Niger were lured to visit Ghana and meet Nkrumah. Worse for the French was that these 
figures, which included PRA leaders like Djibo Bakary, received important subsidies from the 
Ghanaian leader to help their political parties in their struggle for independence. Once in Accra, 
they also took care to visit the Egyptian embassy which was also embroiled in an intense anti-
French propaganda campaign.321 The French were infuriated at the Ghanaian Government 
because they lodged a mixture of complaints and threats over their public posture on the 
referendum, Algeria, and Togo, none of which caused Ghana to stop.322 Whilst Nkrumah was 
unsuccessful in preventing a general ‘yes’ vote in the 1958 French constitutional referendum, his 
propaganda campaign did achieve a measure of success. His anti-colonial message had tapped 
into the existent discontent in the youth of the populations of the French territories which 
coincidently put pressure on their regimes to defend the argument their territories were better off 
staying in the French orbit. Defeated by the yes vote, many groups, like Senegal’s PAI, 
continued to identify with Ghana’s anti-colonial project and discourse, and travelled to Accra to 
agitate against their own regimes and the French.323  
 During the 1958 referendum on de Gaulle’s constitution, all French territories in Africa, 
bar one, were able to parry the strength of their domestic opposition and convinced their 
populations to vote for ‘yes’ to enter la Communauté and a reformed partnership with the 
metropole. In the runup to the vote in the summer of 1958 Sékou Touré, the Guinean leader, 
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believed Guinea would be better off supporting de Gaulle’s new constitution and found a 
considerable amount of support in the RDA for his position. In the last month before the vote – 
which coincided with Nkrumah’s propaganda campaign – Touré’s popularity sank under 
pressure from the grassroots. New dissenting voices from a younger generation (youth and 
student groups) teamed up with teachers and trade unions to criticise the older generation, 
especially Touré and the RDA, because of their strong links with France.324 As pressure was 
mounting on Touré, on 14 September 1958, the RDA convened in a final conference in Conakry 
to give its final position on the referendum. As the Guinean leader walked in the building to give 
his speech at the end of the debates, he was met with a very boisterous audience of members of 
the unions of teachers, students, and youths shouting ‘no’ repeatedly. The pressure had become 
too much, and two weeks before the referendum, Touré changed course. He proclaimed that 
Guinea would not want a new colonial pact with France but should instead vote no in the 
referendum to claim its independence.325 De Gaulle’s wrath at the news of Guinea’s 
independence was incredible: France completely broke ties with its former colony and ordered a 
complete French withdrawal. In the days leading up to the referendum Touré, in secret, still held 
hope in the first days of independence that he could come to terms with France and stay in the 
Zone Franc and negotiate a form of association with France whilst staying outside the 
Communauté. Once independence was achieved, however, his hopes were dashed as France 
refused to renew any economic or technical aid, and within 48 hours, all French personnel were 
ordered to come back to France.326 Worse was to come for the Guinean President as France 
vengefully began to isolate Guinea diplomatically. 327 Yet help was on the way to save him and 
his state from Ghana, a move that came at a great cost of constraining Guinea’s foreign policy 
orientation until well into late 1961-2. From Nkrumah’s point of view, Guinea’s independence 
and troublesome situation could nicely play in his favour. After all, he had been proclaiming 
over the past year that Ghana’s independence would remain meaningless unless the whole Africa 
were free, and here was an opportunity to make due on his promise. Nkrumah extended his arms 
quickly to the Guinean leader and offered him an emergency loan and a plan, to which Touré 
consented, to unite the countries together and serve as the nucleus of a future, much larger 
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United States of Africa.328 Nasser also welcomed the news of Guinea’s independence. He 
happily sent the first message to Touré recognising his state, and announced he was pleased to 
welcome a fellow African state who “refused to join France.”329 
Putting Pressure on the Colonial Powers: Ghana and Egypt’s Anti-Colonial Propaganda 
Campaigns 
 In 1958-9, Egypt was still the lone African country to possess the radio equipment 
required to spearhead the propaganda campaign on African soil. The Ghanaian Government took 
note that it was establishing a continent-wide anti-colonial message against Western powers and 
their African puppets and that they urged Africans to look to Egypt and Nasser for help in their 
liberation efforts.330 In early December 1959, Nkrumah realised he was late to the game and 
needed to get in on the action. His aides advised him that it was high time for Ghana to broadcast 
its own “vigorous propaganda news broadcast” and Nkrumah not only agreed, but also knew that 
if it were to be an effective vehicle for Ghanaian policy, its listeners had to know who was 
behind the efforts. He thus decided that every radio broadcast should therefore sign on with “this 
is the Voice of Africa coming to you from Radio Ghana, Accra,” and his African Affairs 
Committee vowed to assemble enough “propaganda material” to begin broadcasting the 
following month.331 Despite their will to broadcast almost immediately to challenge Egypt’s 
supremacy of the airwaves, the start of the broadcasts of the Voice of Africa was pushed one year 
behind schedule as clear problems emerged. In August 1960 the Ghanaian Cabinet was informed 
that the construction of transmission masts in Tema was taking longer than anticipated, and that 
the broadcasting service could only be counted on to broadcast in French and English as it still 
had not hired the staff needed to be able to transmit in Hausa, Swahili, and Arabic.332 The first 
transmissions of the Voice of Africa began in the late summer of 1961, and they were very much 
copying the format of Egypt’s Voice of Free Africa. Every part of Africa was singled out for a 
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daily 45 minute propaganda broadcast in the appropriate language (English, French, Portuguese, 
Hausa, Swahili, and Arabic).333  
As France Flexes its Grandeur, the List of African Opponents Gets Longer 
 On 13 February 1960 near the town of Reggane in the Algerian Sahara, France detonated 
its first nuclear bomb as part of the Gerboise program and joined the elite club of nuclear powers 
as its fourth member. While Charles de Gaulle was undoubtedly beaming with pride at bringing 
France closer to its lost Grandeur, it came at a cost to his country and its African allies because 
his poor choice of site for the test. France did receive warning signs in advance that there would 
be opposition if it ever carried out nuclear tests in the Sahara. As far back as September 1958 and 
again in July 1959 the French Foreign Ministry knew that Kwame Nkrumah had warned them 
not to carry out any nuclear tests on African soil because it risked the “severest condemnation 
from all Africa.”334 Nkrumah’s response to the first nuclear test was immediate – in the days 
after the test, Ghana froze all French assets in the country in protest.335 Nkrumah’s initial 
reaction was ideologically motivated because France’s choice of detonating the weapon in Africa 
forced the continent’s entry in the nuclear age.336 In the weeks following the blast, however, 
Nkrumah’s opposition was motivated by obvious worries for the health and safety of Ghanaians. 
Despite France’s public assurances that no nuclear fallout would travel to populated African 
areas, its timing was poor because of great winds (called the Harmattan Winds) blowing through 
the blast area. As a result, the Harmattan Winds carried radioactive fallout over a wide swath of 
West Africa raising radioactive levels throughout Ghana and Mali.337 The Gerboise program was 
the perfect pretext for Nkrumah to galvanise more opposition to France, and he immediately 
 
333 “Voice of Africa, Vol. 1, No. 9, September, 1961. Édition anglaise-française.” ADM 16/1/31. PRAAD. 
334 “Press Release No. 799/58. Prime Minister’s Speech on Foreign Policy Made in Parliament on 3rd September, 
1958.” 50QO/20. Le centre des Archives diplomatiques de La Courneuve, Archives Nationales de France. The joint 
communique of Saniquellie by Ghana, Guinea, and Liberia in July 1959 also warned France not to conduct tests in 
Africa. See, “Joint Communique. K.N. 18/7/59.” RG 17/2/720. Bureau of African Affairs Collection, PRAAD. 
335 “Cabinet Memorandum by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Subject: Second French Nuclear Test in the Sahara.” 
ADM 13/2/71. PRAAD. 
336 Nkrumah mentioned this in his opening speech to a conference held in Accra in 1960. See, “Positive Action 
Conference for Peace and Security in Africa. Accra, 7th to 10th April, 1960.” ADM 16/1/24. PRAAD. 
337 “Cabinet Information Paper by the Minister of Defence. Subject: Radio-Active Fallout over Ghana.” ADM 
13/2/88. PRAAD, and “N. 288. Léopold Sédar Senghor, à Monsieur Kwamé Nkrumah, Prime Minister, Accra. 
Paris, le 23 Mars 1960.” RG 17/1/204. Bureau of African Affairs Collection, PRAAD. 
109 
 
reached out to other African states to convene an emergency conference to protest French 
behaviour in Africa.  
 Nkrumah’s efforts to gather a conference, however, clashed with the views of 
Francophone African states, and this brought another butting of heads between Senghor and 
Nkrumah. In a very frank letter to Nkrumah, Léopold Senghor rejected the idea a conference 
needed to be held at all. Naturally the nuclear test worried Mali, he explained, but France had 
privately reassured him the tests would not harm his citizens. It would also be fraudulent to 
single out France for its nuclear testing when 207 similar nuclear tests had been conducted by 
others before; what was more acceptable was a general condemnation of all nuclear powers. 
Senghor pointed out that trying to bring a conference to discuss France’s conduct in Algeria was 
also unnecessary because Mali was already putting pressure on France to solve the issue 
peacefully, and besides, it was too complex a problem for them to solve. Senghor then ended the 
letter on an accusative note. If Ghana was trying to forge some sort of African cooperation on 
common issues, perhaps it ought to revise its foreign policy because its territorial claims on Togo 
and Ivory Coast were raising fear in the region.338 Senghor’s letter angered Nkrumah who 
dismissed any allegations of foul play in Togo and Ivory Coast. Nkrumah expressed his 
disappointment that Senghor did not agree an African conference was needed because France’s 
nuclear testing “constitute[d] a practical danger in its results on the material life of Africa.”339 
For Nkrumah, France had once again attacked Africa with devastating effect and should be 
singled out by African states. Nkrumah expressed his disappointment with Senghor over his 
views on Algeria: “Ghana’s stand has been consistent with our declared policy of pursuing our 
goal for the total liberation of the entire African continent from foreign domination” and said that 
he was therefore obliged to say that “the complexity of the Algerian question does not alter the 
principle that it is wrong to impose foreign rule upon a people.”340  
 Despite the Mali Federation’s refusal to heed Nkrumah’s call for a conference against 
French behaviour in Africa, many African states did respond favorably. Six days after France’s 
second nuclear test in Algeria on April 1st, official state delegations from Egypt, Morocco (who 
had cut diplomatic relations with France over the first test), Guinea, the GPRA, Libya, Sudan, 
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Ethiopia, and Tunisia assembled in Accra for the Positive Action Conference for Peace and 
Security in Africa in protest. Also joining were representatives of dissident parties from Senegal 
and Cameroon, as well as nationalist parties from East Africa and South Africa.341 In the 
introductory speech, Nkrumah warned the conference to remain vigilant for the constant threat of 
imperialism because the French were still showing signs of its imperialist nature by exploding 
nuclear weapons on African soil. He counseled them not to listen to French statements because 
that their new form of “nuclear imperialism” was incredibly harmful to African lives. Scientists 
from the West, he claimed, had concluded that the fallout of the explosions would result in “the 
birth of fifteen-thousand abnormal children” and put one million lives in danger. Nkrumah seized 
the opportunity to use the conference to further criticize France’s role in Africa. In a barb to 
Senghor and his ilk, He claimed that France were also the authors of yet another “New 
Imperialism”, which was designed to trap “the “parts of Africa in Common Market and Trade 
Preference areas set up by industrial Europe.” In a clear nod to the Egyptian delegation, 
Nkrumah also noted with disdain the spurious French argument that Algeria was part of France, 
adding “France belongs to the continent of Europe.”342 Nkrumah’s opening speech 
unsurprisingly coloured the conference’s resolutions, with Egypt also bringing their influence to 
bear for its own ends. In the resolution concerning French nuclear testing, the conference “calls 
upon our brothers and sisters in French Community States in Africa who are equally and directly 
endangered by these lethal atomic tests in the Sahara to join us in our struggles and efforts to 
bring pressure to bear on the Government of France to stop further nuclear tests.” The resolution 
on Algeria, whose entire proceedings was chaired by Egyptian diplomat Fouad Galal, declared 
that all African countries provide “effective support for the militant Algerians in their fight for 
independence.”343  
 France’s African policy, which included a war in Algeria and now atomic tests that 
carried radioactive fallout throughout parts of North and West Africa, was becoming 
increasingly difficult for some African states to defend. The Soudanese leadership344 inside the 
Mali Federation were growing weary of their supposed French allies because they increasingly 
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believed the French were trying to re-assert their authority and dominance in the whole of the 
Sahara which threatened Bamako’s hold on the country’s north. In late 1959 the French secret 
service tried to conserve France’s sphere of influence in the north by convincing the Tuareg 
leaders of northern Sudan to call for their own independence but did not find overwhelming 
support. The Sudanese leadership were alerted of French designs and kept their guard up. In 
January 1960 the French Government, during a Francophone West African defence conference 
announced it wanted to rectify Sudan’s Saharan border and give more Saharan territory for their 
Algerian province.345 According to Vincent Joly, the French Government wanted to extend its 
grasp and control of the Sahara for security reasons as the FLN had announced the start of a 
Southern Saharan front.346 Unlike with the Senegalese, trust between the French and the 
Sudanese eroded fast because of France’s wishes to conserve a sphere of influence in the Sahara. 
The ongoing Algerian War and France’s attempt to assert its control in the Sahara was thus a 
major cause of concern to the Sudanese leadership, and their relatively quiet support for future 
Algerian independence only grew in 1959-60.347 It is therefore plausible that the French nuclear 
tests in the Sahara close to their border was interpreted by the Sudanese as yet another signal that 
France was bullying its way to gain the Sahara for itself. When the Sudanese attempt to take over 
control of the Mali Federation failed in August and France stood up for Senegal, Modibo Keita 
immediately blamed France for its breakup.  
There is evidence that Nkrumah sensed discord building between Senghor and Keita 
before the breakup and sought to reach out to the latter. Given the machinery of state within the 
Mali Federation, Nkrumah wanted to do so privately without the Senegalese finding out, so he 
contacted Keita’s uncle and great admirer of Ghana’s foreign policy, Sheikh Ibrahim Niasse, a 
famous Sufi leader in Senegal. Nkrumah shipped Niasse a shiny new Buick and asked for an 
introduction to Keita, which Niasse was only too happy to oblige. Thanking him for the car, 
Niasse replied that Keita was interested to come visit Ghana to meet Nkrumah.348 While the visit 
never occurred owing to the tense situation building up to the breakup of the Mali Federation, 
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Nkrumah was poised to get in touch with Keita who now found himself isolated and surrounded 
by Francophile states. On 8 September, Keita signalled through his nephew that he wanted to 
assess and inform him of Mali’s economic situation. Keita hoped that Ghana could help 
financially with taking Mali out of the French monetary zone and into an African zone. He raised 
the fact that Ghana had come to Guinea’s aid after its betrayal by the French with a ten-million-
pound loan which proved to all Africans that one’s complete independence did not lead to 
economic collapse. Keita’s nephew claimed in the letter that Mali needed Ghana just as badly 
and that a grand gesture was needed to introduce Nkrumah to the hearts and minds of Malians 
and that an advance of ten million pounds would likely do the trick.349  
While Nkrumah mulled the request, Keita dispensed with the messengers and sent a letter 
to Accra with his version of the events that led to the split. Nkrumah was undoubtedly ecstatic to 
hear a version of the narrative he had been warning against for so long. Keita explained that the 
split was “inspired by the French colonialists, faithful to their secular policy of dismembering 
our dear Africa.” The proof, Keita said, was that France intervened in the internal affairs of the 
Mali Federation to recognise the independence of Senegal. As a result, he hoped that the 
Ghanaian Government could recognise his renamed state, the Republic of Mali, and back its 
entry into the United Nations.350 Nkrumah not only agreed, but also sent a goodwill mission to 
Bamako to study the state of its economy and recommend an amount for an emergency loan to 
help Mali leave the French economic zone. It merely confirmed that Mali was in dire need of 
economic aid (some 16 million pounds), and the mission concluded that a lower figure of five 
million was enough for Nkrumah to help rescue Mali and “lay the foundations of a future 
African Monetary Zone.”351 Shortly after, Keita travelled to Accra to meet Nkrumah, where he 
was offered financial aid and both leaders concretised their new alliance by declaring their wish 
to begin to build a political union in Africa.352  
That November, Nkrumah arranged his first visit to his new allied state of Mali and 
disregarded their request that the size of his party be limited to under twenty. Nkrumah was 
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coming to Bamako as a victor and brought a very large party for the visit which shocked the 
Malians, but nonetheless ensured a warm welcome. Nkrumah’s visit brought much fanfare and 
the largest Malian newspaper, l’Essor, reminded readers that Nkrumah was the saviour of 
Guinea in the aftermath of de Gaulle’s referendum and came to Mali in its hour of need during 
the Mali Federation’s breakup.353 Nkrumah’s ego was stroked by the welcome to his grand visit 
and definitely drew the wrong conclusions from the Malians’ welcome. One of his first public 
announcements in Bamako surprised the Malian regime because it overstepped the boundaries of 
their understanding of their ‘political unity.’ Ghana and Mali, Nkrumah claimed, would share 
one parliament; the Malians, understandably confused and surprised by the claim, kept silent. 
Modibo Keita and his leadership harboured no intentions to cede or share any form of 
sovereignty with Ghana, and his feelings were obvious in the joint communiqué of the visit 
which mentioned only that Mali supported “political unity in its most general sense.”354 Mali’s 
split from the rest of Francophone Africa only fuelled Nkrumah’s belief that the pressure he had 
applied on France was generating results and that other leaders were coming to the same 
conclusions he was. There is some evidence to suggest that Nkrumah’s interpretation of the Mali 
split was askew. Mali was forced to come to Nkrumah for economic aid and to relieve it of its 
encirclement by Francophile states. Keita was forced to seek common allies to put pressure on 
France because Mali’s domestic politics had turned completely against him and the French desire 
to scoop the Sahara for itself threatened Mali’s hold on the north. Mali’s desire to come to 
Nkrumah was therefore driven by expediency and not a commitment to Nkrumah’s vision to 
build a United States of Africa.  
While Nkrumah’s anticolonial campaign did have an influence in corralling together like-
minded African states and even luring Mali away from France into its camp, there can be no 
question that the most influential factor was France’s complete bungling of its African policy. 
Nkrumah was gaining allies in his anti-colonial crusade, and a few months after the conference, 
was proud to add another state, Mali, to Ghana’s list of allies. This encouraged Nkrumah to keep 
up his anti-colonial position and his propaganda machine running. If Ghana had been able to help 
push Guinea and Mali away from France and into Accra’s orbit, then perhaps the time was ripe 
to form a rival group to up the pressure a little more. His occasion came at the behest of 
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Morocco, who invited Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Egypt, the GPRA, and Libya for talks days after the 
new year in 1961 to discuss the mounting issues they faced together in Africa, namely the 
Mauritanian Question, the French War in Algeria, and French Nuclear Testing.355 
The Casablanca Summit of January 1961 and the Founding of the Casablanca Charter  
 During the first week of 1961, government delegations of Egypt, Ghana, Mali, Guinea, 
Algeria (GPRA), and Libya assembled in Casablanca for a summit to form a common front in 
African affairs. A number of decisions and resolutions were taken at the summit which affirms 
the positions of these states in African affairs during 1960-1, and that the clear thread binding all 
of them were their opposition to France. The political document issued and signed by the 
Conference, the Charter of Casablanca, declared the signatories’ complete dedication to the 
liberation of the whole of Africa “and to achieve its unity.”356 Somewhat puzzling was the 
Charter’s support for its states’ rights “to safeguard our hard won independence, the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of our States.” Ghana, Egypt, Mali, and Morocco had a radically different 
interpretation of these words compared to their African counterparts in the Monrovia Group and 
the UAM because the former could be charged with such violations. So what then, was their 
interpretation of these words? It is thus very likely that the Casablanca Charter was sending a 
message from its signatories to the outer world that the African states were still in danger of 
intrusion by imperial powers.357 Naturally, by invoking the spectre of the imperialist powers, this 
was designed to hide the fact they were doing the exact same. The Resolutions of the conference 
were unsurprising and were veiled messages to the other African states not attending and were 
designed to further the specific interests of the signatories: the six signatories denounced French 
nuclear testing in Africa, declared that any aid given to France in its conflict with Algeria was a 
crime committed against Africa, and they called on all African states to provide material aid to 
the Algerian resistance (including guerrillas).358 Mauritania was also declared by the conference 
resolutions as a part of historical Morocco and should therefore go back to its motherland. 
According to the resolutions, Mauritania an illegitimate “puppet state” designed to allow the 
French imperialist state to encircle the free African states with its satellites. The Casablanca 
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states added that these were an existential threat to the continent because “the increase in the 
number of artificial States in Africa is a permanent threat to the security of the African 
Continent, and, at the same time, a strengthening of the forces of imperialism.” In a bold move 
by Nasser, he introduced and received backing for a resolution decrying Israel as an imperialist 
danger to the developing world and called for “the necessity to have a just solution to this 
problem in conformity with the United Nations resolutions and the Asian-African Resolutions of 
Bandung to restore to the Arabs of Palestine all their legitimate rights.”359  
As the meetings adjourned, Nkrumah rose defiantly to give his final address after being 
impressed by the meeting of minds that week. He claimed that the conference launched “a 
revolutionary challenge to the colonial powers and indeed the whole world in relation to its 
attitude towards Africa,” and considered it the only proper steppingstone to African unity. He 
was happy to see that the leaders who assembled for the conference “demonstrated unmistakably 
to the whole world in various ways their iron opposition to colonialism and imperialism and their 
granite resolve to liquidate these evils from the face of our beloved continent.”360 Not disguising 
why he had attended the talks, he (mis)spoke for the rest and claimed he was pleased that they all 
agreed that “All over Africa artificial boundaries dividing brother from brother, sister from sister, 
have been erected by the colonisers. It is within the greater context of African Union that these 
artificial boundaries imposed by colonialism and imperialism will disappear.”361 While he could 
have correctly argued that all attendees did believe colonial borders were bogus and in need of 
revision, Nkrumah unfortunately interpreted their opinion to mean that they also wished to see 
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Chapter IV: Senegal’s Foreign Policy, From Dreams of Unity to Staunch Defence of 
Sovereignty 
 
 The story of Senegal’s foreign policy is different than that of Egypt and Ghana. Not only 
did Senegal begin its independence later than the others and it was also deeply affected by the 
very acrimonious collapse of a hasty federation with another former French colony, French 
Soudan. Much like Nasser in Egypt, Senghor was also very affected by domestic politics and this 
forced him to adopt a foreign policy orientation to insulate him from potential challenges to his 
rule. Although a strong domestic challenge from a younger and more radical Senegalese 
generation did affect him, his main goal for Senegal never changed. Senghor was a Francophile 
and great believer that if Senegal were to succeed and prosper in the future, a strong French 
partnership needed to be secured. Senegal, just as the other ex-AOF states, were the late comers 
to African affairs and last actors to enter the African Scramble for Africa when then gained their 
independence in 1960. France’s grip on its West African colonies (a collection of territories it 
called Afrique Occidentale Française or AOF) and these colonies’ long history of interaction 
with one another explain why their leaders were preoccupied more with negotiating with the 
French and with one another than wider African affairs until they gained their independence. 
Absent from the important African conferences of 1958-1959, they were neither asked to be 
consulted, nor talked about by the other African states. Thus, until their independence in 1960 
they had much less influence in altering the course of inter-African affairs compared to Ghana 
and Egypt who had a head start.  
Despite being late to join the race for African influence, Léopold Senghor was decisive in 
changing the course of African politics by creating a well-organised and cohesive alternative 
bloc against the ideas and behaviour of Nasser and Nkrumah from 1960 onwards. He may have 
started in regional relations with ideas of uniting under one great federation in the late 1950s, but 
at the head of a group of states formed together at Monrovia in May 1961, he successfully 
lobbied the others and convinced them to come together and codify a set of rules for the conduct 
of relations between African states. This important code of conduct, based on the central idea 
that a state’s power of choice over its future and its total sovereignty over its territory, was 
tantamount with respect for one’s newly claimed independence and sacrosanct. This code of 
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conduct, Senghor’ solution to the potential and real problems facing African affairs, was a 
reflection of his troubled experience during Senegal’s short time in the Mali Federation of 1959-
1960. Dealing with domestic trouble stirred by his foreign counterpart in the Mali Federation and 
his hotly debated choice – both at home and abroad – to turn to France for help after 
independence rather than turn its back on it.    
 Documents showing Senghor’s views on the foreign affairs of Senegal, the Mali 
Federation, and inter-African affairs in the 1950s are very scant, and very few examples were 
found in the Senegalese National Archives. Perhaps the most plausible explanation is that 
Senghor conceived of foreign affairs at the time in terms of his relations with France and the 
other ex-AOF territories as they established a new cooperative agreement leading to 
independence (which de Gaulle named la Communauté) in the fall of 1958. The little that does 
emerge comes from documents and addresses by Senghor to the constitutive congress of the new 
umbrella political party of the Mali Federation, the Parti de Fédération Africaine or PFA, in the 
summer of 1959. These documents are not foreign policy documents per se but amount to a sort 
of a combination of political manifesto on the building of an ideal African state and a set of red 
lines on acceptable political behaviour between the two in the federation that should never be 
crossed by the Soudanese leadership. At first glance these documents might seem too focused on 
domestic politics to be related to foreign affairs. Yet the formation of the Mali Federation was an 
act born out of foreign affairs, and it held an important implication for inter-African affairs 
because it was specifically designed to attract more African states to join it. As the sources dated 
after the breakup of the Federation in the summer of 1960, it becomes clear that Senghor saw 
domestic politics and foreign affairs as deeply interwoven. Part of the reasons for Senghor’s 
growing interest in foreign affairs from 1960 onwards is due to the fact that Senegal became 
independent and had to make its position known in foreign affairs. Most important, however, is 
the documentation showing just how much the dreadful experience during the breakup of the 
federation became the influence behind the tone and direction Senghor undertook in African 
affairs. Most of these documents were found in collected works which emerged in the months 
following the breakup of the Mali Federation as Senghor and his second-hand man, Mamadou 
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Dia, scrambled to justify Senegal’s actions as well as level charges that the Soudanese leadership 
led by Modibo Keita was responsible for causing the split by having attempted a coup.362  
Senghor and Senegal: Domestic Constraints and Regionalism, 1954-1959 
 Senghor’s personal goals and hopes for his territory, first articulated when he entered 
French National Assembly in 1945, would go on to structure his ideas of Senegal’s foreign 
policy until 1960. The goals of his struggle was to force the French Government to recognise the 
equality of rights, (including citizenship and the blanket extension of the Declaration of Human 
Rights) to all individuals in the French Empire.363 Furthermore, he advocated for political 
reforms in Africa to democratise the entirety of France’s empire, as well as the creation of a wide 
variety of French-funded programs to raise the quality of life of Africans.364 These goals were 
first articulated in the framework of a foreign policy in October 1954 in an article entitled 
‘Politique Étrangère’. Until 1960, his thought was constrained by the regionalist dynamics in the 
French Empire.365 Senghor is not unlike the other African political leaders at the time in having a 
limited focus on his own region, as he paid little attention to future relations with the Anglo-
African territories or the Arab World. Unlike others, however, Senghor remained steadfast in his 
commitment to maintain a tie with France. The most pressing concern for Senghor was finding a 
way to stymy the intra-African rivalry eating away at the AOF between Senegal and the Ivory 
Coast which was costing valuable pressure to put on the French to concede more rights to 
Africans. Senghor believed that the Franco-West African territories could cluster into two groups 
to be integrated into a French Federal Republic: one with a capital and parliament in Dakar that 
would represent Senegal’s allies French Soudan, Guinea, and Mauritania, and the other with a 
capital and parliament in Abidjan representing Ivory Coast’s allies Niger, Dahomey, and Upper 
Volta. These clusters, he argued, could be politically and economically viable as each already 
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had considerable economic ties to one another.366 The coming together of territories into 
federations was an important idea for Senghor because he believed once they did they could 
finally have the leverage against the French to concede rights and accelerate their 
development.367 Senghor’s dedication to the idea of federation reflected his worldview in the 
1950s. For Senghor, there simply was no other viable alternative for African states to take. If the 
territories fractured into separate independent states they would undoubtedly be economically 
divided, weak, and leave the continent prone to internal conflict. Senghor saw the post-war world 
around him form into large political units with integrated economies and argued that Africa 
should be no different.368 As the 1950s unfurled and more African states became independent, 
Senghor naturally found his opinion increasingly under fire. In the late 1950s, he had to argue 
that a federation within a French confederation was not at all contradictory to African aspirations 
of independence because it would satisfy both African and French aspirations. Both were not 
only historically tied to one another economically and politically, but also needed each other for 
support to succeed in integrating the post-war world. Thus, a truly independent African 
federation inside a confederation with France would satisfy both the Africans’ need for their own 
autonomy and French desire for continued economic ties with Africa.369      
One of Senghor’s most contentious opinions was that independence had to be achieved in 
a series of steps – in other words, independence should be a progressive ideal rather than a hasty 
one.370 This opinion was unsurprisingly contentious because it echoed the hated colonial 
narrative espoused for so many years that only when the Africans were sufficiently ready could 
they begin to gain some control over their own affairs. Calls for immediate independence and for 
the total ‘Africanisation’ of the territorial governments were very popular because they were 
believed to be a way to deliver the people from colonialism. Senghor, however, argued that 
taking such a course was premature and that guidance from French bureaucrats and technicians 
was still needed until African cadres obtained sufficient knowledge in handling the affairs of 
state and for the state to be sufficiently developed industrially and economically before declaring 
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independence.371 For Senghor, purging the territorial governments of French technicians was 
similar to flying blind, and Senegal would be required, he estimated, at least twenty more years 
of Franco-African cooperation to ensure a successful start to independence.372 In the summer and 
fall of 1958, as de Gaulle announced a referendum for the African colonies to establish a 
renewed relationship with the metropole (la Communauté) with a promise of eventual 
independence, Senghor was forced by elements in his own party to concede and compromise. At 
a meeting of the UPS, Mamadou Dia, the old stalwart of the Senegalese socialists, promised that 
his supporters in the UPS would not vote in favour of de Gaulle’s referendum and fracture the 
party if Senghor held to this twenty-year timeline for independence. Senghor’s favoured long-
term approach to independence was simply untenable because the Senegalese public was 
becoming more and more influenced by ideas and stories of other states’ independence in the 
region. Furthermore, a lengthy stay of French officials would undoubtedly cause the population 
to contest France’s continued presence. Facing a disintegration of his party, Senghor acquiesced 
and promised that they would seek independence after five years. Despite severe protests 
organised by the Parti Africain de l’Indépendance (PAI) and other youth movements during de 
Gaulle’s visit to Dakar to promote the referendum, the Senegalese jumped on board with 
Senghor and the UPS and voted to remain in close association with France as long as 
independence would result.373  
Nothing came of Senghor’s early idea of federations he had in 1954, but it is instructive 
because it brings to light two important constants underpinning Senegal’s foreign policy goals 
until 1960: forging a federation with other AOF territories, while improving its status and close 
relationship with France. These two goals culminated in the creation of the Mali Federation with 
French Soudan in 1959-60, and its dissolution soon afterward did not deter Senghor at all from 
pursuing these goals. Sure, the substance of these goals changed – like abandoning the idea of 
unity by federation – but the form did not as Senegal pressed on with creating another form of 
unity built on economic and political cooperation with former AOF territories and France. Whilst 
his struggle went against the grain of the French Empire, he never entertained any ideas that 
would lead to a rupture with France as he always believed that Senegal’s successful future 
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development was tied to the metropole. So why the incredible dedication given by the 
Senegalese leadership to these goals? These goals, simply put, made up the solution devised by 
the leadership in a strategy to cope with a significant internal problem threatening their rule – the 
unrelenting pressure of Senegal’s domestic politics.  
 An important limiting factor for Senghor’s foreign policy was rooted in domestic politics: 
the emergence of a generational divide in 1953 which only grew worse as the years went on. 
Unlike the French university-trained generation of Senghor, the new generation of African 
university students were very radical. Ideas of ‘unity’ were often touted in all segments of 
Senegalese society, but unlike Senghor and his generation, what the younger generation meant 
was attracting other African territories to join in a wide anti-colonial struggle to secure a 
complete independence from France. For many youth in the country, their idea of unity meant 
political unity by abolishing borders.374 Thus, it was unsurprising that they idolised leaders like 
Guinea’s Sékou Touré and French Soudan’s Modibo Keita, and therefore favoured their inter-
territorial political parties like the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA) over territorial 
ones like Senghor and Dia’s political parties (the BPS and UDS which later merged to form the 
Union Progressiste Sénégalaise, or UPS).375 Some of the younger students in Senegal also 
formed a new party, the PAI, which clamored for immediately severing ties with France to 
secure Senegal’s independence.376 The up-and-coming generation of political actors were 
therefore a potential destabilising force to Senghor’s generation who came to power and gotten 
their jobs under the auspices of the French.377 The popular support for Senghor and the UPS 
highlighted another divide; Senghor’s power base was firmly entrenched in the countryside and 
he lacked the important support of urbanites, who were more radical and inclined to support 
younger politicians.378 Senghor understood that if he were successful in retaining the leadership 
of Senegal, gather a mass following, and fulfil his vision for its future he needed to find a 
balance between his party’s aspirations and the radical young generation. Compromises and 
skilful manoeuvring were needed to attract Senegal’s youth into the fold of his party.   
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To solve the dilemma, Senghor came up with an ingenious idea. Throughout the second 
half of the 1950s, he became a strong backer of the idea of a ‘federation’ without properly giving 
it a total definition. Senghor’s position was sufficiently vague – he stated that federalism meant 
safeguarding an African personality with some sort of association with France.379 Leaving this 
important term purposefully imprecise allowed Senegalese people, especially its more radical 
elements, to believe Senghor agreed with their own precise definition. Thus, the term 
‘federalism’ was accepted by both spectrums of Senegalese society in contradictory fashion – for 
some, federalism was the means to incorporate the AOF territories as equals in the French 
Republic. For the others, federalism was believed to be the means to unite the African territories 
against French colonialism and to ultimately find independence. Senghor therefore used the term 
‘federation’ as an important rhetorical tool to rally some support from a seemingly centrist 
position.380 In January and February 1957 Senghor bolstered his position with the more radical 
youth by again catering to a vague and contestable term they often used. Senghor confronted the 
youth at conferences and shaped his narrative as the staunch defender of ‘African unity’ and 
adopted a new slogan: “the African Community before the Franco-African Community.” Lastly, 
he called on other Senegalese parties to join his own because he promised it would continue to 
engage in the struggle against colonialism. Ultimately, this helped him gather more support from 
the younger generation to win the important Senegalese territorial election in March 1957.381 The 
win did afford much breathing room to give the opportunity to centralise his party’s power in 
Senegal, but the internal problems were hardly fixed.382 Domestic pressure forced Senghor to 
promise to pursue a form of unity; not only did it restrict his options for the future, it also 
ensured that his problem with the politics of the younger generation would re-emerge later.    
 From 1957 to 1959, Senghor was one of the chief advocates of a union with other French 
African territories and he tried to attract the other AOF leaders to join him. In Senghor’s mind, 
coming together as a larger unit would allow a better integration into a confederation with France 
because they could leverage more concessions out of the metropole.383 Furthermore, many 
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territories were facing economic problems if they went out on their own. If they combined, 
however, they could solve issues more easily. While Senghor’s idea of unity did seem enticing, 
convincing the other territorial leaders to come together was a long shot. Throughout their 
history in France’s empire, many other territorial leaders were jealous of Senegal’s privileged 
status within the AOF structure, which made them suspicious that the new federation would 
favor Senegal. Furthermore, the Ivory Coast, the most prosperous of the AOF territories, 
resented any form of arrangement where they would be expected to share any of their 
resources.384 Every other territorial leader refused to entertain the idea, except one, Modibo Keita 
of the neighbouring territory of French Soudan. Senghor and Keita both agreed to form a new 
umbrella political party, the Parti de la Fédération Africaine (PFA) to organise and build the 
new Federation of Mali. In 1959 and early 1960, Senghor never gave up on the idea of attracting 
other ex-AOF territories into joining the federation. Not only did the federation fail to draw any 
interest from the other ex-AOF leaders, Senghor’s souring relations with Keita because of 
incompatible views on federation during the building of the Mali Federation laid the groundwork 
for his continental policy from 1960-3. 
Creating Unity: Senghor, the PFA, and the New State 
At the constitutive congress of the PFA on 1 July 1959, Senghor delivered a report that 
precisely stated his and his party’s stand on the structure of the coming federation and its starting 
point in foreign affairs. Unbeknown to some in the audience, notably his counterpart, Modibo 
Keita, Senghor was completely inflexible on his views, and this report functioned as a set of red 
lines not to be crossed by the Soudanese in the coming federation. In the report, he states 
explicitly that aim of the Federation was to go beyond what divided the Senegalese and 
Soudanese and to look towards what united them and to build – step by step – a federated state 
and “negro-African nation”, with French as the language, and freely associated with France 
within a confederation.385 The most important part of this first point – and something that would 
never change in Senghor’s mind – was the absolute necessity of maintaining a tight relationship 
with France despite the fact that they had been responsible for their poor situation. For Senghor, 
a very close relationship with their former colonial power was necessary to help their countries 
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overcome their “millennial backwardness.”386 Senghor understood that at that current time in 
African affairs this argument was contentious both with his own population and the rest of the 
continent, and he addressed the issue. The federation would indeed respect its “terroir” and value 
the growth of organic political, economic, and cultural institutions that reflected their land, their 
race, and their history. In a stab to other states on their continent, Senghor was firm that refusing 
the help of their former colonial overlords in the name of an “anti-colonial struggle” would place 
severe roadblocks on their countries’ road to development.387 Most importantly, Senghor linked 
this choice with the prized idea of independence, and he saw opting for a position of ‘refusal’ to 
join with Europe meant undermining it. For Senghor, the idea of “independence is not grounded 
in refusing; it is [grounded in the ability] to choose. To choose the goal, to choose the means – in 
function to our current situation.”388 Senghor was truly throwing his hat in the ring of Africa’s 
debate on the meaning of independence, and responding to the call of other leaders (like Nasser 
and Nkrumah) to leave the colonial powers behind altogether and arguing that the crux of the 
argument and meaning of independence lay elsewhere. What made a country truly independent, 
in other words, was its capability to choose for itself the goals and means in order to shape its 
destiny. For Senghor, bowing to the pressure exerted by other African leaders was tantamount to 
following a trend without proper reflection.  
 Senghor’s address at the assembly in July 1959 was a very strong message and a signal. 
Not only was it meant to instruct and warn his Soudanese colleagues, but also to signal his 
domestic opposition and other African states of this position. After all, he did state that the 
upcoming federation between Senegal and French Soudan was designed to attract other African 
states to join.389 Yet where did his insistence on maintaining a tight relationship with France and 
his idea of a country wielding its own individual choice by properly reflecting on its own 
particular situation come from? Perhaps the most obvious part of the reason behind his position 
was the fact that Senghor was an ardent Francophile and genuinely wanted to see Senegal’s 
future tied to that of France. The Senegalese leader did have a large amount of personal affinity 
with France and he had lived a significant part of his life in France, married a French woman, 
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was a Catholic, had become an important man of letters there and an admirer of its culture. There 
were more important reasons behind his position, however. The alternative position of breaking 
all links with colonial powers, espoused by the likes of Nkrumah, Nasser, and Senegal’s 
problematic PAI was gaining a lot of popularity domestically in Senegal, particularly with its 
younger generation.390 Senghor argued that his desire for continued good relations with France 
was reasoned because he had carefully considered Senegal’s and French Soudan’s own specific 
situations and urged others to do the same. Senghor believed that if they did, they would come to 
the same conclusion because they would undoubtedly be reminded of a particular cause célèbre 
from the ex-AOF and its hardships for not doing so.  
  Senghor explicitly reminded the congress of Guinea’s hasty decision to opt out of a 
continued close relationship with France in October 1958 and its negative effects. Senghor 
warned the congress not to listen to the PAI’s dubious calls of immediate independence because 
they had not travelled to Guinea to see for themselves the deep trouble it found itself in.391 
Bowing to pressure from his party and the aspirations of a younger and more radicalised 
generation, Sékou Touré had turned down the French offer to join la Communauté and declared 
Guinea’s immediate independence.392 Touré paid a higher price than he imagined for the move 
however, as a vengeful de Gaulle made an example of Guinea and punished it severely. Under 
his orders, the French officials either took out or sabotaged whatever was left of the 
infrastructure it had built, leaving the new state without a leg to stand on and with very few 
options from which to find aid.393 Senghor knew that the appeal of independence was strong with 
the youth of his country, but as the case of Guinea was instructing them, turning their backs to 
the French in a show of anti-colonialism was simply too costly an option.  
At the time Senghor delivered this report, Guinea found itself deeply isolated, poor, and 
forced to solicit any state it could for any form of funding. Ghana did jump on the chance to gain 
good publicity and a measure of influence by ceremoniously handing Touré a 10-million-pound 
loan, but it was hardly enough to build a country from scratch. The Cold War superpowers were 
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also implored to help, but only meagre bits of emergency aid like foodstuffs made it to 
Guinea.394 For Senghor, it would take more than an upstart and very limited industrial sector in 
Senegal and the natural resources of French Soudan to make a viable state able to fill the 
expectations of their peoples. To do so, Senghor needed a proper plan for the federation’s 
development before taking any hasty decisions.395 Immediate independence and the cutting of 
ties with Europe was simply not the answer, because it needed access to European experts, funds, 
and markets; France was therefore their ticket to the European Economic Community (EEC) and 
the West.396 Senghor argued that it was in France’s interests to help the federation achieve its 
goals, as de Gaulle knew that a rival union had emerged in Africa, the Ghana-Guinea union, 
which threatened to draw lone African nations away into their orbit and away from Europe. De 
Gaulle, he added, was a sensible and reasonable man and the federation could very well 
negotiate with him and achieve success.397 Senghor was not the only Senegalese leader at the 
congress to give these opinions. Mamadou Dia, Senghor’s right-hand man in the UPS and who 
would become the federation’s Vice-President, stated the same points and defended Senghor in 
the debates at the congress.398 Senegal’s position on the direction and future of the Mali 
Federation was therefore clearly laid down.  
Senghor reiterated that the aim of this federation was to attract other African countries to 
join them. He did not envisage this federation to be all inclusive, however, as he only meant that 
only former states of the ex-AOF would join, thus excluding Anglo-African and Arab countries. 
This would change two years later at the Monrovia Conference, but Senghor’s assertion shows 
the fact that he had been for years constrained by the politics of France and the AOF and simply 
had not yet considered the regions of Africa outside of it. What Senghor really cared about was 
rebuilding the fractured AOF but instead of allowing France to continue its rule over the 
Africans, the new federation would be on a more equal footing with it inside the framework of a 
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confederation.399 This shows that even in the summer of 1959 Senghor still held on to the idea he 
had fought so hard for to gain France’s acceptance that Africans were indeed equal and that 
Africans and French working together was the best way for them to improve both their futures. 
So how did Senghor imagine the Mali Federation attracting other former AOF states to join?   
To attract them, he argued, they needed to build a federation based on an ideal African 
state. Senghor elaborated on this concept of the state at length and was very clear about that they 
would not build institutions from scratch but instead add an African character to the best 
contributions that the Europeans had brought.400 At the base of Senghor’s concept for an ideal 
state was the notion that there were many different peoples populating the numerous countries of 
the ex-AOF and that each, when it respected and represented a country’s diversity, was much 
better off because all groups brought vital contributions. This was no doubt influenced by the 
fact that Senghor himself was part of a religious and ethnic minority in Senegal – he was a 
Roman Catholic and born in the Serer community. A ‘nation’ as he defined it, was not a 
reflection of a narrow segment of society (like a an ethnic or religious minority/majority), but 
was instead a constructed supra-national identity which reflected and included all societal 
groups. National strength, for Senghor, was to be found in the richness of diversity and a 
“harmonious ensemble”, not in a forced homogeneity.401 The ‘state’, as he defined it, had to be a 
reflection of the nation-in-the-making and the expression of its will, but in order to do so, its 
agents (parliaments, politicians, civil servants) had the task of constructing the new supra-
national identity which would erect the nation.402 Institutions would therefore be designed in a 
way that the individuals had to engage with them; once they did, the different individuals would 
be formed into a “negro-African Nation”, therefore adding an African dimension to the supra-
national identity. Thus, it would “assure a cultural base to the future Nation, by defining the 
essential characteristics of the traditional negro-African civilisation with the contributions of the 
French and European which will permit a renaissance.”403 Naturally, ‘forming’ individuals into a 
collective was necessarily a coercive business, and Senghor alluded to the fact that a temporary 
dictatorship was necessary. He claimed that the new state simply could not have limited powers 
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because this process had to be carried out; only when it was complete could a program limiting 
the powers of the state be implemented.404 Senghor never openly alluded to the true role of the 
new party in the address, but it was amply clear that it would fulfill the role of the vanguard and 
work glove-in-hand with the state in erecting the nation.405 The state (and by extension, the 
party) was to assure the suppression of two forces inherent in all nations, the forces of 
assimilation and imperialism.406 The two forces were connected for Senghor; the first was the 
unwanted process of domestic homogenisation that menaced the diversity he prized, but he also 
saw it as the precursor of its exportation abroad and the enforced homogenisation of peoples of 
other nations. Interestingly, he left the idea open to suggestion that while it most certainly 
applied previously to colonial powers, it was also applicable to African countries. Senghor’s 
solution to keep these forces in check was the idea of a decentralised federation, whereby all 
nations were respected within, and to accept incoming peoples to this federation on an equal 
footing and in mutual respect.407 Senghor acknowledged the economic problem of the ex-AOF, 
namely the economic inequalities of its former territories, and urged them to enter their 
decentralised Mali Federation – which he claimed had no “leader state” – and to knock down the 
useless trade barriers and customs duties harming their development. Instead, it was much wiser 
to form their own version of the EEC.408 
Naturally, given this arrangement between the party and the state in erecting the nation, 
Senghor clearly stated that an organised opposition would be tolerated as long it abided by a set 
of very important rules. In this respect Senegal was in no way different than Ghana and Egypt. 
An opposition could exist as long as it left the party carry out its work, and it could not be 
allowed to criticize the party in the interest of a single group in society nor could it have an aim 
to destroy the party because it meant the destruction of the state itself.409 Senghor was 
determined to make it difficult for an opposition to thrive because he was acutely aware of the 
potential for an opposition to undermine the building of the federation and the party’s hold on 
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power. Finally, Senghor addressed the problematic generational political divide in Senegal and 
explained that it was essential for the entire population to be behind the policies of nation’s 
political leadership for the federation to succeed. Where Senegal differed from the others was its 
problems with an up and coming generation of politicians. It was therefore particularly important 
for students, who were prone to be misled by European ideologies, to understand that their role 
was not to lead but to assimilate the masses behind their national leaders who espoused proper 
theories fit for a ‘negro-African’ civilisation. Interestingly, Senghor added that the federation’s 
students were to take their North African counterparts as an example in backing the 
leadership.410 What he did not yet comprehend is the implications – and threat – that a domestic 
opposition had in the federation’s (and later Senegal’s) foreign affairs. It was the realisation that 
foreign countries and nationals could inflict domestic strife in another country by supporting its 
domestic opposition that drove Senghor to be the strongest supporter of the principle of non-
interference in the affairs of other states and the total respect for a state’s territorial sovereignty.  
 Instead of listening to Senghor’s instructions, the federation’s youth criticized the PFA 
leadership for their links to France and espoused a similar discourse to Nasser and Nkrumah. The 
following spring, as the youth of the PFA gathered for their first political conference, Senghor 
prepared to address them by writing “an essay of definition” entitled The African Path to 
Socialism in order to bring them back in line and justify his position. Senghor believed that their 
idea of cutting off ties to Europe was based on faulty grounds. He argued that at the crux of the 
matter was a great deal of confusion on the continent about what colonialism had been. His first 
message was clear: African people should cease making both ‘colonialism’ and Europe the alibi 
for the current situation of Africa and all its problems because it would never lead to any 
progress, and in any case it was lazy and demonstrated an inferiority complex.411 While 
colonialism brought a good deal of harmful consequences like slavery and oppression, it had not 
been a purely destructive force. Colonialism brought with it some good which could not be 
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The Dissolution of the Mali Federation: Setting Precedents and Contrasting African Opinions 
 The formation of the Federation of Mali in 1959 was held as a triumph for both the 
Senegalese and the Soudanese leaderships. Both saw it as a meaningful step towards African 
unity and independence which greatly pleased their populations and sealed their position atop 
their own hierarchies. Trouble was on a very short horizon, however, as their interaction within 
the new federation highlighted that they had failed to consider each others’ assumptions 
underpinning this venture. Both Senghor and Keita formed the federation as a response to their 
particular domestic constraints – for Senghor, it was a project towards African unity designed to 
pave the way to eventual independence and force France to concede rights to the Africans, and 
for Keita, a federation was the first step to African unity which would bring the long-awaited 
independence to the Soudanese. These goals did seem like they dovetailed nicely, but as the first 
few months came and went, the federation began to unravel because both the Senegalese and 
Soudanese tugged in different directions until the federation fractured in August 1960. The roots 
of the split of the Mali Federation were situated in two contrasting understandings held in the 
Senegalese and Soudanese camps: the idea of ‘federalism’ and how it should take its final form, 
and the federation’s continued relationship with France.413 Up to late 1958, Modibo Keita was 
still supportive of securing a good relationship with France (as long as it would allow the 
federation’s independence), but he was increasingly going against the grain of his own party. Not 
only was the youth wing of the Union Soudanaise (US) pushing for an immediate independence, 
but so were prominent members like Madeira Keita.414 Compared with the Senegalese, there was 
much less unity in the ranks of the party around the issue of cooperation with France, for an  
important reason. On the whole, the Soudanese had been treated much worse by the French 
during the colonial period and a significant portion of the US (as well as trade unions and youth 
organisations) were openly hostile to the continued relationship with France.415  
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In late 1959 and early 1960, a combination of pressure from the US and from continued 
French recklessness on the continent put additional pressure on Modibo Keita. With no warning 
from the French, their military conducted indiscriminate sweeps in the north for Algerian and 
other militants, news of French covert plans to conserve French Soudan’s northern regions for 
themselves, and finally, the first surprise nuclear test north of French Soudan’s border with 
Algeria, Keita finally understood the French could not be trusted partners in cooperation.416 
Thus, he began to demand a renegotiation of the federation’s partnership with France of his 
surprised Senegalese counterparts. A few months later, without consulting the Senegalese, he 
publicly announced the Federation would seek to create an African monetary zone outside of the 
French Franc.417  
 Not only was Keita trampling over Senghor’s inflexible ideal of maintaining a tight 
relationship with France, Keita was also breaching one of the core tenets of the Mali Federation 
by supplanting the careful power sharing agreement between Senegal and French Soudan 
established in 1959. In its original design, a balance of power existed in the Federation to respect 
the national sovereignty of each and to prevent one from overcoming the other on the federal 
level. For Senghor and Dia this arrangement was necessary for them to be able to maintain 
control domestically by staying at the top of the intricate politics of the UPS (by then an 
amalgamation of many parties). This agreement, however, became a large point of contention for 
Modibo Keita who believed that supreme power needed to be possessed by one office in order to 
see the federation progress.418 With an election for the presidency of the Mali Federation coming 
up later in the year, Keita began that summer to intrude directly in Senegal’s internal affairs, and 
as he did so, Senghor increasingly saw a drop in his chances of being able to upend Keita’s 
authoritarianism by winning the upcoming election for the presidency.419 In a UPS congress in 
July 1960, Senghor addressed his party members and announced that the French technicians 
already working in Senegal would not be replaced by Africans. The youth wing of the UPS 
disagreed strongly because it wanted to see an ‘Africanisation’ of cadres and a reduction of 
French influence. Modibo Keita, who attended the congress as an observer, stood up and joined 
the youth wing by castigating Senghor in front of his party and accused him of reneging on the 
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PFA’s assurances that all cadres would be Africanised. Keita’s intrusion at the congress alerted 
Senghor and Dia that Keita was a direct threat to their domestic position.420 This was not the only 
time the Soudanese had been intruding in Senegalese affairs. According to William Foltz, 
Soudanese figures were trying to undermine support for Senghor by meeting Muslim religious 
leaders and telling them that they would be better off with a Muslim leading them rather than 
Senghor, a Christian.421 Keita pushed his luck more and more that summer and his plan to 
supplant Senegal’s influence in the Mali Federation. Claiming he was justified to do so as 
provisional President of the Federation, he attempted to appoint a relative of a one of Senghor’s 
former domestic opponents, Lamine Gueye, as the head of the armed forces. Furthermore, the 
Soudanese ramped up their pressure on Senghor himself not to run for the federal elections.422 
The Senegalese leadership finally exited the Mali Federation in the nick of time in late August as 
Keita and the Soudanese leadership attempted to take key Senegalese institutions for themselves, 
and tried to convince the French to send troops to secure their takeover.423  
Senegal in the wake of the break-up of the Mali Federation 
 The attempted coup of August 1960 by Keita to oust the Senegalese leadership and 
subsume Senegal into a centralised federation left Léopold Senghor very shaken and acutely 
aware of the potential threat to his rule and position in the country. Most unsettling was just how 
easily a foreign leader had been able to tap into Senegal’s weakness, the combination of 
Senghor’s large urban opposition and radical youth, and to try to turn it against the UPS-led 
Senegalese leadership. The project of the Mali Federation – sold to the Senegalese population as 
the way forward – was dead and left a large void in its wake. Senghor, Dia, and the rest of the 
UPS were left with only a temporary measure to keep Senegal moving forward. At the height of 
tensions with the Soudanese, Senegal immediately declared its independence – both as a measure 
to distance and insulate itself from the Mali Federation and to signal to the wider Senegalese 
public that they were not going back to French rule.424 A new project needed to be put together – 
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and quickly – by Senegal’s leadership to satisfy the intricacies of its society and convince them 
that they could lead it to a prosperous future.  
One of Senghor and Dia’s first acts – within five days of the dissolution of the federation 
– was to write a new constitution for their new independent country to secure a permanent and 
virtually unchallengeable set of positions. Senghor’s influence on the document is incredibly 
evident: the preamble includes a passage showing his sentimental attachment to France as it 
states that Senegal declares its independence and belief in the Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and the Citizen of 1789 as well as the UN declaration of 1948 (the constitution also stated that 
the official language was French). Senghor’s previous bargain with the younger generation is 
also enshrined in the preamble, which states that Senegal would spare no effort to create African 
unity (although tactically, it does not state which form this would take).425 The first section of the 
constitution, entitled ‘of the state and its sovereignty’ also shows Senghor’s beliefs in diversity 
as well as the harsh lessons he learned from the Mali Federation. The first article stipulates that 
the state is inclusive and protects the country’s diversity irrespective of religion, gender, and 
race, and article 3 allows political opposition groups to organise and challenge the party in power 
by way of suffrage and as long as they respect the law.426 Articles two through four are a 
showcase of the lessons Senghor drew from the break-up of the Mali Federation, laying the stress 
is on the state’s sovereignty over its territory and laws preventing domestic actors from 
undermining it. They stipulate that no individual or group other than the government was entitled 
to appropriate themselves and exercise the state’s sovereignty, that all political parties must 
respect the principle of Senegal’s national sovereignty, and that acting on “any regionalist 
propaganda which could harm the state’s internal security or the integrity of the territory of the 
Republic” was an offence punishable by law.427  
The understanding and logic behind these stipulations is clear – that it was treasonous to 
wreck the balance of society and to become the channel through which a foreign state could 
undermine Senegal’s sovereignty. As Senghor experienced with the Soudanese leadership using 
 
Nations Unies,” reprinted in Ministère de l’Information, de la Presse et de la Radiodiffusion, Livre Blanc sur le 
Coup d’État manqué, 66 and 67. 
425 “Pièce n. 33. Constitution de la République du Sénégal (Loi n. 60-045, adoptée le 25 août 1960),” reprinted in 
Ministère de l’Information, de la Presse et de la Radiodiffusion, Livre Blanc sur le Coup d’État manqué, 68. 
426 Ibid, 68-9. 
427 Ibid, 69.  
134 
 
ethnic and party sympathisers in his own country to undermine him during the Mali Federation, 
it was important that the country’s constitution clearly forbade it to happen again. Furthermore, 
the constitution clearly shows that in Senghor’s mind, the Senegalese people had to be made to 
understand that their state had clearly defined borders, irrespective of ethnicity and religion, and 
that they had to be respected. No appeals to foreign politicians or states to intervene in 
Senegalese domestic politics was going to be tolerated. With this constitution clearly stating 
Senegal’s sole right to its territorial sovereignty, Senghor sought to insulate himself from the 
combination of foreign and domestic threats. The borders that Senegal had acquired from the 
time of the French Empire had been violated by foreign leaders, and Senghor and Dia’s 
successful defence of them now made them untouchable. From this point onwards in its dealings 
with other African states, Senegal would consistently affirm its rights to its sovereignty over its 
borders and nurture alliances with states that thought the same. As I demonstrate in chapter three, 
because of this belief, Senghor struck a very important alliance with Tunisia’s Habib Bourguiba 
as they came to Mauritania’s aid to fend off Morocco’s spurious claims on its territorial 
sovereignty. It was over this issue that independent Africa began to fracture into two antagonistic 
camps, one which respected the former colonial borders and the other, headed by Nkrumah and 
Nasser who believed all borders should be redrawn or dissolved.  
After the hasty adoption of Senegal’s constitution in the late summer of 1960, both 
Senghor and Dia scrambled to write something as fast as they could to serve as a set of 
justifications for the split and to give the public some sort of vision of what was to come in the 
future. It is evident that both were caught on the back foot by the federation’s implosion because 
their writings barely feature anything new and substantial. In both cases, they collated previous 
writings during the time of the Mali Federation to indicate that Senegal would not change its 
position.428 Senghor, however, was the only one of the two to submit anything new, written in a 
preface, which spanned a mere five pages. Yet in this hastily prepared preface429 he launched a 
new concept which, together with Senegal’s constitution, formed the basis of Senegal’s world 
view and foreign policy for the next few years – Senegal’s duty to what he saw as the ongoing 
creation of a new world order during decolonisation, the ‘Civilisation of the Universal’.430 This 
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concept, which Senghor elaborated more and more in 1961-2, was specifically designed to 
instruct the Senegalese people of their nation’s new identity and give them their state’s sense of 
purpose in international affairs. Furthermore, he saw it as an ideal and a project of inter-state 
socialisation in international relations between the decolonised states and the rest of the world 
with incredible benefits. It was anchored by a few assumptions around the dismissal of the 
radical anti-colonialism espoused on the continent: that their vast negro-African/Berber values 
were able to contribute hugely and positively to build a better world community; that they 
needed to purge of harmful elements of this civilisation keeping them back as a people; that it 
was imperative that people of negro-African/Berber values had to understand that they should 
appropriate themselves with some European ones to be able to merge with the rest of the world 
as well as improve their own situation; and finally, that if they accepted and acted on the above, 
Senegal would get a boost by being allowed to have a sustained relationship with the Europeans 
in their own efforts at development.431   
Reminiscent of his great work on the concept of Négritude which he had introduced in 
the past and a talk he had given in Europe in 1959, Senghor believed that the Senegalese people 
were made from a combination of negro-African and Berber values and the products of a specific 
terroir – of a particular climate, land, and “original cultural heritage.”432 Yet the Senegalese 
people, by virtue of being a people of the twentieth century and itself a “socialising civilisation” 
invested in the future of the planet, had to find a way to combine its negro-Berber values with 
European values to fulfil its true destiny as a contributing force on the world stage. Colonialism, 
he argued, had not simply been a destructive force – with the destruction had come the 
introduction of positive European values which the Senegalese had to wield. They had to shed 
themselves of the worst and most negative values of their own civilisation and accept the good 
European ones because of they held the technical methods to propel them forward.433 By 
achieving the symbiosis of the best of their two civilisations, the Senegalese would be poised to 
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bring a genuine contribution to the project of the Civilisation of the Universal. The most 
influential contribution of the negro-African/Berber civilisation to the project was its peaceful 
socialising nature and influence on other states; thus, the spirit of imperialism and destructive 
tensions, as he witnessed it grow on the continent itself and through the Cold War rivalry, could 
be stymied.434 Senegal’s pursuit of this project, he argued, was also sure to attract other African 
states to the project because it was not an ideology, but an ideal to follow which was compatible 
with a state’s drive to socialism and a non-aligned policy. Given the African nature of the 
project, Senghor argued that it would be beneficial to bring North and Sub-Saharan Africa closer 
together once again.435 Senghor’s concept of the ‘Civilisation of the Universal’, while sounding 
like a hefty philosophical concept, was never really covered in great depth because it was never 
really designed to. Instead, its function was merely to justify the good reasons behind fusing of 
European with African values, or even more specifically, Senghor’s goal of continuing the 
relationship between France and Africa.  
 
Chapter V: The Formation of the Casablanca Group in the Context of Moroccan-
Mauritanian Conflict 
 During the hectic period in inter-African affairs of 1960-1, many issues caused the 
division of the African states. One particularly important cause, the Moroccan challenge to 
Mauritania’s independence, is absent in the literature. Perhaps owing to Mauritania’s size, the 
lack of academic studies on Mauritanian contemporary history, or being overshadowed by the 
ongoing issue of Morocco’s claim on Western Sahara, the Mauritanian Crisis of 1960-3 has 
simply escaped scholarly attention.436 The lack of scholarly attention to the issue – and its role in 
dividing Africa until May 1963 – is surprising because archives in Tunisia, Morocco, Senegal, 
Ghana, and France hold a surprising amount of documents relating to it. Whilst they shared 
similar means of trying to gain foreign territories and tried to justify them with the combination 
 
434 Léopold Senghor, “Léopold Sédar Senghor, President of the Republic of Senegal,” 323, and Léopold Senghor, 
“Élements constructifs d’une civilisation d’inspiration négro-africaine,” 189-190. 
435 Ibid, 191-2. 
436 The only attention paid to this issue (and examined its effects on Maghrebi relations) was conducted by the 
Tunisian historian Abdeljelil Temimi who used Moroccan and Tunisian archives. See, Abdeljelil Temimi, 
“Bourguiba face à l’indépendance de la Mauritanie et relations tuniso-marocaines à la lumière des correspondances 
diplomatiques, 1957-1960,” in Abdeljelil Temimi, Habib Bourguiba: Père Fondateur de la Tunisie moderne et la 
fin d’un mythe (Tunis: Publications de la Fondation Temimi pour la Recherche Scientifique et l’Information, 2012). 
137 
 
of a historical narrative and claims of illegitimacy of colonial-era borders, Morocco’s challenge 
to Mauritanian independence was different than Nkrumah’s challenge on Togo or Ivory Coast. 
Unlike the Ghanaian case, the Moroccan regime had a different relationship to its claim as it was 
used it as a crutch to rally the population around the regime. By making the Mauritanian issue 
part of the new national narrative, the Moroccan Kings made it impossible to abandon the issue 
because they would leave themselves open to crippling criticism at home and appear weak. From 
the point of view of the Mauritanian regime, Morocco’s claims on its right to sovereignty was 
naturally tied to its immediate security and legitimacy. With many political rivals located in the 
border regions of Mauritania, the regime of Mokhtar Ould Daddah had to contend with a 
receptive audience to Moroccan claims inside its own state.  
 Morocco’s determination to grab Mauritania for itself, like most developments of 
relations between North and Sub-Saharan Africa during this period, had considerable effects for 
inter-African relations as a whole. The most important effect was that it helped drive groups of 
African states further apart. As the issue lay unresolved from 1958 to 1963, both the Mauritanian 
and Moroccan regime tried to corral support from other African states, making it a wider African 
issue. States like Tunisia, Senegal, and Nigeria were appalled that Morocco, an African state, 
could have the gall to undermine the legitimacy of another African government and infringe on 
its sovereignty. Others, notably Ghana, Egypt, and Mali, sided with Morocco because they 
believed the narrative that France had unjustly cut off Morocco’s southern province in its 
colonial quest to divide and rule. The Mauritanian Question, therefore, precipitated the creation 
of the Casablanca Group of states as Mauritania’s new allies and supporters founded their rival 
groups in Brazzaville and Monrovia.   
Morocco and its claim on Mauritania 
The claims on Mauritania were levelled first by the popular Istiqlal Party in 1957 and 
picked up by the Moroccan royalty and government would prove to be the cornerstone of its 
African policy as its continued and present, albeit more limited, claims on Western Sahara 
testify. The origins of this stand on the territories south of its borders lay in the combination of 
two factors. The first factor was that in 1956-7 Morocco was a new state and embarked on an 
important process of state formation and began to tailor an identity, particularly around the idea 
of the historic rights of the Alawite throne which retraced its roots to the 16th Century. This 
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belief led many political leaders in Morocco to think that Morocco had been unjustly truncated 
during the colonial period to a mere fragment of what was once the large Cherifian Empire 
which spanned across parts of North and West Africa. This led the most important political 
party, the Istiqlal, to put pressure the regime to claim the entirety of its ancestral lands by 
popularising the idea domestically.437 The second factor which complicated the issue was the 
existence of a discrepancy in the debated understanding in this period of the limits of Morocco’s 
southern borders between Morocco, Spain, France, and later Mauritania and Algeria. The French 
and Spanish governments believed the borders in Western Sahara and the north of what would 
become Mauritania and Algeria to be fixed firmly through existing treaties dating back a few 
decades, but Morocco disagreed citing different older treaties, and the vagueness of the colonial 
powers’ supposed spheres of effective authority. Both this discrepancy in the understanding of 
Morocco’s southern borders and the historical past served the regime as justifications to its land 
claims.438 In support to its claims, maps were drawn of ‘Greater Morocco’ – first by the Istiqlal 
in 1957 then the Moroccan state in 1959 – and distributed both through the press and at state-
level summits. In those two years the precision of the map increased as the Moroccan state made 
its own version. In 1957 the Istiqlal’s map of Greater Morocco was rather vague and shown to 
encompass Mauritania, parts of Senegal, French Soudan, and Spanish Sahara.439 The Moroccan 
Government built on this map, refined it, and made a large copy show at the Arab League 
meeting in Casablanca in September 1959. At this meeting the Moroccan delegation presented 
the Arab delegates a map of 1,5 m by 1,0 m clearly showing the limits of Greater Morocco to 
encompass all of Mauritania, sizeable parts of Algeria (both the region of Colomb-Béchar and 
some territory adjacent to it), the Spanish enclave of Ifni, and the Rio de Oro.440  
The King took to the idea of claiming the lands to his south in a bid to galvanise a nation 
behind one narrative, the throne, and the Moroccan Government. Thus, his claims to Mauritania 
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fulfilled the purpose of crafting the crucial national narrative that Morocco had a long and tragic 
history which dated back to a large and glorious empire which ended up truncated by foreign 
powers. The idea of a larger Morocco and the fixing of a historic injustice by the colonial powers 
was also very popular in the country, and Mohammed V gained popularity, prestige, and 
legitimacy from the issue because it helped reinforce his image of an anti-colonial ruler. The idea 
of calling for a return of Mauritania to Morocco was not simply an ideological measure meant to 
reinforce the idea of the nation, as it had an instrumental purpose as a leverage tactic. Since its 
independence in 1956, the King repeatedly asked the French to evacuate their troops from 
Moroccan soil and see their sovereignty respected, and the French either refused or gave vague 
promises.441 Levelling a very large claim on external territory at the same time as demanding the 
permanent withdrawal of French troops from Morocco could very well cause the French to 
appease them and give up the smaller and much more immediate goal of French evacuation from 
its bases in Morocco.  
Another reason motivating an interest in Mauritania was the incredible potential of the 
iron ore deposits at the mine near Fort Gouraud. The mining project was very extensive and 
ambitious (it included building a railway and a port), and it promised to be very lucrative for its 
investors. The mine held iron ore of excellent quality and enough to supply a growing world 
market for sixteen years, and the majority of the mine’s shares were held by France (55%) while 
the rest split between Great Britain, Germany, and Italy.442 The shareholders of the development 
company (MIFERMA) petitioned their case to the IBRD for a loan to exploit the mine and 
successfully obtained the loan. This infuriated the Moroccan government because it had opposed 
MIFERMA’s bid because they claimed that since the mine was in Mauritania, and Mauritania 
was in Morocco, it was therefore theirs to exploit.443 While his claims to Mauritania had an 
ideological and instrumental purpose, Mohammed V really believed in it. Throughout his reign 
he fought hard on the diplomatic front in the attempt to gain Mauritania until his death in 
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February 1961, and often at the expense of his attention to domestic matters.444 By then the idea 
had taken such a powerful hold over the Moroccan pub129lic and politicians that his successor, 
Hassan II, whom counselled his father to abandon the claim, was forced to take it up and thus it 
remained the bedrock of Moroccan foreign policy until the early 1970s.445  
The King found conditions to be ripe to claim the French-held territory of Mauritania as 
the French-held territory seemed wracked with internal divisions. Mauritania’s society in the 
1950s was not extremely cohesive and was split between three prominent groups – the Moorish 
population of the North, the Black Africans of the South, and a very influential religious class, 
the Marabouts (called zuwaya).446 Tensions existed between them, and important myths were 
rooted inside their societies. The Moorish people tended to see themselves as the most important 
because of their perceived historical role as the warriors and true leaders who protected the 
Marabouts. The Marabouts saw themselves as the proper guides for Mauritania’s future because 
the Moors were rapacious and likely to cause chaos in the country after the French left. The 
Marabouts also tended to favour French rule because of the freedom of religion in the colony and 
their protection from the Moors. The Black Africans of the south resented both the Moors and 
Marabouts because they perceived them as a historical class of slaves and unfit to rule a country. 
The southerners of Mauritania believed they were equals to the others, and that the land was 
theirs first.447 Lastly, there was a further division, on the East-West axis. The peoples living in 
Western Mauritania held themselves to be more intellectually cultivated than the Easterners, due 
to their earlier interaction with the French, and therefore more fit to rule over the rest of 
Mauritania. The Easterners resented this and resisted the Westerners’ attempts to dominate 
them.448  
This growing resentment eventually led to efforts by some prominent eastern leaders to 
identify more with French Soudan, and after independence, to clamour for the East’s inclusion 
into a very willing Mali.449 Its fledgling national movement, led by Mokhtar Ould Daddah, had 
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its hands full given its ambitious goal of breaking down these divisions and uniting all into one 
nation, behind one party.450 It is also difficult to imagine how the Moroccan government could 
have ruled Mauritania and integrated it into Morocco. Moroccan calls for a return of Mauritania 
never went beyond moral and religious justifications as no plan was ever put forward on how 
Morocco was going to merge the territory into its existing Kingdom. French officials at the time 
doubted that Morocco wanted to incorporate the Black Mauritanian population into the 
Kingdom, and it later transpired in conversations between Daddah and Hassan II that they were 
right. The King’s intentions, despite saying that he wanted to incorporate a Mauritania stretching 
to parts of modern-day Senegal and Mali, actually never intended to get control of all of it.451 
Although there is little evidence stating why, one likely explanation is that the Moorish 
politicians in favour of their incorporation into Morocco were doing so only to prevent the 
formation of a Mauritania where sharing power with a Black population was envisaged. Another 
would be that the Moroccan monarch and Government simply did not want to include a large 
black population in the state. Some prominent Moorish leaders in the North did have significant 
backing against such a measure and instead favoured to unify with Morocco, giving Morocco’s 
claims some legitimacy.452 Mauritania’s viability as a future state seemed unlikely, as it was a 
state with little population, a large historical social and ethnic divide between the Moors of the 
North and the Black Africans of the South, with the latter seen as the slaves to the former. As 
was often repeated by the Moroccans at the time, the national movement in Mauritania couldn’t 
have much of a grasp or even a chance to build a country out of the territory as it had no capital 
to speak of fit for a state. Nouakchott was built from scratch in March 1958 for this purpose.453  
During the first years of its claims on Mauritania, the Moroccans were relentless. 
Imitating a tactic from the Egyptians, Rabat built its own radio network and tried to delegitimise 
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the Mauritanian regime of Ould Daddah by broadcasting the ‘facts’ of the Mauritanian Question 
and daily labelled the Mauritanian leader a puppet of the French.454 The Moroccan Government 
also published and spread publications, serials, and studies attempting to legitimise their claims 
on their lost southern province. One study, titled ‘The Kingdom of Morocco and its natural 
boundaries’, came complete with a map of ‘Greater Morocco’ and was designed to convince 
foreign governments of their attempts to bring Mauritania into the Moroccan state.455 Before 
Mauritania’s independence in the fall of 1960, Moroccan diplomats travelled to European 
countries to convince their governments of the legitimacy of their King’s claim on their southern 
province.456 There is also evidence that Mohammed V also profited from help from Nasser. 
Some important political figures from the North of Mauritania, having to leave the country for 
their pro-Morocco sympathies, fled to Cairo. From there they received help to travel to Rabat 
where the King welcomed them with open arms because they could extend and legitimise his 
claim on Mauritania. These included the former ministers of commerce, education, the emir of 
Trarza, the director of the compensation bank of Mauritania, and the president of the Mauritanian 
youth organisation. Some remained in Cairo, joined the other African movements of national 
liberation and formed their own, the National Liberation Movement of Mauritania, and placed 
Prince Cissé Zackaria Ibn Kainou as its Secretary General.457 The King also met other figures 
who fled directly to Morocco to seek protection and patronage; one such figure, Mohammed 
Ould Oumeir, was given the title ‘Emir of the Sahara’ by Mohammed V, who also naturally 
backed the former’s claim that his Emirate stretched as far south as Senegal.458 Another favored 
tactic of the Moroccan King was to place exiled Mauritanian politicians into Moroccan 
government positions to further concretise the claim that Mauritania was part of his Kingdom. 
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Horma Ould Babana was given the post of Morocco’s Ambassador to Libya, and Mokhtar Ould 
Bah was nominated director of Moroccan radio.459  
Mauritania’s Defence against the Moroccan Claims 
In the years before independence, the Mauritanian national movement was forced by the 
Moroccan claims to its territory to define its foreign policy outlook for the future. Mokhtar Ould 
Daddah, the leader of the Mauritanian movement (first at head of the Mauritanian Progressive 
Union and then the Mauritanian Regroupement Party), laid down the basis for Mauritanian 
foreign policy for the next two decades – Mauritania would serve as a bridge between ‘White 
Africa’ and ‘Black Africa’.460 The new state of Mauritania would be a true reflection of its 
population as it would be inclusionary to both Moors of the North, Black Africans in the south, 
and while it would identify itself deeply with Islam, never would it pretend to be an Arab 
state.461 Thus, Mauritania would play a role on the continent both north and south of the Sahara. 
Morocco’s claim on its territory in violation of its sovereignty, however, cut down the number of 
foreign policy options for Mokhtar Ould Daddah because it was a critical security issue. From 
1958 to 1963, Daddah’s foreign policy objectives understandably consisted of defensive 
measures. Daddah was forced to gather support for its claim to independence and the sanctity of 
its sovereignty, to find the support required for Mauritania’s accession to the UN, as well as 
establishing a counter-propaganda radio campaign against Morocco and clamping down on pro-
Moroccan sentiment in the country’s north.462  
The Mauritanian Question and Subsequent Deterioration of Tunisian-Moroccan Relations 
From 1956-9, Tunisian-Moroccan relations did not get off to a great start but remained 
cordial despite some suspicion and resentment on both sides. From the end of 1960 onwards, 
they would become acrimonious and each Maghrebi state found itself in two different competing 
African groupings. The turning point in Tunisian-Moroccan relations came as a result of standing 
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up to differing principles – Mohammed V arguing that adding Mauritania to the Kingdom would 
right a historic wrong induced by colonialism, and Bourguiba standing up for the principle of 
state sovereignty over their own borders and the necessity for postcolonial states to refrain from 
certain policies that would turn them into the imperialist states they so despised.  
In October 1960, the President of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania showed his 
intentions to declare Mauritania an independent state in the following weeks. This was hardly 
surprising at the time, but it did set off a race between Daddah and Mohammed V to find allies 
over the issue of its recognition. Daddah visited and met with leaders from the Arab World but 
found them unflinchingly on Morocco’s side. West African leaders, however, were much more 
amenable to recognise Mauritania’s independence. In October 1960, Daddah travelled to Nigeria 
and met its Prime Minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, who sensed the dangerous precedent 
Moroccan claims would bring to African politics. Balewa told Daddah he had turned down the 
Moroccan delegation’s request, and he advised them to stop these claims for fear that it could 
incite others to claim lands close to their arbitrarily created borders and thus poison inter-African 
politics. Besides, Morocco was not coming out of these claims looking clean: “By claiming not 
only the totality of Mauritania, but also of a portion of Mali and even a part of Senegal, Morocco 
is behaving as an expansionist state. This is quite grave for an independent Africa.” Nigeria then 
became the second African state after Liberia to recognise Mauritania’s independence.463 In late 
October Daddah met the leaders of the Francophone African states at the conference in Abidjan; 
they too declared their support for Mauritania’s independence, and Daddah later remarked that 
their ensuing active support was crucial in defeating Morocco’s claims.464  
In October 1960 Daddah also held talks with Saddok Mokaddem, the Foreign Minister of 
Tunisia. Daddah was hopeful the Tunisians would be sympathetic to the justice underpinning 
Mauritania’s cause despite their relationship with a fellow Maghrebi state. Mokaddem told him 
Mauritania could count on Tunisia for its unconditional and active support despite risking a 
rupture of diplomatic relations with Morocco. “Tant pis,” said Mokaddem, “your cause seems 
just, the reason for which we will recognise your independence. [Bourguiba] does not mess 
around when it comes to principles.”465 Nearly a month later on 23 November Mokaddem called 
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a press conference and gave an official statement that Tunisia was recognising Mauritania’s 
independence. Tunisia was recognising its independence, Mokaddem explained, because of his 
country’s attachment to the principle of self-determination of peoples, and besides, Tunisia could 
not go against fifteen other African states who had done the same because Tunisia had sponsored 
their accession to the United Nations which recognised those principles. In a propaganda blow to 
Morocco, Mokaddem finished with a thinly veiled insult – he stated that Tunisia would not side 
with Morocco and against independence because it meant prolonging colonialism.466  
Mokaddem was merely delivering Bourguiba’s verdict on the issue, which he had 
reflected on since at least early 1959. According to documents in the Tunisian archives, Tunisia’s 
ambassador in Paris, Habib Bourguiba jr., met in early January with Mokhtar Ould Daddah, and 
it was the first time a Tunisian official was given the other view of the Mauritanian question. 
Daddah indicated that Mauritania had no wishes at all to become a part of Morocco which was 
only interested in Mauritania’s riches. Daddah disclosed that it was possible for his country to 
reach autonomy in the coming years, that he saw Tunisia as a good example to follow and thus 
would be honoured if he were invited for an official visit. Bourguiba jr. reported that Daddah 
made a good impression on him and recommended his father not reject the Mauritanian view a 
priori.467 Throughout 1959 and 1960, Bourguiba had plenty of time to consider his future 
position on the Mauritanian question.  
 Mohammed V was taken by surprise with Mokaddem’s statement and quickly tried to 
convince Bourguiba to backtrack. In the second week of November, Mohammed V sent his son, 
the Crown Prince Hassan, to Tunis to deliver a note to Bourguiba and attempt to change the 
Tunisian leader’s mind. Mohammed V conveyed his disappointment because Bourguiba’s 
decision threatened to derail their relations. It was therefore up to him to side with Morocco to 
ensure it would not happen. The note expresses the amazement that given Tunisia’s shared 
colonial experience they could not understand why Bourguiba did not recognise the obvious 
justification for Morocco’s calls for the return of one of its territories which was violently torn 
away by colonialism. The Mauritanian question was an important issue for national unity, 
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Mohammed V wrote, and it was his duty to handle it; he also stated that he harboured no feelings 
of oppression, only feelings of fighting for a just cause. 468 Mohammed V then warned that 
Tunisia should reconsider and side with Morocco, a brotherly Maghrebi nation, or else risk not 
only the stability and future of their relations, but also the project of Maghrebi unity.469  
Bourguiba’s answer to Mohammed V came rapidly, and it is evident in his note that he 
was incredibly upset. Bourguiba was not only hurt that the Moroccans started a radio propaganda 
campaign against his country, but he also claimed that it was in no way Tunisia’s fault for this 
situation. Mohammed V had never been clear on his claims to Mauritania and failed to provide 
enough detail or enough time for foreign states, especially Tunisia, to make up their mind.470 Yet 
this was nearly beside the point because the disappointed Bourguiba could not understand why 
Mohammed V did not see he was committing a serious wrong by claiming Mauritania for his 
state. This was most injurious to the Tunisian leader, and he dedicated the rest of his note to 
lecture the Moroccan monarch on how to properly act in international affairs, as well as the duty 
and obligations incumbent upon postcolonial states. In order for postcolonial states to add their 
weight to the world stage and properly integrate in international relations, he argued, they had to 
abide by strict fundamental principles. The most important of these principles was to help 
liquidate colonialism and foreign domination “whatever the nationality of the colonizer or the 
geographical situation of the colonised people.” This meant refraining from any action which 
would help foreign domination, “and better yet, it is our obligation to support the independence 
of peoples, without any reservations.”471 Bourguiba reminded Mohammed V of recent political 
developments in French parts of Africa. According to Bourguiba France had divvied up its 
African holdings into distinct territories which went through of period of administrative change 
and like the general evolution of the world, acquired a political awareness which caused them to 
create little autonomous states. These states then abandoned the idea of autonomy and came 
together in la Communauté before finally becoming independent. Bourguiba reminded 
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Mohammed V that the independence of these states was never contested by either Tunisia or 
Morocco under the pretexts now used by Morocco that the borders were created arbitrarily or 
artificially, that the character of their independence was incomplete, or that the leaders of these 
states would become the puppets of colonial powers.472 Tunisia could not oppose Mauritania’s 
independence because it meant transgressing this principle which it necessarily had to apply 
universally to every case.473  
Bourguiba’s response to Mohammed V was incredibly curt and to the point. Morocco 
was not only in the wrong when it came to its claims, but its behaviour was detrimental to the 
efforts of movements seeking independence and made it more difficult to integrate in the concert 
of nations. The national movement in Mauritania was legitimate and no different than the others 
which sprouted up in other parts of French-held African territories. It not only had to be helped 
as much as possible, but its goals and borders also had to be respected. Most scathing in his 
response was the ultimate reprimand possible from one postcolonial leader to give to another. 
Bourguiba skirted a very fine line and without saying the words, allowed the Moroccan monarch 
to fill in the blanks. Bourguiba blamed Morocco for partaking in a familiar imperialist venture, 
the attempted foreign domination of another people vying to be free. This was no small charge, 
and with it came the implicit warning that Morocco was on the edge of becoming what former 
colonial states dreaded most – an imperial power. Bourguiba’s reply to Mohammed V was more 
than a mere message, it was the Tunisian leader taking his stand in African politics. This note is 
very important because it sketches the outline of his position in Africa affairs for the next three 
years: Tunisia would help and assist any state-in-becoming with what it could and seek out allies. 
Bourguiba took this stand, even at the cost of ruining his relations with a fellow Maghrebi state. 
It is clear that he believed that allowing and supporting Morocco’s claims on Mauritania could 
set a very nasty precedent for African political integration. The transgression of established 
borders – whether set by colonial powers or not – was not acceptable since it could jeopardise 
the harmony needed in African politics and increase suspicion and tensions. Any African state 
could then challenge the legitimacy of any border and make claims on foreign territory for 
whatever reason. Furthermore, Tunisia was also taking a stand on the issue because much like 
Mauritania, it had a history of suffering from foreign interference in its own affairs with Egypt 
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supporting Bourguiba’s opposition.474 Furthermore, coming to Mauritania’s defence against 
another African state’s disrespect of sovereignty was Bourguiba’s recognition that the continent 
had given him a new opportunity to play an important role and help shape the future of 
decolonisation.     
Mauritania’s Steps to Independence 
On 24 August 1960, Daddah sent a message to the Arab leaders attending the Arab 
League the following week in Lebanon because he’d heard that Morocco had put the 
Mauritanian issue on the agenda in its quest for support. Daddah implored them not to support 
Moroccan claims because they contradicted the principle of the self-determination of peoples 
enshrined in the UN Charter, and because they also transgressed the “imperatives of the Afro-
Asian peoples.” Daddah expressed his confidence that the Arab states would “refuse to accept 
the imperialist ambitions of the Moroccan Government and to recognise the Islamic Republic of 
Mauritania at the accession of its independence.”475  On 11 September 1960, the Mauritanian 
Government formally dissolved Nahda, a powerful opposition party with strong ties to Morocco, 
on the grounds that it was behind violent incidents in the country’s north on the leadup to 
independence. When Daddah was questioned by reporters about the arguments circulating for 
fusing Mauritania to Morocco, he responded that only some lost souls were trying to convince 
others and the message really didn’t have an audience.476  
On 18 September 1960, a few weeks after the Arab League meeting in Lebanon, Daddah 
called a press conference. He announced that he would fly to New York right after his country’s 
independence celebrations in November for Mauritania’s accession to the UN and fight off any 
Moroccan attempts to convince the body to side with Morocco. In order to gain inclusion to the 
UN, Daddah said he needed the help of both France and Tunisia just as they had helped the other 
West African states.477 The Moroccan Government replied soon after by sending Ahmed Ould 
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Abdallah, a former Mauritanian official living in Rabat after being fired from the Mauritanian 
Government, to New York. Abdallah’s role was to contest Mauritania’s independence and 
possible membership at the UN, as well as support Morocco with its claim.478 In the first week of 
October Daddah sent invitations for the upcoming independence celebrations on 28 November to 
various African heads of states. On 6 October, a large group of heads of states from Africa 
agreed to come to Nouakchott for the event, many coming from the ex-AOF. None of the states 
who would form the Casablanca Group sent delegations to Mauritania’s independence 
celebrations.479 In the week of Mauritania’s declaration of independence, the Mauritanian 
Government countered Moroccan claims by publishing a ‘Green Book’ which gave its side of the 
story. The book included a history of the country, and it claimed that Mauritania became 
completely distinct from Morocco during its colonial administration from Senegal. Since then it 
grew into a sovereign nation with a foreign policy aimed to make Mauritania the bridge between 
North Africa and Black Africa. The book made it clear that the Mauritanian Government 
expected to be respected as sovereign state and that its independence was to be made concrete by 
Mauritania’s accession to the United Nations.480 
Moroccan Desperation and the Creation of the Casablanca Conference 
 With Mauritania being debated at the United Nations and staunchly defended by a bloc 
led by Senegal and Tunisia, Morocco scrambled to find allies to help their cause. In December 
1960 Mohammed V found a solution – he would create a bloc of his own.481 In order for his idea 
to work and draw enough interest, the King had to bring like-minded states to a summit on other 
issues facing African politics. In other words, not many other African states were as invested in 
the Mauritanian question, so he had to make the summit more appealing to others by opening the 
floor to their own pressing issues. Yet the King had an ace up his sleeve. Invitations were sent 
that month, but since the fault lines in African politics were already drawn, specifically because 
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of the two different positions on France’s continued role in Africa, only a select few leaders got 
invitations.482 This was an indicator, and later confirmed with the resolutions adopted, that to 
corral a group together the Moroccan King appealed to a broad anti-French sentiment as a 
common denominator. His appeal hit the mark: despite not converging together for the purpose 
of discussing the Mauritanian question, Morocco, Ghana, Egypt, Mali, Guinea, the GPRA, and 
Libya signed some resolutions hostile to France. These included Mohammed V’s goal, the 
resolution in support of Morocco’s claim to Mauritania, as well as the resolution against French 
nuclear testing on African soil, and the resolution appealing for France to end the war in 
Algeria.483 Looking at the resolutions, it is apparent that the states involved all had a bone to pick 
with de Gaulle. Ghana had severe reservations for French intentions on the continent since the 
formation of the Community in 1958 and was the most vocal African opponent to France’s 
nuclear testing in Algeria because the fallout reached the country’s northern regions. Egypt’s 
support of the Algerian war effort against France since 1954 and the harbouring of its provisional 
government showed its inclination against the French. Mali had recently split from Senegal and 
blamed the French for the failure of the Mali Federation. Guinea was still resentful over the way 
France ended its relationship after the country decided not to join la Communauté.  
Anti-French sentiment was a facilitating factor tempting states to attend the Casablanca 
Conference, but not the only one. Since Mohammed V opened the floor to others’ pressing issues 
to lure the invitees to come to Casablanca, other resolutions were signed, notably on the Congo 
Crisis, the status of Ruanda-Burundi, the Palestine Question (of special importance to Egypt), 
Apartheid and racial discrimination in Africa. Of great consequence to Africa’s politics for the 
next two years was the resolution which founded the Casablanca bloc – the foundation of the 
‘African Charter of Casablanca’. Despite not being very interested in this conference at the start, 
the Ghanaian leader, Kwame Nkrumah, quickly became the most energetic state supporter of this 
charter until the end of its political relevance in 1963. Coming originally to use the conference as 
a platform for discussion and statements on the Congo Crisis, he recognised enough common 
ground between the state leaders during the talks as his opportunity to put his plans of African 
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unity into action.484 This charter called for the creation of several bodies and invited any 
independent African state to join them: the African Political Committee, the African Economic 
Committee, the African Cultural Committee, and a Joint African High Command. These bodies 
had a simple overriding objective – to help liberate and consolidate an independent Africa. To do 
so, the charter created permanent committees to be able to coordinate the policies of the 
signatory states to help “liberate the African territories still under foreign domination […], to 
liquidate colonialism and neo-colonialism in all their forms, to discourage the maintenance of 
foreign troops and the establishment of bases which endanger the liberation of Africa and […] to 
rid the African continent of political and economic interventions and pressures.,” and to 
encourage the African states to adopt economic and social policies to benefit their populations 
and ensure an equitable distribution of resources domestically.485 Unlike in some previous 
instances in African politics, the charter was not paying lip service to unity at all. So keen was 
Nkrumah that he told the head of his delegation, K.B. Asante, to stay in Casablanca and begin 
work immediately to create these committees.486  
Tunisia’s Foray in African Affairs 
Tunisia was also in a good position to honour one of its most important principles – the 
support of a national movement’s efforts to claim independence from the colonial powers – since 
it was an elected member of the United Nations Security Council in 1959-1960. It thus could do 
more than recognise Mauritania’s independence from France in November 1960, it could give it 
a boost and notoriety in international affairs by sponsoring its accession to the United Nations. In 
1959 Tunisia was elected to the Security Council and thus became the only Arab and African 
state to sit with the major powers. In the summer of 1960, many West African countries from the 
French Community declared their independence, and included states like the Ivory Coast, the 
Mali Federation (later becoming Senegal and Mali), the Malagasy Republic, Togo, Cameroun, 
Chad, Gabon, Niger, Upper Volta, Dahomey, the Central African Republic, and the Republic of 
Congo. This was a perfect opportunity for Tunisia to help and get noticed, and it stepped in to 
sponsor their accession to the United Nations with France’s help. This was an excellent way to 
 
484 Interview with K.B. Asante, Nkrumah’s top diplomat in his delegation at Casablanca, conducted in Accra, 9 
March 2017. 
485 La Conférence des Chefs d’État Africains à Casablanca. Official pamphlet of the resolutions found at Dar al-
Kutub al-Wataniya, Tunis. 
486 Interview with K.B. Asante. 
152 
 
begin to have good relations with fellow Francophile states, and as French officials correctly 
remarked at the time, Bourguiba’s move was also meant to break Tunisia out of its isolation.487 
Tunisia’s sole position as an African country at the Security Council also gave it the opportunity 
to act and speak on behalf of its continent to add to its prestige, especially since the breakout of 
the Congo Crisis. Mongi Slim, the Tunisian Foreign Minister, successfully applied his idea to 
allow African states to participate in the UN mission in the Congo. In June Bourguiba declared 
he was sending troops, the first African state to do so (later followed by Ghana and Egypt), and 
he was thanked publicly by the UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold for his contribution. 
With the corresponding press offensive in Tunisia reporting the country’s role in being in 
solidarity with fellow Africans and the ramping up of a propaganda campaign against Belgium, it 
is clear that Tunisia’s involvement was devised to bring it more clout and credibility in African 
affairs, and as French officials evaluated, a clever way to be seen as the “champion of the 
emancipation of African peoples.”488 Not only was this necessary to end its isolation and find 
allies south of the Sahara, but this diplomatic offensive in Africa helped consolidate Bourguiba’s 
domestic legitimacy as a strong Africa anti-colonial leader.  
A major fault line was beginning to form in Sub-Saharan Africa just as it did in North 
Africa. African states began to converge into two camps over the issue of conserving a presence 
by former colonial powers on the continent. Ex-French colonies might have declared their 
independence from France in 1960 but they in no way renounced their links to the old metropole. 
While they did leave the French Community and their multi-lateral agreements, they would 
negotiate bi-lateral defence, financial, and cultural agreements with France, therefore securing an 
important presence for the former colonial power in Africa.489 This went counter current to some 
states in Africa which militated for the total liquidation of colonialism on the continent. 
Countries like Ghana, Egypt, Guinea, and Mali detested the colonial powers and were actively 
trying to convince the rest of the continent that African states could and needed to proceed 
together without them.490 Since Bourguiba’s outlook for Tunisia’s future included a close 
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relationship with France, it gave common ground for an alliance with the francophone African 
states. Another factor was slowly bringing them together, the threatening behaviour of states like 
Egypt, Ghana, Morocco, and Mali. By late 1960 these states had all partaken in either claims to 
territory outside their borders, interfered in the domestic affairs of others, or propaganda 
campaigns meant to chip away at the legitimacy of foreign rulers - all of which was destabilising 
to new regimes trying to cement their rule. Egypt tried to delegitimise Bourguiba’s rule by 
hosting Salah Ben Youssef in Cairo and giving him airtime for his anti-Bourguibist message on 
radio, Kwame Nkrumah made territorial claims on its neighbour Togo, entertained the idea of 
taking up a small part of the Ivory Coast through an irredentist claim by the Sanwi people, and 
also tried to delegitimise the leadership of Togo’s Sylvanus Olympio, Mohammed V claimed the 
whole of Mauritania and harboured some Mauritanian politicians in Rabat who engaged in a 
radio propaganda campaign against Mokhtar Ould Daddah, and Modibo Keita claimed territory 
in Eastern Mauritania as well as used a political party there to challenge the rule of Daddah and 
prevent Mauritania from forming a country.491 The foreign policies of these states was not only 
deeply invasive to many ex-French colonies, but it also threatened the stability of inter-African 
relations at a time when every state agreed coming together was needed. The many affected 
states did worry about the behaviour of others because these policies reminded them of the 
imperialist tactics they were subjected to in the past.  
They did have reason to worry, as a secret imperialist scheme was being hatched in 
Accra. In February 1961 Prince Hassan was sent to Accra by his father, Mohammed V to discuss 
African issues.492 Nkrumah made an aide-mémoire which he then brought to the meeting, and it 
shows that he devoted a considerable amount of time on the problem of Mauritania before the 
Prince’s arrival. Both considered this issue the most pressing facing the Casablanca states, and 
Nkrumah came up with a dramatic solution. Nkrumah awaited the Prince with a radical and 
complicated proposition: Mauritania would be partitioned and go to the Casablanca states. In this 
scheme, Mali would get swathes of Eastern Mauritania (including the site of the former capital of 
the Ghanaian Empire Koumbi Saleh), Senegal would get areas north of the Senegal river, and the 
rest was for Morocco to take as long as it “accept[ed] the principle of a Union with 
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Mauritania.”493 This partition was contingent on one factor in order to work – the precipitated 
downfall of Senegal’s Leopold Senghor and his regime. According to Nkrumah, Senegal was an 
important regional power, and being a close ally to France and Francophile states, it stood as a 
bulwark to Morocco’s ambitions. Senghor was also steadfast against the Casablanca group and 
its resolutions, and he waged a propaganda effort against the Casablanca states in which he 
charged the group of being guided by “Arab Imperialism”, which was nothing more than the 
main force replacing European imperialism. It was too late to convince Senghor, and he had to 
go. A change of Senegal’s foreign policy was needed for the plan to work, and this necessitated a 
change of leadership. Believing that Senghor’s domestic support was weak, Nkrumah suggested 
to Hassan that a propaganda campaign from the Casablanca powers against Senghor which was 
enough to knock him off his perch, and then putting Lamine Guèye, a political rival and mayor 
of Dakar, in power in his stead would bring Senegal under the thumb of fellow Casablanca 
states. Nkrumah concluded his scheme very succinctly: 
“Conclusion: Senghor’s downfall would discourage Houphouet Boigny, upset 
France’s hand, and sign the death warrant of neo-colonialism in West Africa. It is 
only then that Mauretania [sic] would be truly united with Morocco, and an era of 
real independence and African unity supersede colonialism in Africa.”494 
Nkrumah was very serious about this scheme and he was confident that he could succeed in 
toppling Senghor, especially since he’d recently established a new radio station he planned to use 
for propaganda like the Egyptians.  
Not only would the Mauritanian question be put to rest and Morocco satisfied, but Ghana 
would gain enormously from the scheme too. As was said in previous chapters, Nkrumah had 
militated since 1958 against the French presence through its puppets (what he called a form of 
‘neo-colonialism’) in West Africa and relished the chance to at once liquidate French influence 
there and seal a much larger sphere of influence for the Casablanca powers. Collapsing the state 
of Mauritania and the leadership of Senegal would also be a crucial step towards his dream of 
uniting Africa under the terms of the Casablanca states. There was no follow -up evidence 
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showing the Moroccan response to Nkrumah’s proposal, and this plan – if it was ever adopted by 
both states – came to naught. Yet this aide-mémoire is important because it shows the total lack 
of respect that some African states had for the sovereignty of others and that they harboured 
some imperialist tendencies themselves.  
North and West African Cooperation: The Senegalese-Tunisian Alliance  
Bourguiba’s sponsorship of newly independent African states to the UN, its defence of 
Mauritanian independence, and desire to maintain links with France naturally aligned Tunisia 
with other Francophone states in West Africa. In the week before Mauritania’s independence, 
Tunisia began to focus its diplomatic foray in Africa on the Senegal, then the most important 
actor in Francophone Africa. Senegal had very recently split from the Mali Federation and was 
beginning to corral the former members of the French Community into an African bloc aimed at 
keeping a special relationship with France and forming a united front against radical ideas of 
African unity. The Mali Federation split was very acrimonious, and it left a very angry Modibo 
Keita blaming the split on the French and Senegalese. In late September, Mali ruptured its 
relations with France and called its previous agreements with them void on the account of its 
meddling in Federation’s affairs. The new republic also announced it stood for the unity of 
Africa and favoured a common African market and currency, therefore effectively declaring its 
intent to join states with similar goals like Ghana and Guinea.495 The rift with Senegal and 
France also prompted Keita to take a stand on the Mauritanian question. While he did stay mute 
on the Mauritanian question a few days after the split, Keita moved closer to Morocco in the 
following weeks in response to Senegal building better relations with Mauritania. Modibo Keita 
visited Rabat, and rumours soon began circulating in the French press that a plan was afoot to 
split Mauritania between them.496 There was some truth to these as Mali had been dabbling in 
Mauritania’s domestic affairs since February 1960 by supporting politicians in the Eastern 
regions sympathetic to fusing with Mali.497 Mali would then drop its efforts to gain eastern parts 
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of Mauritania in late 1962 in favour of choosing to get closer to France and away from the 
Casablanca states.498   
 The rift between Senegal and Mali caused both to scramble for allies both inside and 
outside of West Africa, and Senegal soon began to look outside of the states of the ex-AOF and 
cultivate a very beneficial relationship with another former French colony, Tunisia. At the peak 
of his isolation from the Arab World and just after he declared his intent to recognise 
Mauritania’s independence, Bourguiba sent his trusted cabinet director to Dakar for talks on the 
African problems rocking the continent’s politics.499 Bourguiba reached out to Senghor to sound 
him out to see his potential to become an ally in African affairs. Although no document was 
found on the meeting, Senghor sent a personal message to Bourguiba a week later. Senghor 
expressed how pleased he was at just how much both held the same political objectives. Given 
their stand on similar issues, Senghor agreed to Bourguiba’s opinion of the necessity for both 
countries to maintain and even grow their ties by increasing the number of contacts between each 
other.500  
Over the next month, an alliance grew between the two, and they began to work together 
to add their leverage against France to change its policy in Africa, particularly in Algeria. Both 
understood the need to conserve a role for France in Africa’s future, and also believed that if they 
acted in concert, they could strongarm France to alter the political situation on the continent. 
Tunisia had for years attempted, with little success, to become the mediator between the 
Algerians and the French to help terminate the war. Both Bourguiba and Senghor believed the 
war in Algeria was incredibly destabilising for African politics, and that France’s total 
decolonisation of Africa was needed. In January 1961 they began to coordinate their efforts to 
bring the French and Algerians to negotiate, as Bourguiba had been unsuccessful by himself. 
Bourguiba urged Senghor to keep pressuring France to negotiate as it would undoubtedly pay 
off, and supported Senghor’s idea of introducing a resolution to the UN as a means of 
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pressure.501 Senghor began to help Bourguiba in his attempts to mediate. Senghor sent a letter to 
de Gaulle asking him to renew negotiations with the Algerians and sit down with Ferhat 
Abbas.502 In February, Mauritania joined Tunisia and Senegal and agreed to introduce a 
resolution to be backed by twelve African states at the UN to pressure France into negotiations 
with the Algerians. Bourguiba even went as far as asking Belgium, the United States, and Great 
Britain to back the resolution given the gravity of the situation. Ultimately, the resolution failed 
to be adopted, partly because the Algerians themselves resisted accepting it because they would 
come under fire from allies in the Afro-Asian group. Despite the resolution’s failure, Senegal and 
Tunisia claimed success on their coordinated efforts because the French changed their stance. 
Just before the General Assembly opened, the Senegalese delegation appealed to the French for 
talks with the Algerians, and their message gained traction in the French camp. Bourguiba was 
also busy trying the same with the French President in Switzerland, as well as asking for the 
release of prominent Algerian figures captured in 1956 like Ahmed Ben Bella. They successfully 
helped de Gaulle change his mind, and he entertained the idea of negotiating with the 
Algerians.503  
 
Chapter VI: Senegal Builds a Coalition Around Important and Lasting Principles 
This chapter traces the remarkable developments of Senegal’s isolation in African affairs 
after Senghor’s failed project of the Mali Federation in the summer of 1960 and provides the 
important context to understand why Africa became split in rival groups from 1960-2. For many 
states in West and North Africa, the growing anti-colonial character of the foreign policies of 
states, which now included Ghana, Egypt, Guinea, and Mali, became a problem as they caused 
tensions to rise.  The most detailed narrative available of the divide and coming together of the 
two main African political groupings in the prelude to the May 1963 summit in Addis Ababa is 
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W. Scott Thompson’s account, built on unprecedented primary sources from the Ghanaian 
foreign ministry and interviews with the politicians involved. Given his heavy use of Ghanaian 
documents, Thompson’s narrative attributes the death of the Casablanca Group to Nkrumah’s 
own domestic failings which caused the slow pace and erratic nature of his foreign policy from 
1960-2. As a result, Nkrumah suddenly found himself surpassed by the speed of events 
unfolding, was increasingly isolated, and therefore found it very difficult to effect any form of 
change in African affairs.504 Thompson also notes that a contributing factor was Nkrumah’s 
further isolation from other African states after the demise of the union he had created with what 
he thought were his closest allies, Mali and Guinea, right after the August 1962 assassination 
attempt on Nkrumah in northern Ghana. Fearing for his security, Nkrumah began to distance 
himself more from other heads of state and rudely rebuffed a visit from Keita and Touré which 
killed their friendship.505 Thompson states in his book that the assassination attempt revived 
Nkrumah’s desire to pursue his pan-African policy, but as a result of these reasons, the main 
thrust of the drive towards African unity shifted away from Accra to “Addis Ababa, Dar-es-
Salaam, and other capitals.”506 Thompson can certainly be forgiven for coming to this conclusion 
because of his reliance on Ghanaian sources which confirmed this was the perspective from the 
point of view of Accra.507 Finally, Thompson’s Ghana-centric narrative posits that the dividing 
factor in African politics was the Congo Crisis because their response split the African states into 
two camps.508  
This chapter challenges Thompson’s assessment of events in this period. As some of the 
previous chapters have highlighted, fissures between African states had been building since April 
1958, and the rift only grew during the Mauritanian recognition crisis. While Thompson is partly 
correct, the Congo Crisis was a dividing issue in Africa but it was only a major issue of any 
significance to Ghana and Egypt. The rift between African states was not caused by a single 
crisis, but by collection of issues built up over three years of state interaction towards the same 
desire. All African states had shown they held one common goal - to establish some sort of 
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platform for common action to guide the continent out of its colonial period. At the heart of the 
dispute was not the goal, but the means to reach that goal. That disagreement was the dividing 
factor as Francophone African states came together from late 1960 to 1961 against Ghanaian, 
Egyptian, Moroccan, and Malian foreign policy tactics which had undermined their 
governments’ legitimacy. This was the factor for the serious change in momentum in late 1960 
whereby the main thrust of building a system of continental cooperation changed not from Accra 
to Addis Ababa or Dar-es-Salaam, but rather to the Francophone African states who spearheaded 
a movement to create a platform for intercontinental cooperation based on a code of conduct 
regulating African affairs and the right of each to decide on its development policy.  
Evidence from the Senegalese archives and the Francophone group of African states 
therefore provides a much different picture of African affairs in this period and shows that 
Thompson made the same critical mistake as Nkrumah. Both drastically under-appreciated the 
role of the former states of the AOF and AEF in African politics in 1960-2, which wrenched 
away the momentum for African unity away from the radical states to take control of it 
themselves.509 Led by Senegal, the Francophone African states were the major catalyst for the 
shift in the balance in African affairs after they formed the Brazzaville Group in 1960. Several 
factors drove the ex-AOF and AEF states to create a new and dominant grouping of states based 
on a cluster of principles that lay the basis of the OAU Charter. Outside of Ghana, Egypt, 
Morocco, Guinea, and Mali many African states grew tired the constant disrespect of other 
states’ borders, particularly exemplified in the case of Mauritania, and did not identify with the 
need to toe the line on a radical anti-colonial policy because they had a stake in creating ties with 
a reformed Europe. Thus, in the winter of 1960, Léopold Senghor began to corral his fellow 
Francophone African leaders together for regular meetings and together they decided to create an 
alternative platform to confront Africa’s post-colonial future based on a guiding set of principles 
to regulate their relations. Originally agreed by twelve Francophone African states, support for 
this platform quickly grew in Arab and Anglophone African states, easily overpowering the 
support of only six African states gathered at Casablanca in January 1961. It was because of the 
success of this new platform and the Francophone African states’ negotiations for development 
aid with the EEC that Nkrumah lost support from what he thought were his two closest allies, 
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Guinea and Mali, who began to mediate with the other side. Lastly, and also very importantly, 
the end of the Algerian conflict finally severed the ties binding the Casablanca Group together. 
Senghor and the Aftermath of the Mali Split: Re-Forging Unity from Isolation 
 The wake of the split of the Mali Federation in the summer of 1960 left Léopold Senghor 
and the newly independent country of Senegal deeply isolated in Africa and compromised 
domestically. With Mali now steering towards Ghana and Guinea, this left Senghor no choice but 
to explore the potential for new and more distant relationships. Domestically Senghor found 
himself becoming more and more isolated too as his once promised beginnings of African unity 
collapsed with the Mali Federation. The popularity of Senegal’s youth, symbolised by the radical 
PAI, would remain a menace for Senghor and his government despite its official ban as its 
members simply established bases for their propaganda efforts in more radical states.510 Striving 
towards a new form of unity to make good on his promises and consolidate his position at home 
thus became his main foreign policy goal. Apart from finding a new ally in Tunisia as both 
stepped in to help the fledgling state of Mauritania, his only option was to turn to his old rivals 
from the days of the French-speaking Communauté. Luckily for Senghor, he hedged his bets as 
he felt a rise in tensions between the Senegalese and Sudanese leaderships in July 1960 and 
reached out to his largest rival in secret. According to an important political figure from 
Dahomey, Albert Tévoédjrè, Senghor sent an emissary to Dahomey, then part of the rival 
alliance of the Conseil de l’Entente, to deliver an urgent request to the Ivorian leader Félix 
Houphouët-Boigny who was visiting. To the countries of the entente (Ivory Coast, Dahomey, 
Niger, and Upper Volta), Senghor proposed forming a larger grouping of Francophone African 
states.511 Every leader of the entente believed it to be a good idea, at least in part because they 
felt a great deal of nostalgia for colonial times when they formed a proper “club” at the Palais 
Bourbon in Paris and met to exchange ideas and tactics. With every leader of these states on 
board, Senghor began to break through the isolation and a conference was called to bring all 
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Francophone African leaders to discuss the state of African affairs in Abidjan in October 
1960.512  
 Aside from nostalgia for a time lost, some of the countries of the Conseil de l’Entente 
were also motivated by other important reasons. For one, and as the latter part of the chapter will 
show, they stood to create larger leverage in negotiations with France and the rest of Europe for 
development aid. Secondly, and according to the topics discussed in Abidjan, they were not at all 
pleased with the way inter-African affairs were waged. All wanted to see change on this front. 
Senegal was not the only country affected by the recklessness of one of its neighbours. The Ivory 
Coast also had a reckless neighbour in Ghana as Nkrumah flirted with the idea of supporting an 
ethnic group – the Sanwi people - that straddled the Ivorian-Ghanaian border. Echoing the 
ongoing claims of Ghana on parts of Togo’s territory, Nkrumah was visited by a prominent 
leader of the Sanwi people who claimed their land should rightly be attached to, and ruled by, 
Ghana. Nkrumah did attempt to establish closer relations with Houphouët-Boigny to bring him 
into his sphere of interest at two meetings in August and September of 1960, but despite the 
veneer of cordiality between them, the Ivorian leader remained suspicious and began to use his 
foreign policy against his neighbour. Days after their last meeting, Houphouët-Boigny called for 
the francophone states to come together for a conference in Abidjan.513 As for the other states of 
the entente, Upper Volta, and Dahomey were also in close proximity to Ghana and undoubtedly 
watched on in dismay that Nkrumah sought to gain Togo for his country and wanted to thwart 
Ghana’s foreign policy. Houphouët-Boigny’s influence on them, shown when he enticed them to 
join his entente over the Mali Federation, also suggest why they would not turn down the Ivory 
Coast’s direction in African politics. In the wake of the Mali Federation split, Senghor found 
new potential partners in African affairs.   
 Despite hitting the ground running in the African Scramble, the Abidjan Conference of 
the new independent Francophone African states was the first of a series of large steps forward 
with which they quickly overcame the gap they had with Ghana and Egypt. Over the next two 
years, the Francophone African states mounted a robust challenge, thanks to the sheer number of 
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states coming together as a group but also by their willingness to organise and build powerful 
and effective institutions together. In October 1960, a few months removed from the collapse of 
the Mali Federation, the Abidjan Conference drew an impressive crowd which rallied together 
nearly every Francophone African state, making it the first time that the leaders of ex-AOF and 
AEF states met one another since independence. The coming together of the heads of state of 
Senegal, Ivory Coast, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Upper Volta, Niger, Cameroon, as well as 
delegations from Mauritania, Gabon, the Central African Republic, Chad, and Mali (as reluctant 
observers) did much to signal to the rest of the continent that the old rivalries and divisions 
within Francophone Africa were coming to an end. The three days of talks were designed to 
create a round table on pressing common African issues like Mauritania, the war in Algeria, and 
the Congo Crisis.514  
The conference yielded an important joint communique: not only did the attendees agree 
to harmonise their foreign policies to confront international issues (instructions were to be sent to 
their UN delegations for common action); they also decided they would come together on 
African ones beginning with supporting Mauritania’s upcoming independence.515 It also emerged 
during these talks that all participants wanted and vowed to meet together in similar conferences 
regularly.516 It was a resounding success for all involved, yet Senghor emerged as a clear victor 
because he could once again claim domestically that his country was striving toward some form 
of unity. As a result of his canvassing of the idea, he brought together the Francophone African 
states and they had vowed to act in concert on common issues. Most importantly, however, this 
conference was an important turning point in inter-African politics because the recognition and 
support for Mauritania’s independence in the face of Moroccan claims on its territory was the 
first time that so many states expressed the principle of respecting the integrity of existing 
territorial borders. This declaration, which naturally enraged the Moroccan King, was 
responsible for Mohammed V’s call for a rival conference to convene in Casablanca early in 
1961 as he sought to rally support for his claim.517 
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 Francophone African leaders’ efforts accelerated soon after the conference in Abidjan as 
they strove to build on the progress achieved and because several issues, like the Algerian 
conflict, had been discussed but not conclusively. Thus, less than two months later the leaders of 
almost every state that participated in Abidjan (minus Mali this time but including Philibert 
Tsiranana of Madagascar) held another important series of talks in Brazzaville, Congo, which 
was to give them the namesake of the Brazzaville Group. The object of the Brazzaville 
Conference of December 1960 was to forge new progress on the way to a narrower definition of 
African unity by cooperation founded on a few vague principles – ‘good neighbourliness’, the 
expansion of culture, and a respect for a community of interests.518 The final resolutions of the 
conference – given their breadth – demonstrate that the twelve states had shared many common 
concerns and one common desire to cooperate to overcome them. First and foremost, the 
Brazzaville Group declared their belief in the principle of non-interference in other’s internal 
affairs. Mutual respect for the sovereignty of each member was primordial, and they further 
stipulated that one’s sovereignty could never be contested.519 The twelve states also vowed to 
work towards economic, defence, and cultural cooperation, to solidify their ties to France, and to 
formulate a concerted foreign policy to face international affairs. One of their first acts in 
common was to fire a warning shot to their ideological rivals, Nkrumah, Nasser, and Mohammed 
V over their strong policy in the Congo Crisis. The twelve announced that they would bind 
together in a strong African Bloc at the UN and support the latter’s attempts to find a solution to 
the crisis, instead of meddling in it to support Patrice Lumumba. Whilst not naming them 
outright, the twelve accused “certain Afro-Asian States” of creating the opportunity for one of 
the rival superpowers to “recolonize the Congo-Leopoldville.” Tainting Ghana, Egypt, and 
Morocco with the crime of helping colonialism was a serious accusation and gave them another 
reason to form the rival Casablanca Group.520 The twelve also indicated the means to these ends 
were to begin to build effective and lasting institutions.521 So enthralled they were to get going 
that the conference set the task of studying how to build these institutions to a committee of 
nominated delegates at a conference in Dakar the following month.  
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 Since the conference was proposed and finally agreed to take place in Dakar in January 
1961, Senghor tried to give the project a nudge in the right direction as he assigned Mamadou 
Dia to give the inaugural address. Dia reminded the other delegations that it was their mandate to 
begin to forge unity and assured them that it would never come at the cost of losing their 
personality and independence. In clear barbs to their rivals, the Casablanca Group, Dia stated 
that this institution would not engage in propaganda campaigns and preach empty slogans reliant 
on the vilification of ‘neo-colonialism’ because this could never be enough for Africa to build its 
future and build anything concrete. Before they could build a new set of institutions to ensure 
their cooperation as mandated, all members of the Brazzaville Group had to come to an 
agreement on a development policy.522 Recommendations were then sent to their heads of state 
for discussion before they were scheduled to meet a few weeks later in March in Yaoundé, 
Cameroon. The Yaoundé Conference yielded the group’s first important treaty, which 
established a new institution of economic cooperation bringing together its members: the Afro-
Malagasy Economic Cooperation Organisation (OAMCE). The OAMCE was an important 
economic organ tasked with organising the economic cooperation of the group, as well as 
harmonising policies of development, industrial and agricultural policies, and systems of 
exchange with the goal of bringing about a better standard of living for their peoples.523 In this 
regard the OAMCE was an effective institution. During the Francophone African states’ 
negotiations with the EEC in 1960-2, the work of the OAMCE was highly praised by the 
European negotiators for its efforts at harmonising their economic policies because it made it 
much easier for the EEC to trade with them.524 Just as Dia expressed a few weeks earlier, the 
treaty stated that all of the signatories respected the sovereignty of each state and that the 
OAMCE not a “supra-national’ organisation and membership did not come at the cost of 
relinquishing any form sovereignty. The OAMCE, the treaty stipulated, was only created in the 
spirit and will of the signatories to harmonise their economic policies. Furthermore, its members 
did not envision the organisation as on restricted to states of the former French empire, but as 
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open to any other African state wishing to join.525 It was an invitation that quickly got a 
response. 
From Twelve to Twenty: The Spread of the Brazzaville Principles 
The rapid pace with which the Brazzaville Group united together and its inclusive nature 
attracted much attention from the rest of the continent and permitted its foundations to expand 
outward into Anglophone Africa and North Africa to create the Monrovia Group in May 1961. 
There is some confusion in the scholarship as to the foundation of the Monrovia Group and its 
relationship to the Brazzaville Group. For instance, some scholars, notably Mohamed Saliou 
Camara and Michael Anda, posit that the Monrovia Group was a creation of Nigeria, Liberia, 
and Sierra Leone because they did not believe that the policies of the other two rival groups 
represented their interests.526 This is incorrect on two counts: for one, the Monrovia Conference, 
whose resolutions gave the group of states its namesake, was prompted by Senegal when it 
reached out to non-affiliated African states. Secondly, while some disagreement did arise 
between the Monrovia and Brazzaville Groups, they were contained to economic matters, which 
all parties chose to ignore.527 In reality, these disagreements never formed a barrier against them 
combining into one to rival the Casablanca Group because they both felt the same about African 
affairs. The Monrovia Conference came about as a result of an urgent request by Senegal on 
behalf of the other eleven Brazzaville states in February 1961 to hold a conference rallying 
African states to form a common policy on the deepening Congo Crisis. The Senegalese 
Government had just been informed that the United States was about to try to manage the 
conflict at the UN Security Council, well away from the General Assembly. This threatened to 
take away any influence on resolving the conflict, which was an African issue, from the African 
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states which was unacceptable to the Brazzaville Group. Thus, Senegal wished to know if either 
Liberia, Nigeria, or Togo (since they were not affiliated to either group) would be ready to 
quickly host a conference with all African states present so they could devise the best way to 
counter the efforts of the United States.528  
This meeting never took place, but the correspondence continued and the idea of hosting 
a large conference was kept alive because a new call arose soon after.529 A few weeks later 
President Tubman of Liberia, with the backing of Senegal, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, and Togo 
invited all independent African states to come to Monrovia in the second week of May to discuss 
a much wider range of issues than the Congo Crisis and help heal the divide between the 
Casablanca and Brazzaville groups. Even Guinea and Mali showed interest, but ultimately 
declined to attend under pressure from Nasser and Nkrumah. In a small blow to the Casablanca 
group, Libya, one of the Casablanca founding members, decided to defect by going to Monrovia 
because it watched the group’s conduct with growing dismay.530 From 8 to 12 May 1961 the 
Brazzaville Group and an additional eight independent African states (Liberia, Tunisia, Sierra 
Leone, Libya, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Togo) discussed the need to regulate the 
problematic state of inter-African relations. The four issues set on the agenda were thus to find 
“the means of promoting better understanding and cooperation toward achieving unity in 
Africa,” a discussion about “the threats to peace and stability in Africa,” the potential of 
establishing an institution to regulate problems and issues between African states, and finally, the 
ways in which Africa could contribute to world peace.531  
The Monrovia Conference paved the way for the Addis Ababa summit of May 1963 more 
than any other conference held between 1958 and 1962. This was for two reasons: the sheer 
number of states that combined to agree with the resolutions, twenty in all, and because the OAU 
could trace the genesis of its principles to Monrovia. Despite regretting that the Casablanca 
Group declined to attend, the twenty attendees made remarkable progress and made an important 
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stand in African affairs by signing many resolutions which were the very antithesis of the 
Casablanca Charter. These resolutions formed the codification of a rulebook of acceptable 
conduct for African states in their relations with each other and tantamount to a complete 
rejection of what leaders like Nkrumah and Nasser (and by extension, the Casablanca Group) 
stood for:   
“1. Absolute equality of the African and Malagasy states no matter the importance of their 
territories, the density of their populations, the volume of their resources; 2. Non-interference 
in the domestic affairs of the states; 3. Respect for the sovereignty of each state and its 
inalienable right to existence and to the development of its personality; 4. Formally 
condemns the establishment of subversive bases helped by independent states; 5. The 
instauration of a cooperation on the basis of African dimensions and based on tolerance, 
solidarity, relations based on mutual respect, periodic exchanges of views and the refusal of 
any form of [single] leadership; 6. The unity aimed at this moment is not the political 
integration of the sovereign African states, but the unity of aspirations and considered actions 
on a converging basis of social solidarity and African policy.”532 
The twenty states assembled at Monrovia also agreed to band together at the UN “to fight for 
common international issues” and to force the UN Security Council to admit Mauritania as a 
member.533 Material and moral assistance was also pledged to all territories still under 
colonialism (including Angola), but on the topic of the Algerian conflict the Francophone states 
had more sway and forced the others to issue a resolution protecting France. As a result, the 
conference only implored both the Algerians and the French to negotiate an end to the war. The 
Monrovia Conference also pledged its total support to the efforts of the UN to resolve the Congo 
Crisis and in an attack on the Casablanca Group, called on the African states to resist the 
temptation of recognising and supporting rival secessionist Congolese groups.534 
On 12 May 1961, twenty African states stood up together and delivered a large message 
to their continent and to the world and it radically altered the African political landscape. The 
signing of the resolutions of Monrovia by a group of twenty Arab, Anglophone, and 
Francophone African states tipped the balance of the inter-group rivalry firmly to the side of the 
Monrovia Group. Given the balance was twenty states against five (six with the GPRA), it was 
only a matter of time for the ties holding the Casablanca Group together to begin to fray. Apart 
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from the overwhelming continental support for the principles of the Monrovia Conference, two 
very important factors caused two more states to defect from the Casablanca Group. In 1961-2, 
the continued march forward of the Brazzaville states towards erecting effective institutions and 
the end of the Algerian War brought Guinea and Mali not only close to the Brazzaville Group, 
but actively undermined the Casablanca Group, and Nkrumah and Nasser’s efforts to dominate 
African international relations.  
Building Organisations, Building Envy: From the Brazzaville Group to the UAM 
 Fuelled by the desire to cement their power at home by proving to their citizens that they 
could be trusted to lead their states in overcoming problems inherited from the colonial past, 
Francophone African heads of state like Senghor rushed ahead to build meaningful institutions of 
economic, political, and socio-cultural cooperation. Reeling from the successful foundation of 
the OAMCE and the Monrovia Conference’s resolutions, the Brazzaville Group’s members met 
in July 1961 in Madagascar to concretise their stance by founding a new institution of inter-state 
cooperation. Named the African and Malagasy Union (UAM), the new organisation was created 
by a charter with a rigid structure to ensure the smooth cooperation of its members. At the same 
time, the Francophone’s solidifying ties to the Monrovia conference was recognised in a UAM 
declaration describing it as one circle within the larger circle of the Monrovia Group.535 The 
UAM’s members were obliged to meet every six months for summits to discuss outstanding 
issues, policies, and common objectives as well as vote on the adoption of resolutions. An 
administrative seat, headed by an interim then a nominated Secretary-General, was established in 
Cotonou to oversee the work of sub-committees on implementing any adopted resolutions. The 
UAM charter stipulated that all members would combine as a group at the UN to act in concert 
on international and African issues.536 Naturally, the cost of running an institution of this scope 
would be quite high, so the members decided that they would pay according to their means. 
Unlike in the Casablanca group, the members of the UAM paid on time, every time.537 There is 
some evidence to suggest that there may have been some hesitation on the part of some about 
forming the UAM. Senegal, as the state most desperate to form a new bloc to break out of its 
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isolation, pursued the idea of the UAM the hardest among the Twelve. As a result, and probably 
to ensure the other states came on board, Senghor offered to pay the most of any member despite 
Senegal not being the richest. Thus, Senegal offered paying for 18.5% of the costs, almost 2% 
higher than the richest Francophone African state, Ivory Coast.538 To no real surprise given his 
drive to create the UAM (and perhaps because he bore the highest cost), Léopold Senghor was 
entrusted by the others as the UAM’s first Secretary-General to oversee its foundation.  
 The UAM was therefore designated the parent institution of the OAMCE (which was 
thus relegated to handle economic matters and the harmonisation of development policies) and of  
an other new institution, the African and Malagasy Postal and Telecommunications Union 
(UAMPT). This institution, like the foundation of the inter-African airline (Air Afrique), was 
specifically designed to rearrange the vertical links tying the UAM states to Europe imposed on 
them by the colonial system into horizontal ties among African states. Prior to their 
establishment, any form of air travel or telecommunication was incredibly inefficient because of 
the need to go through the former metropole, France, just as in the colonial period.539 Not only 
were the UAMPT and Air Afrique designed to make air travel, postage, and communications 
more efficient in Africa by making them direct, the wide publicity they were afforded was 
designed to demonstrate that the UAM’s leaders were abolishing the vestiges of colonialism and 
taking control back from the French on vital services. Another significant aspect of the UAM 
was its dual concern with external and domestic security to protect members from both foreign 
and internal threats. At Tananarive, the Twelve decided to sign a common defence pact which 
allowed the member states to take over the infrastructure and bodies inherited from the French 
armed forces. The pact also stipulated members would retain complete control of their own 
armed forces and unlike the Casablanca Charter, they would not be required to be handed over to 
a centralised command. Any form of combined military action would have to meet important 
conditions: every state needed to be satisfied of any claim that one member’s national 
sovereignty or independence was truly under threat, and that the state under threat accepted the 
others’ intervention. To reassure France of their good intentions, the UAM also explicitly stated 
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in its defence pact that it in no way voided any bilateral military agreements it had with its 
members.540  
The most important part of the defence pact, however, was the work the UAM members 
were doing to come up with a working definition of ‘subversion’ and the steps they could take to 
insulate their regimes from it. According to a secret UAM report, a committee of experts 
convened to consider the question noted that ‘subversion’ was not defined across the UAM. The 
term, they argued, should be considered in its immediate sense of the reversal or stifling of the 
political order by internal or foreign agents acting against the ruling governments. Under this 
definition, the report declared the foreign policies of Ghana and Egypt of being guilty of 
activities helping subversion and the manipulation of domestic forces in other African states.541 
A very crucial security problem to tackle was preventing subversion in UAM states by 
neutralising the efforts of some of their citizens (identified by the experts as students, intellectual 
elites, workers, and rural figures) who were liable to support subversive organisations or 
governments abroad. Once identified, preventing them from going abroad to subversive 
conferences and meetings was a priority.542 Out of all the potential threats identified by the 
experts, students were the most likely to engage in subversion, and the committee gave several 
recommendations to UAM heads of state. Since students going abroad to study were likely to 
come into contact with foreign ideologies, it was up to the UAM to create its own countervailing 
ideology to counteract their effect. Given the propensity of subversive student unions abroad, 
UAM student unions needed to be set up with mandatory registration for UAM nationals to serve 
as a transmission belt for its own ideology, and to assist them with the adjustment of living 
abroad. Lastly, the UAM could create an intelligence apparatus to monitor them, or even better, 
gain informants from their own ranks to monitor them whilst they studied abroad.543  
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 Overall, the UAM was a very well-organised and run institution, particularly when 
compared with the Casablanca Group. Unlike the ad hoc and clumsy Casablanca Group’s 
attempts to cooperate, the members of the UAM took their membership extremely seriously and 
made it effective. As the second part of this chapter will show, the OAMCE’s foundation was a 
crucial step towards the harmonisation of economic policies and made it much easier for its 
members to negotiate and secure a new postcolonial economic aid agreement with European 
states. The UAMPT and the defence agreement helped the member states insulate their regimes 
by abolishing the vertical ties they had with the former colonial metropole, and by designing 
joint strategies and cooperative mechanisms to identify and root out potential subversive 
elements. What of its record with cooperation on African affairs? Albert Tévoédjrè, its second 
Secretary-General, wrote in 1965 that the UAM failed because it did not always achieve what it 
was ultimately designed to do – to manage issues through the UAM framework without any 
recourse to external assistance. As one of a few examples, Tévoédjrè points to the UAM’s 
charter and its duty to come to the material aid of colonised peoples and movements of national 
liberation in Africa. Whilst diplomatic aid was given by the UAM, not a single Franc went to 
them and this role was later deferred in May 1963 to Algeria, Guinea, and Ghana.544  
 To judge the success of the UAM on this factor alone is unfair because it did achieve 
remarkable things in African affairs. The UAM did achieve some conflict resolution internally 
without external aid. In the fall of 1962, for instance, a spat erupted between Gabon and 
Cameroon as each failed to protect the others’ citizens living in their countries from violence. As 
a result of pressure from the other ten UAM states, the Gabonese and Cameroonian leaders were 
forced to attend an extraordinary meeting to let off some steam and the others finally made them 
come to an agreement to stop the violence.545 On African affairs, the UAM states were also well-
coordinated and formed a common front. A key component of this success was the level of 
communication between them; whenever something of note happened to one of them, they 
immediately informed the head of the UAM who would relay it to the whole.546 Prior to General 
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Assemblies, the UAM states would meet and decide together on common action. For example, 
the UAM members agreed in Libreville in September 1962 to act together and sent specific 
instructions to their delegations at the upcoming UN General Assembly on the issues of Angola, 
South Africa, and the other Portuguese colonies.547 They also acted in concert when it came to 
their relations with the other states of the Monrovia Group. Nigeria, before it hosted the second 
Monrovia Group conference in early 1962, added the GPRA to the list of its observers. Given the 
UAM’s position on supporting France and its stand on the Casablanca Group, Houphouët-
Boigny wrote to Senghor and others, suggesting they appeal to Nigeria to revoke its invitation to 
the GPRA. The UAM members agreed unanimously and Senghor sent a message to the Nigerian 
leader who responded by saying he had never invited them and that it had all been a 
misunderstanding.548 There were hardly any surprise foreign policy moves after decisions were 
taken in concert. When there were inklings that some of the members might make a move 
conflicting with others’ interests or views, they were urged to get back in line. As Senghor 
argued as his leadership of the UAM ended at the Bangui UAM Conference of March 1962, it 
was their common policy moves that had secured Mauritania’s UN membership and their 
common efforts that were yielding success in their negotiations with the EEC. The UAM states 
also believed that their resolutions and combined diplomacy was a factor in forcing France to 
come to terms with the Algerians.549  
The Offer they Couldn’t Refuse: Francophone Africa’s Gravitation to a New Europe 
 As this dissertation has argued, Senegal’s Léopold Senghor made the case repeatedly that 
his country needed conserve ties to France in order to prosper and bring the Senegalese 
population to a better standard of living. One of the breaking points of the Mali Federation was 
over this issue as Modibo Keita’s Sudanese faction of the Federation ramped up its attacks on the 
French over their nuclear testing in North Africa and their continued military conflict with the 
Algerians. Apart from his clear Francophile tendencies, why did Senghor join other ex-AOF 
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leaders in insisting on maintaining a strong relationship with France? Unlike the British colonies, 
the French colonies witnessed an important change in their relations with their metropole in 
March 1957 when the ‘Six’ of Europe (France, West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and 
Italy) signed the Treaty of Rome. This treaty, designed to foster European integration, also made 
economic provisions for the members’ dependent territories because of their strong economic 
reliance to the metropoles. Thus, under the Treaty of Rome, these territories were made 
associated members of the European Economic Community (EEC), a status which privileged the 
French territories immensely. Despite not being included in the negotiations of the Treaty of 
Rome, the EEC and the Six pledged to assist the associated territories with trade and 
development, which offered them significant potential. Under the treaty, they not only enjoyed 
access to the European Common Market, but also guaranteed prices for their goods in the 
Common Market (which were more favourable than world market prices) and the protection of 
their own nascent industries from the might of European business with the right to raise their 
own tariffs. Another important provision of the treaty which benefitted the associated territories 
was the $581 million dollars that the European Investment Fund earmarked for development aid. 
From 1957 to 1962, almost all these funds were used for infrastructure projects like roads, 
hospitals, education, and irrigation in the associated states.550  
 Despite some early misgivings from some of the Six about bringing African territories 
into an associative relationship with the EEC551, one of the negotiators of this agreement said that 
the growing relationship between the EEC and the associated territories had “been much more 
favorable than the negotiators of the treaty ever dared to hope” as confidence grew between their 
cooperation.552 As a result of benefitting economically from the relationship and the growing 
trust between them and the EEC, when the French territories declared their independence in 1960 
they immediately requested an extension of their status which the EEC granted until a new 
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agreement could be negotiated and finalised.553 From the summer of 1960 to December 1962 the 
character of the relationship and the tone of negotiations changed as the former French territories 
finally became included in the negotiations instead of being represented by France on their 
behalf as in 1956-7. This altered the character of the negotiations because the associated African 
states wanted important assurances from the European Six which would carefully spell out the 
basis of their cooperation. Several meetings were held in 1960-1 between representatives of the 
EEC, the European Parliamentary Assembly, and the parliaments of the associated states.554 By 
the June 1961 meeting in Strasbourg this basis was ironed out. As recent victims of European 
colonialism, the associated African states had legitimate concerns; what they wanted was the 
assurance that they would not become victims of a new form of economic colonialism and lose 
their independence.  
At the June 1961 summit in Strasbourg, the EEC affirmed that its members now 
recognised all nations as equals and that any links between the EEC and the new African states 
needed to be founded on the principle of guaranteeing their independence. Furthermore, the EEC 
respected the right of African states to assert their “African personality,” understood to mean 
their own political direction in the future, and that their aid would not conceal any form of 
political-economic ideology.555 Members of the European Parliamentary Assembly, notably its 
President, Hans Furler, France’s René Pleven, and the Netherlands’ Goes van Naters gave their 
assurances that their negotiations would end in a reform of the vertical links tying African states 
to Europe, vouching that the Six would not force upon them any political programme and that 
they would not be required to take a stand in Europe’s ideological conflicts. Since the associated 
African states had voiced concerns, in their first negotiations with the Six the year before, that a 
new agreement with the EEC could be a “Trojan Horse” for neo-colonialism, the Six explained 
that they were not trying to repackage an agreement for the political and economic advantages 
they gained during colonialism. What the Six genuinely desired, they said, was for other states to 
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be able to profit from Europe’s economic, social, and cultural resurgence.556 By late 1962, the 
Six had convinced the associated African states of their good intentions. Finally signed by all 
parties in December 1962, the new agreement included an expansion to their development aid, 
$800 million for the years 1963-8, as well as the right to expand this aid to include loans as well 
as infrastructure projects.557 The associated African states’ certainly appeased because of the 
promises that no ideological commitments would be demanded for the aid, but there was also an 
added layer of security because they knew of the amounts the EEC had available for them.558 
This agreement provided certain advantages for the associated states like providing scholarship 
for African students so they could gain instruction in Europe and form their country’s cadres 
instead of seeing European technicians flooding Africa as they had during the colonial period.559 
Another factor helping the associated states to sign on to the agreement was the Six’s 
commitment that they would not decide on their own where resources would be allocated; 
decisions would instead be taken together as equals.560  
 The character of the negotiations also changed from those of 1956-7 because the 
European Six altered their requests according to the unfolding political situation in Africa with 
more and more states becoming independent. This agreement was very generous given the sums 
involved for African development and it was specifically designed to attract other African states, 
particularly Anglophone states, to join in. Enticing the others thus formed the largest demand 
from the European Six to the associated African states. The Six wanted to create a more 
favourable economic atmosphere conducive for the other African states to join.561 West 
Germany, for instance, had more economic interests in Anglophone Africa than the ex-AOF and 
AEF and was therefore interested in promoting and developing them by bringing the other 
African states into the fold.562 Undoubtedly due to their knowledge of Europe’s colonial past, the 
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Six were adamant that their economic aid and trade with African countries should not make them 
appear as creating favouritism and division on the African continent by supporting some and not 
others.563 Thus, they demanded changes to the 1957 agreement in the Treaty of Rome in their 
economic arrangements with associated states to even out the playing field between the 
associated and non-associated African states. For one, the new agreement of December 1962 
reduced the preferential treatment for goods from associated states coming into EEC as had been 
established in 1957 by knocking down some common external tariffs with non-associated states. 
This was designed not only to prevent resentment from the non-associated states, but also 
ensured that the price of goods from the associated states would fall more in line with world 
prices. This agreement also embodied the belief that inter-African trade could flourish as the 
African states kept up their rhetoric of unity because it also allowed the associated states with the 
right of “establishing customs unions, free-trade areas, and other types of economic agreements 
[…] in the same geographical areas.”564 This was a dramatic change to the substance of the 
original relationship between the EEC and its affiliated African states and it was a large 
concession for the latter to acquiesce to. On the other hand, it was also in their interest not to 
cause resentment and alienate the Anglophone states after the progress made in building relations  
at the Monrovia Conference.565 Furthermore, forming a common link to Europe could be the 
antidote to the radical agenda the Casablanca Group was proposing. Thus, shortly after sealing 
the deal with the EEC, Senghor sent an appeal to the non-associated states to join into 
partnership with the EEC.566  
 The initial reception from former British territories, however, was not good. During the 
negotiations over the United Kingdom’s potential entry into the EEC in 1962, the Anglo-African 
states all voiced their opposition to joining with associated status “out of principle.”567 Scholars, 
however, have made the mistake of concluding that this refusal was final and that behind the 
 
563 Jacob J. van der Lee, “Community Economic Relations with Associated African States and Other Countries,” 20-
1, 23. 
564 Ibid, 21. 
565 The Senegalese were aware of the potential resentment from fellow West African states. For instance, William 
Tubman, the Liberian President, warned his country during his January 1962 presidential address that he would 
follow the negotiations closely because of their potential to harm Liberia’s economy if the Common Market 
discriminated against Liberian goods. It is reasonable to assume other African states felt the same. See, “39/Conf. 15 
janvier1962. L’Ambassadeur du Sénégal au Libéria, Monrovia, à Son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères 
du Sénégal, Dakar.” VP 153, Fonds de la Vice-Présidence et Présidence du Conseil, National Archives of Senegal. 
566 Aaron Segal, “Africa Newly Divided?,” The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1964): 73. 
567 Tom Soper, “The EEC and Aid to Africa,” 468-9. 
177 
 
façade of refusal was genuine interest. Aaron Segal, for instance, seemed to suggest that the 
complete opposition to entering the EEC was due to a feeling that joining would open the door to 
neo-colonialism. Nkrumah, for one, is cited as leading this opposition on the grounds that the 
EEC’s invitation was “a special plea for collective colonialism of a new order.”568 In his own 
draft and notes written around the same time, it is clear that Nkrumah saw the EEC-African 
relationship as a threat to his vision for Africa. Nkrumah described it as “economic imperialism” 
meant to ensnare the African states in a neo-colonial system: “the common market is a device for 
the collective exploitation of the less developed countries of Africa by the protagonists of neo-
colonialism. It must be avoided like the plague.”569 But while it is true that Nkrumah opposed the 
EEC’s relationship with Africa, we cannot conclude that he persuaded others to think and act in 
like fashion. After all, states like Nigeria and Sierra Leone were members of the Monrovia 
Group. It is therefore plausible that the opposition from the Anglo-African states was for other 
reasons. Unlike the Francophone African states, they had not been in close contact with the EEC 
for the last six years and not much time was given for the Six to persuade them of their good 
intentions. Thus, their fears of opening a new door to economic colonialism were amply 
justifiable. Perhaps another contributing factor can explain their refusal to entertain the idea of 
joining. The British Government was also reaching a dead end in their negotiations to enter the 
EEC. Thus, it was inconceivable for the Anglo-African states to sabotage their relationship with 
the United Kingdom by openly opting for an agreement with the Six. None of the Anglo-African 
states ended up joining the EEC during this period for these reasons, but the EEC-African 
relationship nevertheless built an incredible amount of interest. By mid-1963 Nigeria had 
engaged in several talks with the EEC about joining, and by then Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda 
had also approached the EEC.570  
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Mali and Guinea Cross the Picket Line: The Beginning of the End of the Casablanca Group’s 
Cohesion 
 As the Francophone African states dashed ahead creating a set of cooperative institutions 
and negotiating an important development aid agreement with the EEC, two other ex-AOF states 
– Guinea and Mali – watched with interest from the sidelines. As the most radical anticolonial 
former AOF states, they had gravitated towards Ghana and then thrown their lot in with the 
Casablanca Group. Yet for all the attention this group gathered with its radical rhetoric, its 
members had not come any closer to building a set of institutions of cooperation and, as a 
consequence, were not able to attract any of the Monrovia states to join their side. The 
Casablanca group’s statements of solidarity and unity, however, were masking discord and 
growing dismay from Mali and Guinea. In the latter’s case, Sekou Touré began to feel that 
Nkrumah and Nasser were showing him a lack of respect as an equal, and he started to put in 
question his antagonistic stance against his neighbours to the north. From early 1961 to early 
1962, Touré gradually improved his relations with Senghor and toyed with the idea of a new role 
for his country as a mediator between the African groups. In the case of Modibo Keita of Mali, 
his overtures to Ghana and his desire to embark on anticolonial crusade against France disguised 
divided loyalties. While it seemed that Keita had gambled away Mali’s future by backing Ghana 
and the Casablanca Group, he had in fact hedged his bets. Unlike Guinea who opted out, his 
country had profited from being tied to the Treaty of Rome and could still benefit if it remained 
in the negotiations with the other Francophone countries. Even as the Mali Federation imploded, 
Keita kept his state in the negotiations with the EEC along with the other Francophone states. 
The combination of the prospect of aid from Europe and the end of an important event – the 
Algerian War – removed one of the largest fixations affecting Mali’s foreign policy orientation. 
As France finally came to terms with Algeria, Keita realised there was no longer any point to 
remaining in the Casablanca Group and joined Touré in playing a mediation role.  
 Understanding Guinea’s decision to leave the Casablanca Group in early 1962 requires 
looking at the context of its changing relations with an important member of the AOF, Senegal, 
and its ally from independence, Ghana. Independent Guinea was born of Touré’s decision to defy 
de Gaulle and refuse his call to form a new association of states in West Africa in 1958. Whilst 
secretly harboring hope that he could maintain links with France, Touré fell under the pressure of 
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his party and advocated a strong anticolonial position rejecting any links with colonial powers. 
Seeing this as nothing short of betrayal, de Gaulle not only cut all ties to Guinea, but he also 
allowed his secret services to mount assassination attempts on the Guinean leader. These 
assassination attempts dramatically altered the relationships that Touré had with his two 
immediate neighbours – Senegal and Ivory Coast – because the French used these states as 
staging grounds for their attempts.571 Thus, Touré began to see himself under siege from 
collaborationist and aggressive neighbours and his relations with them plummeted, causing him 
to get closer to more radical states like Ghana and to accept radical exiles from other 
Francophone states.572 Despite his strong response, Touré did give himself room for future major 
policy reorientations. As part of his radical posture against colonial states, he entered the Ghana-
Guinea Union and placed an item, article 34, in Guinea’s own constitution allowing the 
government to surrender its entire sovereignty at the disposal of a larger whole. Yet, as his top 
diplomat, Diallo Telli, told the UN Secretary General at the time in confidence, he never 
seriously considered doing so.573 Unlike Nkrumah, Touré simply was not willing to commit his 
state to the fate of another. 
 There is also some evidence suggesting that Touré may have quickly regretted joining the 
Casablanca Group because of its lack of coordination and because not all members thought 
themselves equals. Mere weeks after attending the Casablanca Conference and signing the 
charter in January, Touré sent a scathing message to the group reminding them of their duties. 
Touré was irate because Nasser and Nkrumah had not bothered to consult either him or the 
others before laying down proposals for a solution to the Congo Crisis at the UN General 
Assembly in their name. In an obvious barb to Ghana and Egypt, he reminded everyone of their 
duty to consult each other to form a common policy or else risk fraying their ties.574 In 1961 
Guinea also began to resent growing Ghanaian intransigence at its expense, particularly in their 
joint military mission in Congo. According to Achkar Marof, Guinea’s ambassador in Accra at 
the time, Guinean objectives were often thwarted and superseded by the orders of a white 
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commander in the Ghanaian armed forces. This caused a dramatic shift in how Touré perceived 
the reliability of his radical allies, and W. Scott Thompson marked it as the point that he began to 
nurture relations with the Monrovia states out of fear of eventual isolation in African affairs.575 
What scholars have not uncovered, however, is evidence that there may have been an economic 
dimension to the rapprochement with the states of the former AOF. Touré had undoubtedly 
followed the Francophone states’ negotiations with the EEC, and he was probably anxious to 
find his way aboard, particularly since the now cash-strapped Ghana had not yet given the 
majority of its promised 10 million Pound loan from 1958.576 What he needed was to initiate a 
thaw in relations with Senegal, and luckily, Senghor was willing.  
In January 1961 Guinea and Senegal signed a commercial accord designed to get the two 
sides meeting regularly to discuss the problem of bilateral trade, and in November the two sides 
agreed to a comprehensive trade agreement along with a cultural accord.577 In the summer of 
1961 Touré’s tone changed dramatically in his correspondence with Senegalese officials, 
referring to the Senegalese ambassador to Conakry as his “dear friend” and to Senegal as 
Guinea’s “sister state.” In this correspondence Touré also relayed a message to Senghor hoping 
they could open a dialogue and expressing Guinea’s feelings of genuine fraternity.578 In January 
1962, Touré insisted once more that he wished to have better relations with Senegal. By way of 
showing Senghor his intent, he declared himself willing to abide by the code of conduct of the 
UAM and Monrovia Group, notably to respect the idea of not allowing subversive elements 
target a foreign state. The Guinean leader admitted that after launching his own investigation, 
there were members of the PAI operating in his country and vowed they would be stopped from 
spreading seditious propaganda and doing harm to Senegal. Radio propaganda against Senegal 
was also reported to have ceased and favourable news programs now proclaimed Senegal a sister 
state.579 A few months later Senghor wrote Touré, thanking him for his gesture and letting him 
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know he would reciprocate by expelling a group of Guinean students who were doing the same 
in Dakar. Furthermore, Senghor stated his own desire to normalise relations, but declared there 
was still one outstanding issue to tackle. The two states remained at odds over the delineation of 
their border. Senghor suggested appointing a commission of Senegalese and Guinean experts to 
settle the matter, to prevent the issue from becoming an obstacle. He concluded the letter by 
wishing Touré well and calling him ‘my dear good friend.”580 In the case of the normalisation of 
their relations, both Senegal and Guinea came out winners. For Senghor, he was satisfied with 
the knowledge that his southern neighbour moved away from the Casablanca Group by 
expressing interest in abiding by the core principle of the UAM and Monrovia powers by 
surrendering the right to interfere in the affairs of others. As for the Guinean leader, cozying up 
to the UAM’s leading state gave him not just the hope that he was a little closer to sharing in its 
economic success, but also a means of building up his prestige in African affairs and opening a 
door to a new role of mediator. Touré had become disgruntled with the way the Casablanca 
Group and the radical states handled their so-called ‘cooperation’ compared to the success of the 
cooperation between the members of the UAM and Monrovia Groups.  
In April 1962, Nkrumah was deeply alarmed by the negotiations between UAM members 
and the EEC, and the United Kingdom’s possible entry into the common market. Not only did 
his propaganda machine begin to militate against the idea, but he quickly backed the idea, floated 
by the Casablanca Group’s economic committee, of an African common market, whereby states 
joining in would see a 25% drop in customs duties every year until free trade existed. Yet the 
idea was ill-researched and overly optimistic.581 Its greatest shortfall was that it was designed to 
attract the six members of the Casablanca Group in the face of a much more advanced agreement 
that was already in place with the Twelve of the UAM. When he approached Keita for support of 
the idea, Keita reportedly shut down the Ghanaian delegation’s proposal and cynically wondered 
aloud what sort of products Nkrumah planned to peddle in it. According to W. Scott Thompson, 
Nkrumah had overlooked an obvious fact. Keita, who had participated in negotiations with the 
EEC since 1960 and secured an agreement, had based his country’s planned economy around 
it.582 It is also quite telling that the Senegalese, despite the problems between the two, and not 
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Nkrumah, understood that Mali faced difficult economic circumstances. A report from the 
Senegalese foreign ministry a few months later stated that capital flight was taking place in the 
country because of Keita’s devaluation of its currency since taking Mali out of the Franc Zone.583 
Nkrumah should have known that Keita was left no option but to pin his hopes on the EEC. 
Instead of confronting the fact that his idea was too little, too late, Nkrumah decried Keita for his 
betrayal by selling himself out to de Gaulle and instructed his diplomatic staff he could never 
work with him again.584 As for Nkrumah’s project of the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union, the 
Ghanaian leader could not hope to keep Keita to his side because he simply never believed in the 
project. According to the Ghanaian cabinet records, Keita never sent a permanent representative 
to sit on Ghana’s cabinet meetings as Touré had done.585 Whilst Keita was very interested to take 
Nkrumah’s money when the Mali Federation fell apart and Mali came out of the Franc Zone, 
when it came time to showing interest in building a union by attending Ghana’s cabinet 
meetings, Keita showed none. Mali therefore regarded its relationship with Ghana as a 
transactional one as Keita never showed any real interest in Nkrumah’s ideological convictions.  
There was another important reason for Mali’s growing distance from the Casablanca 
group. In the spring of 1962 the entire reason why Keita joined in the first place – to find allies to 
oppose French policy in Africa – was largely rendered moot, as de Gaulle and the GPRA signed 
the Evian Accords and began the process of restoring peace in Algeria, paving the way for 
Algerian independence. After the Mali Federation imploded and Keita blamed the French, he 
could rely on scoring points domestically by opposing France’s policy on many fronts – on 
Algeria by supporting the GPRA, on its nuclear testing in Algeria, and on its support of 
Mauritania with whom Mali held territorial claims. France’s dramatic change in policy in Algeria 
undermined this policy, and a small but important Malian foreign policy change came out as a 
result. Keita met with Ould Daddah to discuss the former’s land claims and came to terms. Soon 
after the meeting, Mali stopped its radio propaganda campaign against Mauritania, showing that 
Keita had dropped his claims. This had the effect of sending a strong signal to the UAM and 
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Monrovia states that his African policy was changing to accept the sovereignty of borders as they 
stood.586  
The end of the Algerian War also sounded the end of the strong anti-French stand of two 
other leaders of the Casablanca Group, one more surprising than the other. In the wake of the 
signing of the Evian Accords, both Sékou Touré and Gamal Abdel Nasser sent congratulatory 
messages to Charles de Gaulle and expressed their desire to patch up and normalise their 
relations. Given that France was signing a peace with the Algerians, Nasser explained that he no 
longer saw French foreign policy as harming Arab interests.587 There was another important 
factor behind Nasser’s decision, however, which became apparent to the French Chargé 
d’Affaires in Cairo tasked with normalising their relations. Nasser had noted France’s economic 
policies with developing states in Africa and hoped that he too could negotiate some sort of 
economic aid from France.588 Given that Guinea had watched as the other ex-AOF states 
negotiated with the EEC, before normalising its relations to Senegal by signing a trade 
agreement, it is therefore plausible that Touré hoped to gain access to the EEC through a return 
to good relations with France. The end of the Algerian conflict therefore caused a remarkable 
turnaround in the foreign policy orientations of Guinea, Mali, and Egypt, which no longer 
backed the common front against France decided at Casablanca in January 1961. The end of the 
Algerian War therefore unpicked one of the important threads tying the Casablanca Group 
together, severely questioning if there was any purpose left in the group. 
The Unravelling of the Casablanca Group 
 The Casablanca Group was created by five African states and the Algerian government in 
exile with the purpose of creating African unity by signing a charter harmonising their political, 
economic, social, and cultural policies. In reality – and in contradistinction to the Brazzaville 
Group – every member of Casablanca joined the charter for rather immediate and different 
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reasons such as forming a front against other African states, trying to gain recognition of 
territorial claims, and promote Afro-Asian issues. Thus, the Casablanca Group was held by its 
members more as an alliance than a true organisation with an important purpose. The Casablanca 
Charter, however, founded a working organisation with political organs and it did function to an 
extent. Its failure as an organisation was not due to the people staffing it, but rather because of its 
structure and its reliance on member states to act on its recommendations to bring about change 
in Africa. From the time signing of the Charter in January 1961 to May 1963, the member states 
demonstrated they cared more for their own autonomy than being bound by recommendations 
from the Charter’s committees and they neglected their duties to the Charter. Worse for their 
alliance was that their foreign policy goals diverged dramatically as well as their relationship to 
one another and this caused the organisation to be abandoned.  
 Every signatory to the Casablanca Charter had attended many African conferences in the 
past. Some of the member states, like Ghana, really wanted this organisation to be meaningful 
moving forward unlike the AAPC and AAPSO conferences had been in the past. Thus, the 
Ghanaian delegation succeeded in convincing the group to create an operative machinery within 
the organisation to bring political, economic, social, cultural, and military results to the charter. 
At the heart of the organisation was a secretariat called the Liaison Office which was based in 
Bamako and staffed with officials of all member states. This office was responsible for 
reminding the governments of the member states of their obligations to the charter, to call 
member states and organise meetings to move the project of the charter forward, and to pass 
along reports of the progress of the charter’s committees. Under the liaison office were several 
committees (made up of delegations of all member states) in charge of meeting once or twice a 
year to make resolutions to fulfill the charter’s goals. These committees, rarely made up of the 
heads of state themselves, would deliberate and then issue resolutions to be made binding by the 
member states. The liaison office would then send the resolutions to each member state so they 
could be ratified by their parliaments.589 This was a system which had the potential to advance 
the principles of the charter, but ultimately success would rely on the signatories adopting the 
resolutions and passing them through their parliaments. Thus, a willingness to partake in the 
system by the member states was assumed. For the organisation to function effectively, member 
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states needed to participate and show they were truly invested in the project. This proved to be 
the organisation’s unravelling in 1962-3.  
 The system built into the Casablanca Charter was often frustrating for both its staff and 
the governments of member states, and it did make the organisation appear shambolic. As a 
result, the members’ respect for the institution of the charter eroded. The first meeting of the 
Economic Committee in Casablanca in late November 1961, for instance, held its debates only in 
French. The Ghanaian delegation, astounded that no effort had been made to provide an English 
translator, left the meeting early without any idea what was being debated. As a result, Ghana 
could not participate and only learned about what happened later.590 Consistent attendance was 
also problem for the committees of the Charter of Casablanca. In December 1961, during a 
meeting of the Political Committee, the Ghanaian Foreign Ministry received an urgent cable 
from Casablanca stating the Ghanaian delegation meant to be at the meeting was missing. The 
committee urged the Ghanaian Foreign Minister to quickly send someone because the committee 
could not deliberate without a representative from Ghana.591 During the first week of August 
1962, Ghana missed the third meeting of the Economic Committee entirely as it failed to send a 
delegation on time and gave no warning to the others. By the time the delegation arrived, the 
conference had been concluded for several days. This was very embarrassing to the Ghanaian 
Government because it irritated the host, Hassan II. Not only did he receive no news from Ghana 
about its tardiness, but he was also forced to delay the start of the meeting. The Ghanaian 
delegation reported back to Accra that it tried as best as it could to dispel the idea that Ghana no 
longer cared about the Casablanca Charter.592 Ghana was not alone in not attending on time or at 
all. In October 1962, the Ghanaian assistant at the liaison office in Bamako reported to Accra 
after the start of an important Economic Committee meeting about the African Common Market 
that delegations from Egypt and Algeria were going to be several days late. The Moroccan 
Government, knowing that attendance was often a problem, assumed no delegations would arrive 
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on time to the meeting. Instead of sending its delegation to the meeting, it asked the Secretary 
General of the Charter to postpone the meeting altogether.593  
Inside the organisation, frustration was building. The Secretary General of the Charter 
and head of the Liaison Office, Thami Ouazzani, lamented the poor effectiveness of the office 
and blamed the governments of the member states because they were not taking the organisation 
seriously and did not come to its aid. Ouazzani first wrote to each government in in July 1962 
asking for their help and got no replies. Thus, an exasperated Ouazzani wrote to Nkrumah six 
months later complaining that the situation within the Casablanca Charter was still as confused 
as it was two years before. The liaison office, the effective HQ of the Charter, was not only still 
only partially built, but it was located fifteen kilometres from Bamako’s city centre making quick 
communications difficult. He also complained that his messages to the member states often went 
ignored and replies, when they did come, were incredibly late making planning very difficult. 
The liaison office’s staff, he stated, were also not numerous or competent enough to work there 
despite the Casablanca states agreeing to commit qualified personnel. Guinea, he claimed, still 
had not sent its promised assistant to the liaison office nor had it sent its military staff to help at 
the Joint African High Command and neither had Algeria.594 Finally, Ouazzani said that a pattern 
had clearly emerged regarding interest in setting dates for the Economic, Cultural, and Joint High 
Command committees. Hardly any of the members showed any interest in replying to requests to 
set dates.595 Other reports from the liaison office show complaints that whilst they sent the 
recommendations, resolutions, and draft treaties of the Economic Committee to member states 
for acceptance and ratification, many states still had not yet done so.596  
This led to its receding credibility in the eyes of some members like Egypt, Guinea, and 
Algeria who refused to pay their yearly dues to the organisation for 1963.597 Algerian and 
Egyptian liaison staff began to absent themselves from work often in the winter of 1963 because 
they saw no point on showing up, which led to their governments recalling them home in April. 
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The Liaison Office suffered by their frequent absences because it influenced junior staff 
members to do the same.598 Ouazzani, too exasperated to keep going and knowing there was no 
point in saving a doomed organisation, gave up a week later and returned to Morocco to run as a 
member of the House of Representatives. Emblematic of the erratic nature of the Casablanca 
group, Ouazzani told no one he left for good leaving the Ghanaian Government to find out the 
news in a Le Monde article.599 By late April, with no Secretary General and funds running out, 
the Ghanaian liaison assistant wrote to Modibo Keita and made an urgent appeal for funds to 
keep the office running. The Malian leader refused which effectively snuffing out the organs of 
the organisation.600  
The committees of the Casablanca Charter would meet, deliberate, and send their 
recommendations, resolutions, and proposed treaties for adoption to the governments of member 
states to move the project of the Casablanca Charter ahead. There is evidence there was great 
reluctance by the governments to blindly accept their recommendations and ratify whatever they 
sent which can account for why the members did not ratify treaties in defiance to the charter and 
its aims of forging unity. In January 1962, the Ghanaian Minister of Finance and Trade received 
a set of recommendations from the Economic Committee of the charter asking him to gradually 
remove Ghana’s trade barriers and tariffs over the next five years with Casablanca states. Clearly 
dismayed that he had not been consulted, the minister cautioned Nkrumah’s assistants that these 
measures would have severe repercussions on the state’s revenue. He instead urged the 
government not go ahead without reflection and had to “take an unrushed decision in the light of 
all the facts.”601 Not everything that was decided by the committees of the charter was deemed 
advisable by the governments of member states and it therefore caused friction between them.  
Some member states of the Casablanca Charter felt like they could pick and choose 
which agreements they were bound to which reduced the charter’s legitimacy. Furthermore, it 
also showed that for some members, the Casablanca Charter was more of a convenient alliance 
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rather than a set of ideals to pursue. Guinea, for instance, chose to ignore their military 
commitments agreed in the charter. All member states were required to provide trained military 
officers to help design, build, and operate an African High Command based in Bamako. Guinea, 
for instance, defied the agreements of the charter by not providing any military staff for the 
African High Command.602 Algeria, on the other hand, was shockingly forthright from the 
beginning. The Algerian representative declared during the first Economic Committee meeting in 
1961 that whatever resolutions the committee agreed to would not be held as binding by the 
future Algerian state. Without raising the significant problem in his statement, the representative 
quickly told the other delegates that this did not mean that Algeria’s adherence to the principles 
of the Casablanca Charter was in question.603  
The members’ lack of seriousness shown to the Casablanca Charter was also shared by 
some important states outside of it, and this helped to prevent its recognition as an effective 
organisation. In July 1962, the members of the charter finally combined and supported the idea 
by signing a treaty in Cairo creating an African Common Market to rival the UAM’s agreement 
with the EEC.604 For this treaty to work and enable trade with countries outside of the common 
market, it had to gain the treaty’s recognition from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) in Geneva. GATT members put together a working party in November to examine the 
treaty and allowed the Ghanaian Minister of Finance and Trade and GATT’s Egyptian delegate 
to give an expose. The Egyptian delegate tried to sell the idea by appealing to GATT’s position 
on less developed countries which “should strive to attain and preserve liberal access to one 
anothers’ [sic] markets.”605 After all, the Egyptian delegate had a good point as states of the 
charter were merely trying to rearrange trade links away from Europe and towards each other. 
The Egyptian continued his argument but raised serious doubts in the working party on whether 
the proposed common market was viable or even needed at all. He stated the incredibly poor 
figures of Egypt’s trade with other Casablanca states: “Exports from [Egypt] to these countries 
were 0.66% in 1959 and 0.76% in 1960 against imports of 0.11% in 1959 and 0.17% in 1961.” 
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The Egyptian admitted that his state had tried “to expand and diversify trade among African 
countries, [but] the progress made had so far been little.” Further sowing doubt, he told the 
working party that “the commodities featuring in African inter-territorial trade had been few, 
limited in variety and in many cases insignificant.” By any metric, none of these figures or 
statements were reassuring as Egypt had been clamoring and pretending to strive for more inter-
African economic cooperation since December 1957.  
The working party then allowed GATT representatives to raise questions or issues. The 
Ghanaian delegate then faced resistance to the idea because they mainly came from the two 
colonial powers with wide trade interests in Africa – Great Britain and France. The British 
delegate then unpicked the treaty and highlighted the many “defects in the drafting of the 
treaty.”606 One of the first points of contention in the treaty, he argued, was the idea that any 
member of this proposed free trade area could form a “bilateral arrangement with a third party 
outside” because it was “something both foreign to and inconsistent with the institution and basic 
principle of a Free Trade Area.”607 He also raised a concern with the item in the treaty whereby 
“two or more member States can conclude provisional bilateral agreements” within the free trade 
area. He wondered how this could effectively work given that bilateral agreements were between 
two countries, not more. The delegate, in similar fashion to a schoolteacher, noted sternly that 
“this aspect of the draft treaty should be gone into more carefully.”608 The most contentious point 
from the point of view of GATT, he argued, was that the treaty used the term “priority” in the 
context of imports from third parties. He and the American delegate thought this could 
effectively mean the same as ‘discrimination’ which was in violation with GATT principles.609  
Finally, the British delegated noted the incredible inconsistencies with the dates written 
in several places for when the treaty would come into force. The Ghanaian delegate had to 
conceded that the dates written down were indeed not accurate as the treaty had not yet become 
ratified by its members. The Ghanaian delegate added that a new and postponed deadline of 1 
January 1963 had since been submitted to each member state for the treaty’s ratification.610 After 
demonstrating that the treaty in front of them was very shoddy work, the British delegate then 
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allowed the floor to his French counterpart. Unlike the British delegate, the Frenchman was frank 
and immediately dismissive. He stated bluntly that since the treaty was formulated when the 
foreign relations of Algeria were still France’s responsibility, France held “the right to challenge 
the international validity and legality of the Treaty.”611 The GATT working party then closed the 
meeting and allowed its members to one more month to submit further issues or questions and 
that it would then host another clarifying meeting on the treaty in early 1963. The Ghanaian and 
Egyptian delegates hardly presented the Casablanca Charter in a good light by presenting their 
rough draft of a treaty to GATT members who did not approve it. They also found out that the 
British and French delegates, given their negative attitude to the treaty, presented a formidable 
obstacle to the creation of an African Common Market to rival their trade links in Africa. Despite 
Ghana’s assurances that the Casablanca group of states would seek another meeting to approve 
the treaty, it never came to be as the group disintegrated in the winter of 1963.  
A New Arab Rivalry Unravels the Alliance of the Casablanca Charter 
In December 1962 and with the Addis Ababa Summit looming, the heads of state of the 
Casablanca Charter tentatively agreed to hold a conference together – their first in nearly two 
years – in the first week of January to discuss the African situation.612 Nasser agreed with the 
idea and explained its purpose should be to corral more “team spirit” before Addis Ababa and 
ensure “that their positions will be consistent with the principles and aims of the Charter.”613 
Nkrumah also sent his wishes to host another conference for the same reasons.614 Both leaders, in 
other words, wanted to keep tabs on the alliance and possibly firm it up before heading to 
Ethiopia in May. This conference, however, never took place. A string of cancellations from 
leaders forced it to be rescheduled many times and finally abandoned mere weeks before the 
African Summit at Addis Ababa. This failed last ditch attempt to bring the group together 
effectively signalled the end of the Casablanca Charter and their alliance. The individual and 
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differing interests that brought the group together in January 1961 not only diverged a year later, 
but some Casablanca states also saw them turn on each other.  
Guinea and Mali had grown more interested in re-joining their ex-AOF states for pressing 
economic reasons and became less interested in opposing France’s sphere of influence in Africa. 
The situation in the Arab world in early 1963 – both in the Maghreb and beyond – meant that the 
relations between Morocco, Algeria, and Egypt changed dramatically because their focus was 
drawn away from African to Arab affairs. This unfortunately left Ghana as the lone state 
interested in keeping the alliance alive. The date of conference was pushed back twice before 
being postponed altogether with leaders giving flimsy reasons to one another for not being able 
to attend. Hassan II wrote to the charter members that he could not host the meeting in March as 
the others wanted because he was first receiving the Italian President before travelling to the 
United States and “casually” suggested for mid-May instead. In May Nasser claimed he could 
not attend because he was already travelling to Yugoslavia and Algeria.615 Finally that same 
month Ben Bella wrote a very disappointed Nkrumah that there was no point in combining 
before the African Summit.616 In the first four months of 1963, Nkrumah watched as the other 
leaders began to use flimsy excuses not to come together as a group. As he found out that winter, 
these excuses hid even more significant issues that split the alliance apart. 
In January Nasser did suggest that the leaders of the Casablanca Charter should meet but 
informed the others that he would send an envoy in his stead. Nasser explained that the situation 
in the Yemen Arab Republic was forcing him to stay in Egypt. He needed to devote more 
attention to this matter because of the many colonial intrigues undermining the Yemeni 
Revolution.617 By stating that he would not personally attend, Nasser was unfortunately 
signalling to the other charter members that he now considered African affairs a secondary 
priority. As weeks passed, the Ghanaian Government learned of another reason why Nasser did 
not want to attend himself. There were new tensions between Morocco and Egypt, and since the 
conference was due to be held in Marrakesh, Nasser was reluctant to go. As the Ghanaian 
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ambassador to Morocco told Nkrumah, “under no circumstances will President Nasser personally 
visit Morocco – at least not in the foreseeable future.” Besieged politically by Arab nationalists, 
Hassan II was forced to hold a plebiscite on constitutional change in the country and Morocco 
adopted new constitution skewed towards the royalists. Nasser was angry with this change and 
considered it a “national defeat” for his country and the Arab Nationalist cause. Nasser held 
Hassan II responsible for this change and got himself ready to retaliate by dismissing Morocco’s 
claims and recognising Mauritania as an independent state.618  
When the meeting was postponed to March, Nasser refused to go once more on grounds 
that Morocco had snubbed him for not recognising the Yemen Arab Republic.619 Nasser was 
deeply invested in the Yemeni Civil War and with many Egyptian troops on the ground, it had 
become his top foreign policy issue. Since it was a proxy war between Nasser and King Faisal of 
Saudi Arabia, Nasser believed the royalist regimes in Middle East were working together to 
undermine him. Nkrumah knew of this spat and that Algeria’s Ben Bella was also actively 
supporting Nasser in his rivalries with Maghrebi leaders. His intelligence service found out that 
Algerian and Egyptian agents were on the ground in Morocco and Tunisia hatching plots to 
assassinate the King and Bourguiba.620 Ben Bella also refused to travel to Morocco because the 
presence of other Arab leaders in Marrakesh would bolster the popularity of their King as an 
important Arab figure before important Moroccan elections in May.621 The new rivalry between 
the Arab nationalist leaders and the Moroccan monarch effectively collapsed the alliance 
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Chapter VII: The Creation of the Organisation for African Unity 
 The main factor explaining the coming together of all African groups – UAM, Monrovia, 
and Casablanca – to a summit at Addis Ababa in May 1963 was to debate the African regional 
order. Five years after the first African conference of independent states in Accra, a firm 
definition of what exactly African unity consisted of had yet been agreed to. Sustained 
propaganda campaigns, land claims on other African states, and the entrenched divisions 
between African states all contributed to the lingering feeling of unease in inter-African 
relations. The assassination of Sylvanus Olympio, Togo’s President, in January 1963 was the 
final straw. Hugely significant, it convinced many African leaders that the state of affairs on the 
continent had gone too far and that they should all finally come together to set rules on the 
conduct between African states. Since Olympio was assassinated whilst tensions with Ghana 
were at their peak, it was only natural that the African leaders suspected Nkrumah was behind 
the plot. Nkrumah may have rejoiced at seeing a new regime take power in Togo, but the 
assassination – whether he was behind it or not – came at a huge cost. From January to the 
summit at Addis Ababa, Nkrumah’s once significant influence on other leaders reached rock 
bottom and his stature and ideas no longer had any effect. As a result, opposition to Nkrumah 
grew larger as former allies changed sides, and he lost the power to affect any change in African 
affairs.  
The Final Straw: The Assassination of Sylvanus Olympio 
 The acrimonious Ghanaian-Togolese relations were reaching their peak in the latter half 
of 1962. In August 1962 Nkrumah headed to the north of his country to meet the President of 
Upper-Volta for political talks. On his way back after the meeting, through the village of 
Kulungugu, Nkrumah’s motorcade was attacked by unknown assailants with hand grenades. 
Nkrumah survived the assassination attempt but was very shaken by the event. The Ghanaian 
leader, who had been warned by his intelligence service of impending attacks by Togolese agents 
for years, decided that Sylvanus Olympio was certainly behind it.622 Nkrumah sent an immediate 
message of protest to Olympio about the failed assassination attempt and Guinea jumped in in 
the weeks after the assassination attempt to try to defuse the situation. Touré asked Olympio if he 
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could visit Accra to speak with Nkrumah and reciprocate Nkrumah’s visit to Togo in 1960. 
Olympio noted that the situation between the two was so grave that he did not feel safe travelling 
to Accra; besides, he simply did not see what could be achieved with a one-on-one meeting. 
Olympio also gave proof that Nkrumah did not want to come to terms with him as both received 
Touré’s invitation of mediation, and only he had replied.623  
Accusations and warnings by Nkrumah continued to mount on Togo in the following 
weeks after a spate of explosions in Accra.624 Nkrumah accused Togo of harbouring and plotting 
with important members of Ghana’s exiled opposition (including K.A. Busia). “The Government 
of Ghana has positive proof that the Ghanaian citizens referred to above have been organising 
acts of terrorism to take place in Ghana and have in fact been responsible for the four explosions 
which took place recently in Accra.” Nkrumah charged Olympio with facilitating the smuggling 
of explosives into Ghana for use against his government and demanded that Togo send these 
conspirators back to Ghana. As far as he saw it, political refugees had the right to find asylum in 
other states only if they did not use their adoptive country as a base for attacks on others. In a 
final warning, Nkrumah reminded Togo that Ghana had “the right to institute measures which it 
considers appropriate to the safety and security of the State of the Republic of Ghana.”625 
Olympio replied to Nkrumah in December that the idea he had been behind the assassination 
attempt in Kulungugu was false, as were the claims that a campaign of “terrorism and 
subversion” was being hatched in Togo. Olympio then tried to reassure the Ghanaian President 
that the political exiles in Togo were not engaging in politics. Olympio ended the note by 
warning Nkrumah that he should not contemplate violating Togo’s “territorial integrity and 
independence” on the claim of acting in Ghana’s defence.626 
 Mere weeks after Olympio’s reply to Nkrumah, during the night of 13 January, fifty 
armed men made their way to the Togolese leader’s house. They arrested him in front of his 
wife, drank his liquor, and loaded him into a car. Two men in suits approached Mrs. Olympio 
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reassuring her that if her husband agreed to their demands he would be released and climbed 
aboard. After the car left the compound and turned a corner, she heard four shots and found her 
husband dead on the side of a street.627 While it is still unknown who plotted the Togolese 
President’s demise, many African leaders had reason to suspect Ghana was behind it because his 
death coincided with the series of public spats with Nkrumah which began in the summer of 
1962. There were already signs that the ongoing Ghana-Togo feud was starting to become a 
major issue for inter-African affairs to those who were closest to Nkrumah who urged him to 
stop. His former closest allies, Sékou Touré and Modibo Keita, approached Nkrumah discreetly 
and explained their worries about his dreadful conduct towards Togo. They tried to convince him 
to stop his quarrels with Olympio because they were undermining what he wanted to erect in 
Africa: “any dispute, however trivial, is exploited out of all proportion by the enemies of African 
unity.”628 Having already agreed to work with Haile Selassie to try to bring rival African groups 
together to resolve their differences, Touré was given the reason to double his efforts to do so 
after Olympio’s assassination. For other African leaders, however, Olympio’s assassination was 
the last straw and proof that inter-African relations had gotten out of control. The Monrovia 
Group’s 19 leaders met in Lagos for an emergency conference to discuss Olympio’s death and to 
unanimously condemn the use of “political assassination as a means of overthrowing the 
government and rising to power as a means of settling political conflicts” mentioning specifically 
that they saw Olympio’s murder as such an act.629 Olympio’s death, whether he had been 
involved in it or not, threw a wrench in Nkrumah’s plans to secure his version of African unity.   
The Road to Unity and the Addis Ababa Summit 
In the two months leading to the African Summit in Addis Ababa in late May 1963, 
Nkrumah found himself increasingly isolated and outmaneuvered in African affairs. Whilst his 
goal to unite Africa under one government remained the same, he got no nearer to achieving it. 
Ghana was still dragged in the shadow of Olympio’s murder and his former Casablanca allies 
lost interest. In the months of March and April there were signs that Nkrumah was growing very 
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anxious about his upcoming chances of convincing the majority of African states of his goal. In 
March, Nkrumah ordered the Bureau of African Affairs (BAA) to gather intelligence and report 
on the views of other African states. AK Barden, the head of the BAA, delivered a worrying 
report. Barden wrote that Nkrumah’s former ally, Sekou Touré, was trying to sink Ghana’s hopes 
of creating an African political union by trying marshal more allies to side with the Monrovia 
Group. Touré sent an emissary to speak with Julius Nyerere about the recent murder of Olympio. 
Nyerere, a dear friend of Olympio during their studies in London, was told by the Guinean envoy 
that Ghana masterminded his assassination.630 Barden reported that Nasser also sent emissaries 
to speak with Nyerere about the prospects of African unity, but despite this, Nasser’s attention 
was devoted not to Africa, but to the Arab world. Nasser, Barden argued, merely pandered to 
African unity to African leaders to keep a connection to the continent as his real efforts were to 
forge Arab unity.631 Barden also hinted that the Arab states were beginning to be more interested 
in Arab affairs. Both Nasser and Ben Bella, he claimed, had agents working in Morocco and 
Tunisia trying to assassinate their leaders. Hassan II, he reported, was more interested in 
establishing a strong relationship with the Americans to deter other Arab leaders from mounting 
a coup.632 Despite some significant domestic support in Nigeria for Nkrumah’s idea of forming a 
union, its government was actively trying to convince other African states against this idea, 
notably those of the Casablanca group like Guinea, Mali, and new African states to inter-African 
relations like Tanganyika.633  
In March and April Nkrumah attempted to reach out to other leaders, friend and foe alike, 
but got nowhere. At the end of March Nkrumah wrote to Houphouët-Boigny and floated the idea 
of a strong political union in Africa. Since Nkrumah never heard back from Houphouët-Boigny, 
he asked his ambassador in Abidjan to find out what the Ivorian leader thought. Nkrumah was 
informed to expect a negative answer because Houphouët-Boigny preferred the idea of a “loose 
alliance of independent African states.” If this were to materialise, he could then climb in 
importance in African affairs by using his status as the closest African ally to Charles de 
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Gaulle.634 A month later, Nkrumah wrote a respectful and tactful reminder to his “dear Friend 
and Brother” Gamal Abdel Nasser to not lose sight of the goal of African unity. Nkrumah noted, 
much to his chagrin, that for the last few months that Nasser was reviving the idea of Arab unity 
once more and putting more and more focus on the Middle East.635 By the end of April, 
Nkrumah was running out of time to convince anyone of his idea of continental union and he 
turned to a last ditch attempt. 
 Every head of state from independent African states were sent an invitation for the Addis 
Ababa Summit in the fourth week of May 1963, and all agreed to send their foreign ministers to 
a preparatory conference on the 13th. The foreign ministers’ duties were to create less work for 
the heads of state by coming to an agreement on an agenda for the summit as well as propose a 
draft charter to create a new African organisation to bridge the divide between African 
groupings. Nkrumah tasked his foreign minister, Kojo Botsio, to formulate a plan to convince the 
other foreign ministers of “the necessity of having one Continental Government.”636 Botsio 
understood he had a steep hill to climb, and along with his draft agenda for the summit he 
brought a very large delegation as an advisory committee to Addis Ababa to help him sell the 
idea. Included were senior Ghanaian figures with experience with African diplomacy like Alex 
Quaison-Sackey (Ghana’s representative at the UN), Michael Dei-Anang and K.B. Asante from 
the Foreign Ministry, the financier and pan-African activist T. Ras Makonnen, the ex-resident 
minister to Guinea and CPP official Nathaniel Welbeck, as well as a host of personal 
secretaries.637 Meeting together in the Ghanaian embassy before the start of the conference, they 
decided to a series of “intensive lobbying” efforts on African diplomats present and convince 
them to back Ghana’s draft agenda because it contained the wording and the idea “of [a] Union 
of African States.” The Ghanaian delegation was then split up into sections and assigned specific 
foreign ministers to lobby.638  
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 On the 13th, the preparatory conference opened and Botsio pounced on the opportunity to 
give Ghana’s case for a unitary continental government and the adoption of Ghana’s proposed 
agenda for the summit. Botsio needed to press his case because the day prior, the Ethiopian 
Government submitted a draft agenda based on the views of all African blocs to serve as 
reference point for the talks. This draft agenda, however, was the antithesis of Ghana’s because it 
did not bring up for discussion the idea of continental government. Instead, the Ethiopian 
Government suggested they should discuss the “establishment of [an] Organization of African 
States” of which the goal would be to promote “cooperation in agreed areas of African 
endeavour.”639 At the start of proceedings, Botsio launched into Nkrumah’s argumentation to see 
if the idea could take hold. He argued that creating a continental government instead of a loose 
organisation of cooperation was the only answer to combat the entrenched forces of neo-
colonialism dividing the continent. Not only would it marshal all of Africa’s resources to build 
its formidable potential strength but it was the only way for Africa to regain its dignity in the 
postcolonial period.640 Botsio then submitted Ghana’s proposal for the summit’s agenda in which 
the main point of discussion was the “Creation of a Political Union of African States.”641 
Political unification and cooperation as independent states were very different things, and 
Ghana’s idea was ignored by the other foreign ministers who were on side with Ethiopia’s 
suggestion. Tunisia, Sudan, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Congo-Léopoldville, and worse for Ghana, its 
former allies, Mali and Egypt submitted agenda proposals which wanted to discuss establishing 
an organisation of cooperation instead of unification.642  
The Ghanaian delegation was boxed into a corner and Botsio was furious at not having 
allies backing him up during the conference. This was compounded when the issue of Togo’s 
recent regime change came up. Botsio felt short changed because he expected at least one to 
 
639 “Confidential Agenda/Conf/1 12 May 1963. Ethiopia Agenda Proposal for the Foreign Ministers Conference,” in 
“Summit Conference of Independent African States. Proceedings of the Summit Conference of Independent African 
States, Volume 1, Section 1, Addis Ababa, May 1963.” RG 17/2/550. Bureau of African Affairs Collection, 
PRAAD. 
640 “’Appendix A.’” RG 17/2/1047. Bureau of African Affairs Collection, PRAAD. 
641 ‘No. C,4/4(S)/153 Secret. 15 May 1963,’ in “Summit Conference of Independent African States. Proceedings of 
the Summit Conference of Independent African States, Volume 1, Section 1, Addis Ababa, May 1963.” RG 
17/2/550. Bureau of African Affairs Collection, PRAAD. 
642 See, ‘Agenda/Conf/13 16 May 1963,” ‘Agenda/Conf/1/Amd. 1 15 May 1963,” “Agenda/Conf/10/15 May 1963,” 
“Agenda/Conf/4/15 May 1963,” ‘Agenda/Conf/6/15 May 1963,” “Agenda/Conf/1/Amd. 2 15 May 1963,” 
‘Agenda/Conf/1/Amd. 3 15 May 1963,” and “Agenda/Conf/12 15 May 1963,” in in “Summit Conference of 
Independent African States. Proceedings of the Summit Conference of Independent African States, Volume 1, 
Section 1, Addis Ababa, May 1963.” RG 17/2/550. Bureau of African Affairs Collection, PRAAD. 
199 
 
come to his aid, the new Grunitzky regime in power in Togo, but its delegation was stopped by 
Ethiopian security forces from attending. The Ghanaian Foreign Minister was outraged and 
demanded explanations from the Ethiopian Government and strongly castigated every delegation 
that was behind their exclusion from the conference. Unashamed of the blatant hypocrisy, Botsio 
attempted to take the moral high ground. He argued that none present had the right to accept or 
deny another’s attendance at the conference by judgement of how an African state chose to deal 
with its internal affairs.643 By being the only state to argue for Togo’s attendance, Botsio further 
sank Ghana’s cause because he made it seem even more likely that Nkrumah was behind Togo’s 
change in government.  
Insulted by Botsio’s remarks, Guinea’s Foreign Minister immediately spoke up in protest. 
An invitation was indeed sent to Togo to attend, he conceded, but it was sent to Olympio and not 
Grunitzky. This invitation was obviously invalidated when Olympio was assassinated in dubious 
circumstances and replaced by a “puppet” regime claiming to represent Togo. Just before he 
ceded his turn to speak, the Guinean diplomat reminded Botsio that “political assassination has 
been condemned by all.”644 The Foreign Minister of Nigeria told the others that he could not 
allow Grunitzky’s delegation to attend because it was tantamount to his state’s recognition of the 
new regime. This was precisely not done by President Azikiwe because many of the states 
present at the conference decided at the Lagos conference after the murder that “they do no 
accept the principle of murder and assassination as a means of attaining power.”645 The issue was 
finally put to bed the next day as the Foreign Minister of Egypt decided not to come to Ghana’s 
aid. He took the floor and quickly exclaimed that enough time had been wasted discussing Togo 
before moving on to other business.646 Despite the presence of a Togolese delegation in Addis 
Ababa, they were kept from participating and potentially lending a hand to the Ghanaians. 
 The lobbying of the Ghanaian delegation and Botsio’s efforts to convince other foreign 
ministers of the idea of political unity failed as they were ignored and Ethiopia’s draft agenda for 
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the summit was made official. Despite the odds stacked against him, Nkrumah did not plan on 
backing down at the Addis Ababa Summit and he doubled down. To prepare his arrival at the 
conference, Nkrumah ordered Botsio to host a lavish party on the 19th at the Ghanaian embassy 
to celebrate the release of his new book making the case for political unification, Africa Must 
Unite, and invited all African foreign ministers and their staff. The evening did not draw the 
crowd as hoped as the foreign ministers of the Lagos Charter did not show because it was 
designed to promote political unity.647 Nkrumah arrived the next day and still must have had a 
glimpse of hope his personality could command the most attention. Upon landing, Haile Selassie, 
in a show of respect to the first host of an all-African conference, welcomed him personally at 
his aircraft. Nkrumah naturally took the opportunity to speak to the press in the Emperor’s 
presence and declare that he had arrived “to lay the foundation for the establishment of a Union 
of African States.”648 Nkrumah’s confidence was also boosted by the fact that he was the only 
one driven with Selassie to the Ghion Hotel where all heads of state were staying and given the 
room next to his.649 Once at the hotel, Nkrumah took advantage of the close proximity to meet 
with his Casablanca allies Nasser, Touré, and Keita to try to convince them of the need for 
political unity under a “strong centralised government.”650  
 From 23-25 May, the heads of state took turns to give their views on African unity and 
only Nkrumah made the case for political unity. The first to speak, Sékou Touré, argued that a 
charter establishing the new organisation should combine elements from the Casablanca and 
Lagos Charters. The second speaker, Léopold Senghor, pre-empted Nkrumah and stated that 
African unity with a central government under a federalised or confederative structure was 
totally unfeasible. Senghor’s statement held good weight with everyone at the conference given 
the failure of the Mali Federation a few years before. The other Brazzaville leaders then followed 
Senghor and gave similar statements.651 Nkrumah gave his impassioned address on the 25th and 
once again stressed that a truly independent Africa needed was a strong political union, a “Union 
Government of Africa” with a constitution to be drawn at a later date. A capital for the union was 
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also needed and he suggested Bangui or Léopoldville.652 Despite the passion of his speech, the 
next speakers proved to Nkrumah that no one was listening. Nasser then took the podium and 
stated that he desired African Unity to take shape in political and economic cooperation rather 
than a political union. Making amends with his previous irritating tactic of bringing issues from 
the Middle East into African forums, Nasser vowed to stop bringing up the problem of Israel in 
African forums.653 Modibo Keita spoke after Nasser and was followed by Julius Nyerere, King 
Idris of Libya, and François Tombalbaye of Chad. All agreed that it was much more reasonable 
to build African unity through political, economic, and social cooperation.654  
 Whilst the heads of state deliberated on 23-24 May, the foreign ministers were tasked to 
provide a draft charter to establish the new African organisation. Together they wrote a charter 
which demonstrated their leaders truly wanted to abolish the differences between groupings and 
wanted to establish a set of principles for all African states. In the draft charter finally defined the 
contentious term of African unity as “enabl[ing] the independance [sic] of peoples and their 
sovereignty to be safeguarded against colonialist activities and their sequels” as well the “co-
operation between nations and stability in Africa.” Its principles to adhere to were firm and clear: 
“a) sovereign equality of States; b) non-interference in the internal affairs of state; c) respect for 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and of its inalienable right to an 
independent existence […] e) unreserved condemnation of political assassination as a means of 
gaining power as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring States or any other 
States.”655 With these statements this draft paid homage to the Monrovia powers, but it also 
continued with passages important to the Casablanca powers: “g) absolute dedication to the 
complete emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent; h) affirmation of a 
policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs.”656 This draft, which was sent to all heads of 
state for 12 hours of perusal on the 25th, did not remotely signal that Africa was heading towards 
political unity as Nkrumah wanted. A very quick buffet dinner was arranged just past midnight 
on the 26th as the draft charter was being officially prepared, and after having eaten, every head 
of state entered the conference hall and took their turn to sign the charter officially founding the 
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Organisation of African Unity in the early hours.657 The Charter of the OAU finally put many 
arguments of the last six years to an end. 
A Definition of African Unity: the OAU Charter of 25 May 1963 
The aims of the summit at Addis Ababa were to negotiate an end to the rival groupings in 
African affairs because inter-African relations were suffering as a result of different beliefs and 
goals. The summit was therefore tackling the heart of the problem of inter-African relations, 
notably the contested ideas of unity, the goals the independent African states should have for the 
continent’s future, and setting some principles for the conduct of relations between African states 
to establish some clear ground rules. To make the groups come together as one, the states at the 
summit had to come up with a reasonable formula if it were to be accepted by all African states. 
A whole new institution ensuring the participation of all African states was therefore created 
with a name which clearly stated its purpose – the Organisation of Africa Unity. Underpinning 
the charter for the new institution was a clear and important set of beliefs they had all shared 
since the beginning of their independence. These included sweeping statements like the  
“[Dedication] to the general progress of Africa,” that “all African States should henceforth unite 
so that the welfare and wellbeing of their peoples can be assured,” their shared “determination to 
promote understanding among our peoples and cooperation among our states in response to the 
aspirations of our peoples for brother-hood and solidarity, in a larger unity transcending ethnic 
and national differences.” The most important for many also appeared in the preamble of the 
charter – their determination “to safeguard and consolidate the hard-won independence as well as 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our states, and to fight against neocolonialism in all its 
forms.”658 The establishment of the OAU also settled a question raised in April 1958 during the 
IAS conference – the geopolitical limits of Africa – with the founding statement that the 
organisation would only include for membership “the Continental African States, Madagascar 
and other Islands surrounding Africa.”659 
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An important matter which was settled at the founding of the OAU was the definition of 
‘unity’ which the debates from 1957 to 1961 came down to two rival ideas – unity by fusing 
states together under one leadership or the formation of a common front between independent 
states. In this regard the summit fell on the side of the Monrovia Group. The OAU’s designed 
purpose was to “promote the unity and solidarity of the African States” and at the same time 
“defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence” in their quests to achieve 
Africa’s goals like the eradication of any form of colonialism, the search for a better quality of 
life for their people, and for the and the “[promotion] of international cooperation.”660 The 
OAU’s last stated purpose was to “coordinate and harmonize their general policies” in matters of 
diplomacy, politics, defence, economic cooperation (including transport and 
telecommunications), cultural and educational matters, and health and sciences.661 Thus, the 
OAU’s design finally put the matter of what was meant by ‘unity’ to rest; the OAU was designed 
as a system of cooperation on African matters between independent African states.  
With the understanding of unity established, the OAU Charter turned to the important 
principles required to be adopted by its members in the conduct of relations with each other as 
they set out to fulfil the OAU’s mandate. The first three principles fell again in favour of the 
Monrovia states who had been victims of violations of their sovereignty: “1. The sovereign 
equality of all Member States. 2. Non-interference in the internal affairs of States. 3. Respect for 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent 
existence.” The Charter also provided some important principles dear to the members of the 
Casablanca Group – that members remain be totally devoted “to the total emancipation of the 
African territories which are still dependent” and that they all took “a policy of non-alignment 
with regard to all blocs.” One principle also recalled recent events in Togo and had to be 
observed in order to prevent chaos in other states – the “unreserved condemnation, in all its 
forms, of political assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring 
States or any other States.”662 One principle, the OAU’s fourth, (which was consequently closely 
tied to Article 7) introduced an important innovation absent from all principles ever enunciated 
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was that states did not have recourse to help from larger organisations to assist them with a 
conflict or dispute with another African state. All African states up until that point, were left to 
their own devices to settle disputes which unsurprisingly led to a rise in tensions in inter-African 
affairs. Thus, article 7 expanded on the UAM’s idea of arbitration used during the Gabon-Congo 
Brazzaville crisis by establishing an institution within the OAU called the Commission of 
Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration which allowed the African states the pathway to conflict 
resolution by taking the problem to the OAU instead of taking it on themselves.  
Another important matter was also put to rest at Addis Ababa because it was the first time 
since the April 1958 that all African leaders met each other in one location. One of the busiest 
African leaders at the conference, Mokhtar Ould Daddah, used it as an opportunity to seek out 
additional support for Mauritania’s claim in its conflict with Morocco. Daddah met with many 
Arab-African leaders including the two most influential Arab leaders and former members of the 
Casablanca Group, Gamal Abdel Nasser and Ahmed Ben Bella, for the first time to press his 
case. Given the tensions between Morocco and Algeria, Ben Bella told Daddah that he could not 
make any public statements on the matter for fear of making matters worse between the two. 
However, Ben Bella told the Mauritanian leader that he was on his side of the dispute and vowed 
to discreetly help him.663 Nasser was apologetic during his meeting with Daddah, and they talked 
for over an hour in private. Nasser confided that he threw Egypt’s support behind the late 
Mohammed V at an Arab League summit in August 1960 on the issue because he had only heard 
Morocco’s side of the story since Tunisia was still boycotting the Arab League. Nasser promised 
Daddah to kick off a series of steps for the next year which would culminate with Mauritania’s 
de jure recognition by Egypt. Nasser explained it was necessary for him to distance himself from 
the Arab League’s decision not to recognise Mauritania.664 Gone from this charter were Nasser’s 
own famous resolutions relating to foreign causes beyond the African continent. No mention of 
Palestine, Israel, or even the Bandung principles are made in the Charter of the OAU, showing 
that Nasser had finally come to terms with the geopolitical limits of the African continent. Nasser 
also used the opportunity of the gathering of every African leader and decided to put a halt on his 
rivalry with Bourguiba.  
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Daddah ran into Hassan II and once again turned him down on an offer of forming a 
federation with Morocco and reminded him the only basis on which any talks could start was 
Morocco’s recognition of Mauritania as a sovereign state.665 This started a spat at the summit 
between the two, culminating with Hassan II refusing to take part at the OAU Charter’s signing 
ceremony. Hassan II refused to sign if the Mauritanians were going to. Morocco eventually 
signed the charter in September 1963 only after being allowed to caveat their signature with 
Hassan II’s disagreement of the Charter’s provisions on the respect of African borders because 
he felt they were an artificial colonial imposition.666 Hassan thus earned a defeat at the summit 
because he failed to gain recognition for his claims on Mauritania, but he was not the only loser. 
After signing his name on the OAU Charter, a defeated Nkrumah was too proud to recognise his 
lowered status. Nkrumah – as a result of his own inept foreign policy – sabotaged his status as 
Africa’s pre-eminent leader and failed to create the unity he desired. As the ink dried on the 
charter, he tried to spin his defeat into a victory by telling the other leaders and the press in the 
conference hall that this moment was merely the start of unity and that true political unity was 
not far.667 Nkrumah did return to Accra and refused to believe he had lost in his struggle to bring 
to life his vision for Africa. In the following years elaborated a constitution for an African super-
state, and up to his ouster from power in February 1966 he found no willing takers among other 
African nations.668  
Conclusion 
Throughout the story of the tumultuous inter-African relations between 1957 and 1963, 
never did an independent African state deviate from the shared continental goal to cooperate to 
bring an end to colonialism in Africa. As the previous chapters show, it was not this goal that 
was the cause of friction in inter-African relations, but the means through which many African 
leaders chose to try to reach this end. The foreign policies of African states in this period were 
therefore of tremendous importance because they yielded the most enduring and important 
document in post-colonial African history, the Charter of the OAU. The emphasis given on 
problems relating to the effects of the foreign policies of African states during the drafting of the 
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OAU charter is a testament to the difficult experience of Africa’s step into the post-colonial age. 
Despite the wishes of the framers and signatories to give the document an international 
dimension, much more time was spent on framing the rules of the game to regulate inter-African 
relations to put an end to a period of political strife that spanned six years. Most importantly, the 
traumatic experience of states like Senegal, Mauritania, and Togo who witnessed foreign 
intervention in their states’ affairs highlighted the difficult and often weak connections between 
the new regimes and their domestic polity. The charter acknowledged the problem of state 
building where tumultuous domestic politics met foreign policymaking and established an 
important rule to forbid states from intervening in the affairs of others. No longer would it be 
acceptable for states to undermine others by interfering in their affairs as they had to respect each 
other’s sovereignty. For this reason, the document signalled the widespread acceptance on the 
continent that Africa was now made up of a nation-state system.   
The antagonisms underpinning continental politics up to and including the signing of the 
OAU charter created very satisfied winners, and very bitter losers including in their ranks the 
protagonists to this story. The most energetic supporter and standard bearer for the goal of 
ridding Africa of colonialism, Kwame Nkrumah, believed that he alone possessed the foresight 
to build a large political unit with a centralised power structure that could ensure the liquidation 
of the rest of the continent. What is certainly tragic is that while he was never doubted for his 
powerful hatred of colonialism throughout his entire life, he never realised that he contradicted 
his own beliefs by engaging in similar behaviour as the colonial powers in his drive to make his 
dream a reality. Starting out in this story as the most charismatic leader to emerge in the hunt for 
the title of Africa’s leading anticolonial figure, his contemporaries increasingly viewed him with 
contempt as he put into motion a cavaliering foreign policy. His negative attitude to Gamal 
Abdel Nasser’s arrival in African affairs was one of pure jealousy as Nasser had simply achieved 
more on the world stage by virtue of reaching power and independence first. The tensions and 
competition that arose between the two charismatic anticolonial figures soured inter-African 
relations at a time when many hopeful African leaders were watching. The only lesson the 
watching African sates could learn from this rivalry was that there were figures in African 
politics who simply would not share power or cooperate on equal terms in their quest to lead 
African anticolonial efforts. Nkrumah paid dearly for his dreadful behavior in African affairs, 
and documents in the Ghanaian archives and in Washington convey the clear impression that he 
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simply could not come to terms with how he managed to lose the faith of his polity – once so 
united behind him – his influence on the continent, and his prominence in anticolonial matters as 
quickly as he did.  
The reign of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the hero of Bandung and the Suez War, began on very 
shaky grounds. Seizing power at a very opportune moment in Egyptian politics, he was 
immediately disliked in his society for crushing their democratic rights and called ‘Colonel 
Jimmy’ for cozying up to the hated Americans in his quest to gain financial and military aid for 
his state. Lucky to escape unscathed from two unsuccessful coups within his own military, 
Nasser understood that he needed to urgently address his lack of popularity in the military and 
wider public. His successful solution showed him to be one of the most astute students of 
statecraft in the Third World. He skillfully engineered a successful grand strategy where he 
satiated the needs of his state, his polity, and the most dangerous element in Egyptian politics, 
the military. An important facet of this grand strategy was to fashion the Egyptian state a new 
identity as the leading anticolonial actor on the world stage which brought him immense 
domestic popularity. Nasser, however, was very much a victim of his own success. In his quest 
to reinforce his anticolonial credentials on so many fronts he spread Egyptian influence too thin. 
As a result, he was left to ‘tag along’ or ‘ride on someone else’s coattails on issues where only 
his persona could lend a measure of influence as he did not have the resources to bring into play. 
Nasser, simply put, had his fingers in much too many anticolonial pies and conflict areas in 
which he had deeply invested the Egyptian state. The list is long and costly, with Egypt being 
involved – if not entangled – in the Maghreb, Sudan, Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Libya, 
Jordan, Palestine/Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the Non-Aligned Movement with his partner Josip 
Broz Tito. Choices were made on where his attention, and most importantly where he could 
spend his state’s resources, and Africa became less important after the formation of the 
Casablanca Bloc and the intensification of the conflict in Yemen. From this point onwards he 
realised not only that he needed to focus more on the Arab front and make his peace with the 
events unravelling in Africa. Besides, he certainly thought, he had done his most important work 
helping Algeria find independence.  
Senghor, who emerges as the clear winner from this story, was the important lynchpin on 
which African affairs began to swing in the direction of the foundation of the OAU. In hindsight 
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there could not have been a poorer horse to gamble on to take the role of most important figure 
in African political developments. Presiding over a state poor in resources and a deeply divided 
polity, he luckily escaped the trap set by his unruly neighbor Modibo Keita in the last hours of 
the Mali Federation. An early advocate for federation as a means to end France’s colonial hold 
on its territories in Africa, the split of the Mali Federation made him rethink how he could 
achieve this goal. In the wake of the split he also became the leading voice in Africa against 
ideas of any form of unity by readily pointing to the Mali Federation’s smoking ruins. His near 
removal from power by Keita also helped convince any leader still on the fence about such plans 
and he was thus able to draw others to his side. Since the 1940s Senghor had tirelessly militated 
for a reformed agreement between the French territories in Africa that would see Africans 
respected as equals. Ever the master of the ‘trial and error’ method, he had failed to do so from 
inside France’s political system, from the AOF, and from the independent Mali Federation.  His 
new solution needed to be different and ground-breaking, and it reflected his experience leading 
the Senegalese state. Senegal needed to promote cooperation as equals in the African political 
scene whilst being more repressive at home. Not only would this prevent coup attempts and 
deflect any possible external meddling in one’s home affairs, but a large cluster of independent 
African states could attract attention from Europe and hope to be treated as equals. Tragically, 
the popularity rose for this solution and was widely adopted by other African states and helped to 
build the consensus on establishing the nation-state system that reigned at the OAU summit. 
Senghor’s new foreign policy ended up being the winning strategy and it was made much easier 
for it to win out as Nkrumah and Nasser made more and more enemies on the African continent. 
The UAM, Senghor’s brainchild, also got the attention of the European powers which dealt with 
Senegal with a respect befitting an independent state during successful talks on economic 
development. Finally, after years of trying, Senghor could boast that he at last realised his 
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